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Foreword
Bottlenecks and the Ways Out

John K. Roth
Despair is no solution. The solution lies in analysis, in hard thinking and
questioning, and in purposeful and informed action. To that goal this
book is dedicated.
- Michael Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann,

The Coming Age of Scarcity

what they need or want, terrifying sights
often follow. Scarcity is grim. Of course, scarcity and scarcity are not the
same. The former refers to a condition in which something may be in
short supply, but in principle nothing prevents that obstacle from being
overcome . Such scarcity can encourage hard work for what is wanted. It
may spark progress that provides what is lacking. It may even be wealth's
partner, because fortunes have been made in finding ways out of need.
Scarcity of this kind is not too much for optimistic hopes to bear, but what
if scarcity runs deeper? What if scarcity means not a temporary shortfall
or a relative lack of what people need or want? Could there be scarcity,
not a condition in which things we need or want have just run low or run
out temporarily, but one in which those things are gone beyond replenishing? If the answer is yes, then scarcity might as well be a four-letter word,
because it keeps company with the most obscene characteristics ofits closest kin: poverty, disease, greed, exploitation, war, ethnic cleansing, and
genocide.
Although this book explores scarcity's multiple dimensions, its most
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profound concern is not about temporarily short supplies. Concentrating
on scarcity of the more basic and unforgiving kind, it focuses on consumption-driven and wealth-obsessed human policies that are taking us
not just to "the edge of scarcity," as the book's title puts it, but over tl1e
edge and into circumstances that we are extremely reluctant to acknowledge, let alone correct. Thus, as I consider the articles tl1at Michael
Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann have published in this timely revision of
their book, I remember two fascinating figures in Western civilization. As
important as they are different, one is named Cassandra, the other
Wittgenstein.
Greek mythology identifies Cassandra as the daughter of King Priam
and Queen Hecuba of Troy. Loving Cassandra, the god Apollo, whose
domains included light and truth, bestowed the gift of prophecy upon her,
but when she did not return his love, Apollo took cunning revenge. Although Cassandra got to keep her gift of prophecy, which frequently produced warnings about tragic consequences if her words went unheeded,
Apollo ensured that no one would believe her truthful forecasts. Nevertheless, the Trojans and their Greek conquerors disbelieved Cassandra at
their peril.
The social scientists and humanities scholars who have written the essays that follow are latter-day Cassandras. We should hope, however, that
such a description fits them only in part. My reading suggests tl1at, like the
Cassandra of old, gifts of light, truth, and prophecy have been bestowed
upon them-not by a god but through their hard thinking and question ing. The issue is whether their insights and warnings about scarcity will be
disbelieved and dismissed as Cassandra's forecasts were-not because
some divinity has taken cunning revenge but because the self-assurance of
those people who control the lion's share of the world's wealth and power
will prevent them from apprehending the dire straits that lie ahead.
Only when it was too late did people realize that Cassandra knew what
was going on. That fate does not have to be ours where scarcity is concerned, and here is where Ludwig Wittgenstein comes in. Arguably the
twentieth century's preeminent philosopher, Wittgenstein is famous for
saying that the aim of philosophy should be to show "the fly the way out
of the fly-bottle." He envisioned a scene where a fly had unwittingly flown
tl1rough the neck of a bottle and could not find the way out. There was a
way out, but buzzing around to the point of exhaustion and death, the fly
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could not find it. With help, however, the outcome might have been
different.
Dobkowski and Wallimann write about impending bottlenecks that
put us in potentially catastrophic circumstances . They see four factorspopulation growth and constraints on land resources, energy, and environmental carrying capacity- converging in new ways to produce
"absolute deficiencies" and "impenetrable limits" that cannot be overcome by the capitalist market system, increased productivity, or scientific
progress. So it was that my reading of this book made me think of
Wittgenstein and his fly-bottle, which provides an apt metaphor for the
human condition as the twenty-first century unfolds . Without realizing or
intending it, indeed thinking we are doing exactly the opposite, we may
have flown into scarcity's fly-bottle. Without help, we may not find good
ways out. Fortunately, the contributors to this book share Wittgenstein's
motivation. Their essays often have special sections that map ways out of
the dilemmas they foresee. The ways out, of course, will not be recognized, let alone followed, unless the problem analyses that contextualize
them are taken seriously. Wittgenstein cannot help if Cassandra is not believed. The contributors to this book play both of those parts admirably.
The book's outcome now depends on what its readers do.
The Coming Age of Scarcity was the title for this book's first edition,
which appeared in 1998. With the twenty-first century under way, editors
Dobkowski and Wallimann revised that title while the essayists reworked
their articles. Neither the new title, On the Edge of Scarcity, nor the updated essays are causes for optimism. For the edge of scarcity, especially if
people do not think that is where we are, is more immediately ominous
and threatening than an age of scarcity vaguely described as coming but
not yet here . My foreword in the first edition of this book said that The
Coming Age of Scarcity scared me. It did so because I believed what
Dobkowski and Wallimann wrote in their introductory essay. Those
words, which are only slightly modified in the new edition, packed the following punch: "The genocides of the twentieth century have unveiled the
true heart of humanity. At our center lies an ability to commit evil of an almost unimagined degree .. . . The unthinkable has already happened; the
idea of future catastrophes is therefore not unthinkable."
Much of what I said about The Coming Age of Scarcity holds true for
On the Edge of Scarcity as well. Like the first edition, the second deals with
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evil. It documents ethnic cleansing and excavates the world's killing fields.
Sadly, it anticipates mass death and genocide in the twenty-first century
even while trying to prevent them.
The contributors to these pages know evil when they see it. They intend for their readers to see it, too . They succeed- so much so that this
book does more than scare me. It leaves me depressed, almost to the point
of despair. Perhaps it will do the same for you. The world's expanding
megacities and refugee hordes, as well as pressures for and protests against
immigration, are only one sign of an unrelenting global population
crunch, which increasingly leaves the world with more people than anyone
needs. A world with more people than anyone needs is a deadly place. It is
a stage set perpetually for mass death and genocide. Surplus people are
only one of the preconditions for mass death and genocide. Roger Smith's
essay rightly argues that scarcity is another. As this entire book suggests,
moreover, the specter of scarcity-most of it human made-is likely to be
even worse in the twenty-first century than it was in the twentieth. That
judgment is credible in spite of the hosannas sung to globalization, unfettered markets, and economic prosperity that are touted as "really different
this time," as if contemporary monetary and business policies have abolished severe economic downturns, and as if the solution for the growing
disparity between rich and poor is a high-tech tide that deceptively promises to raise all boats. Especially in an increasingly materialistic United
States and among privileged young people who are short on memory,
prone to take unprecedented economic prosperity for granted, and bombarded by promises that there are no limits to future standards ofliving, it
will not be easy for On the Edge of Scarcity to get the hearing it deserves.
Reminiscent of Cassandra's world, that result will come at humanity's
peril. As far as human-made deaths are concerned, no century has been
more devastating than the twentieth . The political scientist R. J. Rummel,
who tallies the statistics of mass death unleashed by human power, helped
to document that fact in his 1994 book, Death by Government. Written before genocide in Rwanda and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo added to the
devastation in the 1990s, Rummel estimated that "the human cost of war
and democide together"- the latter distinguished from war-battle dead
and defined as "the murder of any person or people by a government," including genocide and other atrocities-reached more than 203 million in
the twentieth century. Although "Never again!" still resounds after
Auschwitz, post-Holocaust history has nearly turned that cry into an all-
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too-hollow cliche . The fact is that genocidal killing has taken more lives
since the Holocaust ended than it did in the first half of the twentieth century. The arrival of a new century, moreover, will probably not bring relief.
The twenty-first century threatens to produce even more human-made
death than the twentieth.
At least thus far, attempts to prosecute those people who have been
accused of genocidal crimes against humanity in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia do not inspire confidence that the threat of arrest and punishment will do much to deter genocide's fury. Nor can one take heart from
the observation that projections about the future are uncertain because
history is always full of surprises. As historical analysis helps to make depressingly clear, more often than not history's surprises are lethal to the
point of catastrophe.
In every contribution to this book there are plenty of reasons for despair. John B. Cobb Jr. clearly analyzes developments in the United States
that are producing an underclass of the permanently unemployed. This
underclass, he rightly fears, is likely to be regarded not only as superfluous
but also as cancerous. The prescribed treatment is unlikely to be kindhearted. Kurt Finsterbusch shows how scarcity creates social inequality,
which threatens democracy. Waltraud Morales underscores that violence
thrives when economic deprivation prevails. The impact on women and
children, in particular, is devastating. Ted Trainer regards present society
as unsustainable, Virginia Abernethy sees incivility and disrespect for law
stalking U.S . life in the twenty-first century, and Chris Lewis appraises
what he sees as "the collapse of globalized modern industrial civilization."
These examples illustrate the fact that each essay contains nasty surprises
for those readers who tl1ink the future will be benignly open forever.
On the Edge of Scarcity drives home the sobering point that, in one
way or another, we are approaching the end of the human world as we
have known it. Do not misunderstand: An apocalyptic doomsday is not at
hand. The world is not going to end anytime soon, but times on the edge
of scarcity are changing decisively nonetheless.
Sometimes the ending of an era is a cause for celebration. Ironically, in
an age of mass death and genocide, such a conclusion would be unrealistic. The conditions accounting for our deadly age will die hard. As if tl1ey
realize how unpopular their views may be, tl1e essayists are aware of the
Cassandra-like reception they may get. Far from a diminished sense of
purpose, however, they feel an urgency that intensifies their efforts. What-
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ever happens, including even the corrective and constructive changes that
the authors recommend, the shifts are likely to be wrenching and violent.
Things will get worse before they get better-if they do get better. One
reason is that for too long too many of us, including even people who have
the means to buy this book and the time to read it, have enjoyed the world
that is too much with us. Much as we deplore mass death and genocide,
we will still find it extremely difficult to bring about the global changes
that are needed to check it. Even while trying to prevent mass death and
genocide in the twenty-first century, we may also resist the changes-especially economic ones-that are really needed to eliminate them .
The many beneficiaries of existing circumstances will not set aside
their privileges easily any more than the wretched of the earth will placidly
accept their desperate conditions of scarcity. As the pressures mount, and
they will, parties on all sides are going to defend their interests. In too
many cases, moreover, the defense will be by any means-wrenching and
violent-that are perceived as necessary. History may prove such judgments wrong, but that outcome would be so surprising that only the fool ish bank on it.
This book calls forth dark moods within me. Nevertheless, it evokes
other moods as well. Perhaps it will do the same for you. At least in my
case, these "and yet" moods are neither removed from nor located beyond
the darkness with which this book engulfs me . Their movement is a stirring within that darkness, but the movement is not easily named. What I
feel is not captured by words such as hope or conviction, and even less do
my feelings contain much that a glib word such as optimism implies. The
stirring aroused within me by On the Edge of Scarcity is best expressed in
the negative . It is reflected in the words from Michael Dobkowski and
Isidor Wallimann that are quoted at the beginning of this foreword : "Despair is no solution."
As I explore my feelings and write the words that they have provoked
here, I do so as a philosopher and teacher who has spent most of a thirtyfive-year academic career studying the damage that the Holocaust and
other forms of genocide have done. Reflecting on the essays in this book,
I have been reminded once more that teachers-and sometimes their students, too- are constantly stalked by despair. How could we not be?
Most teachers are idealists . However jaded we may become, most of
us became teachers because we wanted to mend the world. That hope,
however, encounters discouragement aplenty. History, especially geno-
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cide's history, provides it. So does teaching, which is a less-than-reassuring
activity when humankind's future is at stake.
We are all beginners every day. No matter how hard we teachers try,
indifference persists, prejudice remains, ignorance endures, and no place
on earth guarantees safety from the destruction that such forces can unleash. Education's gains take place against stiff odds; learning is not a matter of evolutionary progress. Every year, every class, means starting over
because wisdom does not accumulate. Teachers often know how Cassandra must have felt.
Teaching about the Holocaust and genocide makes me more melancholy than I used to be. It makes me realize how much despair lurks
around every classroom door. Even more, however, such teaching makes
me understand that those recognitions are not the conclusion, but instead
they must be the stirring in the midst of darkness, the insistence affirming
that despair is not the solution. To let despair have its way would be to give
every genocidal act a victory that it does not deserve and must not have.
Where scarcity, mass death, and genocide are concerned, however,
what is the solution? Is there such a thing? Perhaps, but if so, what ingredients does it contain? Responses to those questions-good and thoughtful ones-are found in this book's pages, especially in the essay sections
called "Ways Out." Those responses start with the editors' insistence that
"the solution lies in analysis, in hard thinking and questioning, and in purposeful and informed action," which are the goals to which this book is
dedicated. Beyond that, I will not further identify the ways out that the authors suggest. It is better for you to discover and test them on your own.
As a prelude to those proposed ways out of the impending and deadly bottlenecks that are being produced by population growth and constraints on
land resources, energy, and the environment, I will add only two more
words of anticipation: a warning and then a fact.
The warning: "If we stop remembering," says Holocaust survivor Elie
Wiesel, "we stop being." The memory and analysis of scarcity, mass deatl1,
and genocide found in this book warn against despair. If we do better than
Cassandra's listeners, the effect of tl1at warning can be to sensitize us
against indifference, which is despair's best friend and evil's welcome accomplice. As for the fact, the essays in this book can sensitize us against despair and indifference because history shows that the threats of mass death
and genocide are human made. Those threats are not inevitable, and no
events related to them ever will be. Mass death and genocide-and usually
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scarcity, too-emerge from decisions and institutions that depend on ordinary human beings, on people like us who are responsible for our ac tions and who could act differently and better than we often do.
If we heed the warning and do not deny tl1e fact-especially in an age
of scarcity, mass death, and genocide-then we will keep working to mend
the world's broken heart, and perhaps we will find our way out of scarcity's
fly-bottle after all. In spite of much ofits content, then, this book awakens,
haunts, and challenges me in ways tl1at I ignore at everyone's peril. I bet it
will do the same for you.
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Introduction
On the Edge of Scarcity

Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Wallimann

one of the most pressing and significant issues
that humanity has been confronted with so far. Yet, despite the compelling
nature of the problem, only few attempts are under way to analyze the
dangers we face and to develop strategies designed to avert the looming
catastrophe. We would like to maintain that world industrialization and
urbanization and its associated social system and techniques-such as the
universal market system or centralized planning bureaucracies-cannot be
sustained except for a relatively few privileged people and at the cost of increased mass death, which may include genocide . The alternative, namely,
to abandon the global industrialization project and to begin a move away
from industrial society as it is known today, equally entails a risk of mass
death on a tremendous scale .
It is true that modernization and industrialization have confronted us
with many great problems before while millions have been forced into
deprivation, poverty, wars, and premature death. In the course of modernization worldwide, however, the world population has nevertheless
grown significantly. Therefore, one might be tempted to conclude tl1at
tl1e social and economic systems that have laid the paths and been the engines for industrialization will again respond in time to avert the anticipated mass death and increasing spiral of human self-destruction on a scale
never witnessed so far. However, this attitude would indeed be fateful to
assume.
As social scientists and humanists, we are thus well advised to speedily
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Introduction

reconsider our priorities and to increasingly engage in a kind of scientific
praxis that is explicitly directed toward the preservation of life, at home
and elsewhere in our global society. But what exactly is the problem that
confronts us? What are the anticipated bottlenecks based upon which one
could say that traditional modernization will come to an end? What are tl1e
bottlenecks that could lead to mass deatl1? In an attempt to address these
questions, let us first turn to a short discussion of industrialization.

Industrialization
It is important to recall that the great transformation from agricultural to
modern, urban, and industrial societies has always been financed on the
backs of peasants both in the nineteenth century, in the area that is now
known as the center, and in the twentieth century, in the area now known
as the periphery. Whether this transfer of value from the agricultural sector
has been achieved with political and bureaucratic means or through the indirect and anonymous coercion of market systems, the truth remains that
the surplus value produced in agriculture alone financed industrial production and made urban and industrial life sustainable . This statement is
not to deny that agriculture simultaneously became more productive
owing, in part, to the very growth in the urban -based sciences and industrial production it had financed. However, much of this "great transformation" has always been associated with immense hardship on the
peasantry, be it for the many who remained in rural areas or for those people who migrated as wage laborers to the growing cities. Much premature
death because of poverty, disease, and lack of medical attention went hand
in hand with drastic improvements in the life expectancy, particularly for
infants. Thus, the age structure of the population was shifted to a median
age of twenty, or even below, whereas life expectancy at birth rose to about
sixty years.

Population Growth
All industrialization has been associated with significant population
growth. The world's population roughly doubled from 1750 to 1900 and
again from 1900 to 1950. In 1800 it still took far more than a hundred
years for the world population to double . Today it takes only thirty-eight
years . Some 1.7 billion people inhabited this planet in 1900. In 1990 it
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was 5.3 billion, and in the year 2025 we shall have 8 .5 billion. Only about
one-fifth of the world's population lives in the fully transformed and industrialized part of the world, including Eastern Europe. About two-fifths
alone live in India and China, giving China a slightly larger population
than India. Sixty percent of the world's population lives in Asia, about 9
percent in Latin America, and about 12 percent in Africa. The reasons for
the ever faster population growth are well known. Although birthrates
have tended to decline, they have not decreased fast enough to compensate for the gains owing to lower infant mortality and the general increase
in life expectancy. These gains have been made possible not by high-tech
medicine, but by relatively simple techniques, such as an improved diet,
better control over bacterial environments (general hygiene, water supply,
food storage, and antibiotics), and by vaccinations against various contagious and other diseases. The worldwide knowledge of these techniques,
the possibility for their widespread deployment at a low cost, world information on social and medical problems, political pressure, the need for social control, and human compassion have been major causes for the ever
accelerating population growth. Presently, it is not expected that AIDS or
diseases such as cholera or tuberculosis, although growing, will significantly alter the rate of population growth in the near future.
One of the correlates of modernization has been that birthrates decrease with increased urbanization and a higher standard ofliving. Experience in the fully transformed industrial countries generally has shown that
population growth tends to stabilize at a low positive rate and that some
countries even have slightly negative growtl1 rates . This experience leads
to the notion that, once the world will be transformed into modernity, industrialized, and economically developed, the world population too will
be stabilized in its growth. Of course, the crucial assumption made here is
that it is possible to provide the world with tl1e standard of living of industrial countries, irrespective of the economic systems-particularly capitalism, which chronically tends toward overproduction and crisis-and
ecological considerations .
Experience shows that most campaigns to more swiftly reduce the
birthrate are successful only in societies with a sufficiently high standard of
living. However, they can also be successful in relatively poor societies
with a low standard of living if, and only if, social and economic justice is
simultaneously given a high priority. The more vulnerable people become
economically, and the more they are threatened by modernization and in-
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dustrialization, the more they are inclined to adhere to birthrates that en hance population growth. This pattern is often seen as an example of irrational behavior. Allegedly, it prevents families from accumulating the
human, social, and financial capital needed for the family's economic improvement, and it is said to annul all productivity gains made on the
macrolevel to improve the standard of living. However, as is well known
among development workers and agricultural specialists, when people
must live at the margins of existence, they tend to minimize risks and not
to maximize profits and accumulation. By adhering to higher birthrates,
they aim to spread severe existential risks to more people, which from their
point of view is a reasonable thing to do.
However, it is also true that women often give birth to more children
than they desire, and that the children are required for the family's survival
and successful reproduction. Because this condition is usually induced by
gender inequality, it follows that birthrates can also be reduced in part by
strengthening the position of women in society. In sum, without sufficient
equality on the micro-and macrolevels, there is little hope to reduce the
birthrate sufficiently for population growth to level off.
Migration and Employment

Because the transformation reduces the percentage of the population employed in agriculture, and because insufficient alternative employment is
available in rural areas, people have migrated to cities. The nineteenthcentury transformation of agricultural society channeled migrants into in dustrial work- to the extent that they found employment at all. The
tertiary, mostly service, sector was developed later. Today, just the opposite is true . The formal economy favors the expansion of services. In addi tion, the huge informal economic activity belongs itself more to the
tertiary than to the secondary sector. This pattern seems to confirm the
notion that we are far from growing into a true world industrial society.
Displaced from agricultural occupations, people end up with few perspectives and no vision that can make them feel part of a new era, involving
such things as the creation of nation-states, industrial production, and
mobility, which were characteristic of the nineteenth century.
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Energy and Other Resources
Thus far, all industrialization and urbanization have been associated with
an increased use of energy, directly and indirectly replacing the human and
animal energy used in production and distribution, expanding the sphere
of unnecessary consumption, and allowing for world markets and their
corollary, the world division of labor. This expansion of world trade and
the world division of labor is, of course, again a precondition for world
industrialization.
World energy consumption, although increasing, remained relatively
low until 1950. From 1950 to 1990, however, the use of energy increased
sevenfold, far outpacing the population, which approximately doubled
during the same period. Most of this increase came from the use of fossil
fuels, of which oil and gas constituted the largest share. The contribution
of atomic and hydroelectric power to the world's energy supply is only
about 15 percent.
As the gross national product (GNP) per capita grows, so does the use
of energy. Therefore, one-fifth of the world's population uses about fourfifths of tl1e world's energy, most of it as industrial fuels. Traditional fuels
(wood, peat, and dung) supply about 5 percent of the world's energy and
are almost entirely (85 percent) used in peripheral countries. At the present rate of use, it is estimated that the world has oil for another 40- 60
years, gas for another 60-80, and coal for another 660 years. Coal supplies
about a third of today's energy.
It is not possible here to address the future supply of all resources such
as minerals and water. It is important, however, to mention that the arable
land available for tl1e production of food and fibers tends to shrink. Any
expansion will be possible only at the expense of forests or grasslands,
jeopardizing other resources, particularly water and topsoil. Any increases
in the agricultural output would, therefore, have to come from different
growing techniques, pest controls, irrigation, the use of fertilizers and
plant breeding.
Bottlenecks: A Historically Unique
Constellation
Impending bottlenecks center in population growth, land resources, energy, and environmental constraints . What is most crucial is that we have
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never found ourselves in a situation in which all four factors are so closely
linked. Sure, we have had a growing population and population pressures
before, but there has always been more land to be cultivated. Sure, we
have had large populations to care for before, but more energy-intensive
agricultural production and improvements in plant breeding have always
been possible. Sure, we have had the need for more energy before, but
there has always been some new oil field just a few feet below the ground.
Sure, we have had all these pressures before. But have we experienced
them as impenetrable limits, as absolute deficiencies of land and energy?
Have we experienced them all at the same time and as impenetrable limits/
Certainly not. Have we ever simultaneously experienced such severe land
and energy limits and also faced the real danger of an ecological collapse?
Again, certainly not.
Today, this planet counts some 6 billion people. In 2025, it will contain 8.5 billion. Beyond 2025, we do not know how much the population
will grow. Current opinion tends to assume that, as a result of economic
development, the birthrate will "automatically" fall to about two children
per family before 2050, a level now observed for transformed countries.
This assumption is very unrealistic. But even if the assumption should
prove correct, the population is expected to reach 9 .5 billion in 2050 and
to level off at about 10 billion in 2075. However, by then, we shall also
have exhausted the presently known oil reserves, or about 30 percent of
today's energy supply. And by 2075, we shall further have exhausted the
presently known gas supply, or (together with oil) about one-half of
today's energy supply, although owing to population growth, we shall also
have reduced the per capita energy consumption by about 40 percent.
The energy crunch is made worse by environmental limits. The degree
we have been using fossil fuels is changing our ecosystem and the
which
to
human, animal, and plant reproduction and survival patterns that have for
centuries been built around it. The lives of millions are increasingly at risk
if sea levels begin to rise and glaciers melt. It is estimated that 30 percent
of the world's population lives in a thirty-mile-wide coastal strip and is
concentrated in Asia and Europe. Millions of people would have to be relocated as environmental refugees, their lives would be threatened by
floods and tidal waves, more fertile arable land would be lost, and tl1e erosion inland would be more severe owing to increased rains.
Finally, the tremendous food pressures must be reiterated. We can cultivate the land more intensively and turn our lawns into vegetable gardens,
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but how many millions more can be fed by such measures? We may resort
to the oceans for protein, but oceans are already overfished. We may turn
away from animal protein to feed more people with the same amount of
grain, but this reserve applies only to the transformed world and becomes
increasingly insignificant as the Third World population grows. We may
resort to ocean farming, greenhouse and hydroponic production, but can
we compensate for the destruction of agricultural lands because of overuse
and overexposure to wind and water? Can we compensate for the loss in
land because of urbanization and the increased demand for housing? Can
we compensate for the loss in plant growth and crop yield because of increased ultraviolet radiation? We do not believe that these challenges will
be met without bottlenecks that may cost the lives of millions.
It seems evident now that there will be a temporal conjunction of four
sizable bottlenecks: population, land, energy, and environmental carrying
capacity. All of them are so intricately related that they form a system complexity whose very balance has never been so delicate yet so important to
our survival. Therefore, we must also distinguish between bottlenecks that
present continuous but stable challenges and the ones that represent discontinuous and unstable challenges. Population growth, for example, is a
challenge with great continuity. However, as we approach the question of
energy and land, particularly if environmental pressures are included, we
can increasingly expect challenges characterized by discontinuity. Even
though energy resources may not be depleted, the supply of energy could
for technological, political, or economic reasons become highly discontinuous. Agricultural land may increasingly go out of commission in a discontinuous way, be it because of events such as droughts, floods, erosion,
or drastic overuse . As the system reaches an ever greater complexity, and as
survival hinges ever more and with small margins on this complexity, any
jolt to the system is bound to make survival more immediately a matter of
life and death.
Furtl1ermore, the jolts emitted by the economic system are also ofimportance, for production factors such as population, land, energy, as well
as many environmental constraints are mediated and coordinated by markets. Markets, however, are also known to have a great deal of discontinuity owing to the anonymous number of their participants and the
unforeseeable outcome produced by their myriad market interactions.
Thus, tl1e capitalist market, the very technique chosen to manage survival,
is itself a threat to survival, as is exemplified by speculation, recessions, and
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depressions, booms and busts. Market dynamics themselves upset the delicate balance among land, energy, population, and the environment, and
thereby directly determine survival and death rates.
Additionally, techniques to ensure continuity in a world of random but
significant disturbances may break down. Already insurance companies
suspect that a number of weather-related events may have ceased to be sufficiently random or insignificant or both to be insured. The private market
insurance system may soon prove unable to ensure against certain ecosystem risks. The instability would thereby increase, leaving politics as the last
potential guarantor of continuity and stability, as is already the case with
atomic power plants, where no private insurer is willing to cover the entire
risk, nor could such risk be covered. However, how many big risks, should
the event and the scarcity associated with them occur, can the political system handle before solidarity breaks down, instability increases, conflicts
grow, and massive death results?
In times of growth and system expansion, potential conflicts can more
likely be ignored, for their resolution is relatively easy. Everybody can
come up witl1 Pareto-type conflict resolutions. The going gets much
tougher, though, and more lives are at stake, when conflicts await resolution during system contraction, increased scarcity, and shrinking surpluses. First, the number and severity of conflicts tend to increase. Second,
conflict potentials can no longer be as easily ignored, for, should they
erupt, the disturbance would only augment the scarcity and make any resolution increasingly and unnecessarily more difficult. Third, resolutions to
conflicts are politically and economically much harder to find in times of
general scarcity and contraction.
Presently, our world still relies on expansion and Pareto-type conflict
resolutions. International exchange and free trade are thus enhanced, as is
evident by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the
World Trade Organization (WTO). Furthermore, Eastern Europe, once a
highly self-sufficient economic and political system, is being dismantled
and integrated witl1 the world division of labor. China, though still selfsufficient, may because of its participation in international trade and communication also become more unstable and be pressured to further
expand market relations.
Capitalism, which is now the world's dominant political and economic system, thrives on market expansion. However, how compatible is
capitalism with the long-term zero-or negative-growth environment of
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the future? It is incompatible! Not only does capitalism have great difficulty in handling such conditions, economically and politically, but it also
has, for the same reasons, difficulty in preparing for them. Thus, markets,
if left to themselves, cannot factor in long-term scarcity. Has the price of
oil, for example, signaled that oil will soon be very scarce? On the contrary,
oil markets have, if anything, signaled an ever growing supply of oil. The
same could be said for land, lumber, and many other natural resources in
limited supply.
The ability of the capitalist market system to guide us through the
next decades of increasing scarcity and downscaling of industrial production is very limited indeed, and if lives are to be preserved, the primacy of
politics over markets will have to be introduced again, as was the case for
practically all of human history, except its bourgeois phase.
Issues to Be Addressed
To enter an age of scarcity and downscaling is to enter an age of increased
conflicts that contain a great potential for mass death and even genocide,
depending on the mechanisms by which scarcity is channeled to affect
only certain groups and the mechanisms by which conflict is resolved,
managed, or suppressed. If the analysis given here is correct or even plausible, and if the goal is to help humanity survive this tremendous challenge
with no or minimal human loss, then we must increasingly ask questions
such as the following:
1. Based on our knowledge, where and how can we warn the larger
public of impending bottlenecks, and thus make the bottlenecks a legitimate focus of high -priority discussion everywhere?
2. How does the capitalist system tend to react when it approaches a
zero-or negative-growth environment? What are the economic and political mechanisms by which scarcity is disturbed? What is tl1e likelihood
for fascism and other authoritarian political systems to arise to deal with
scarcity while preserving class relations? What might be the cost in human
lives if the distribution of scarcity were left to markets or to authoritarian
and fascist politics?
3. What could we learn from societies at war or in an environment of
war? How did tl1ey experience and deal with scarcity? What forms of solidarity and other coping mechanisms (even under capitalism) did they
adopt?
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4. What conflict-resolution strategies can be pursued for conflicts in
which all parties have something to lose? How can conflicts be moderated
by a long-term increase in the price of fossil fuels at a steady rate that doubles the price of this energy in ten and triples it in twenty years, for
instance?
5. What can be learned from the behavior of cooperatives and other
mutual-help-type social organizations pertaining to the management of

scarcity?
6. To what extent is the broad social control over the means of production a prerequisite for increased solidarity and a more equal distribution of scarcity (or surplus)?
7. To what extent can the impending bottlenecks be dealt with only by
reestablishing basic self-sufficiency on a regional basis?
8. To what extent can basic regional self-sufficiency, if coupled with a
democratic access to the means of production, inhibit migration, decrease
tl1e birthrate, and reduce tl1e transfer of value from the periphery to the
center?
9. What is the necessary kind and level of industrial production and
modern cultural and social life that must be retained to effectively and efficiently downscale while simultaneously meeting growing bottlenecks
and needs?
10. To what extent should social scientists become ethically engaged
as catalysts and organizers of movements concerned with social justice and
the preservation of human life?
Other important questions could be added. Moreover, the social science-theory repertoire must, in anticipation of the issues ahead, also be
reevaluated. Many classic and modern social science theories have their
origin in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Invariably, these
theories are concerned with the dramatic social changes brought about by
the opening, expansion, and differentiation of social and economic systems, and, as a consequence, will soon prove grossly inadequate. The severe bottlenecks that lie ahead will bring about an equally drastic social
change owing to scarcity, system closure, and the downscaling in industrial production, world markets, the world division oflabor, urbanization,
and so on. This transformation of society will be not just a 180-degree reversal of the ongoing world industrialization, but one of another kind.
This all-encompassing, fast, and drastic social change of the near future
will ultimately also generate a new brand of"classic" social theory.
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The Enlightenment of the eighteenth century bore two different and
opposing conceptions of the human being. Hobbes argued that left to
their own devices, people would descend to the level of the animal, so that
without the proper ordering of society and civilization, human beings
would be ruled by the law of the jungle. The contrary position is that of
Rousseau, who argued that people are inherently good but society was the
corrupting influence. Modernist faith has largely followed Rousseau's position: the self was thought of as ultimately good. What was needed was a
societal revolution that allowed the natural goodness of the individual to
emerge and flourish.
We have come to be highly skeptical of the belief in the inherent goodness of the self. Enlightenment, education, culture, and science will not
necessarily produce individuals who will do what is right. The genocides of
the twentieth century, spilling over into tl1e twenty-first, have unveiled the
true heart of humanity. At our center lies an ability to commit evil of an almost unimagined degree. We have seen the nature of human beings and
found that the most ordinary among us can transport millions to their
death, can fill the earth and sky with tl1e victims of killing fields. The theory of the inherent goodness of the human being was daily disproved in
Nazi Germany and in the otl1er state-sponsored genocides and massacres.
Therefore, if Rousseau's argument was shown to be naive, then so has
Hobbes's been proved wrong.
As time passes, genocides of the twentieth century will recede into
memory. From this moment on, however, fundamental assumptions
about human behavior and about civilization can no longer stand unchallenged, for though the occurrence is past, the phenomenon remains, as
well as the causes exacerbated by the political, social, and economic bottlenecks outlined above. The unthinkable has already happened; the idea
of future catastrophes is therefore not unthinkable .
When we look at our young students, we tremble for their future. We
would like to be able to tell them that despite endless violence and disillusionment, one must maintain faith in people and in humankind and in our
ability to solve problems. Despair is no solution. The solution lies in analysis, in hard thinking and questioning, and in purposeful and informed action. To that goal this book is dedicated.

Part One

STATEMENT OF THE

PROBLEM
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affluent societies in Europe or the Americas care about the
population explosion in the developing world, ecological disasters in the
Mediterranean basin, and the spread of mass poverty and disease in the farflung corners of the world? Of what practical concern is it for a banker in
Tokyo, a businessman in Copenhagen, a farmer in Iowa, or a housewife in
Alberta-who are busy trying to live their lives- that there are famine and
civil war in Somalia, floods in Bangladesh, and genocide in Rwanda,
Bosnia, or East Timar? There always have been enormous gaps between
the rich and the poor nations. The reason people in the developed world
should care is that it is absolutely in their self-interest to limit the exponential growth in population and resource depletion.
The demographic imbalance between rich and poor societies is producing a migratory flow from the poor to the rich societies that is challenging the ability of the rich societies to absorb the poor without
devastating conflict. It is certain that people have always inflicted damage
upon their environment. Human beings have cut down, burned, overgrazed, and polluted their habitats since ancient times. But the environmental crisis we now confront is quantitatively and qualitatively different
from anything we have faced before, simply because so many people have
inflicted so much damage to the world's ecosystem during the present
century that the system as a whole-not simply its parts-may be in danger. We see this happening in world population growth, in increasing rates
of resource depletion, in ecological damage, and in widening disparities of
income and resource use between developing and developed nations. All
of these tendencies strain the capacities of the world's ecosystem to sustain
itself into the next century without regional or global disasters. That is the
focus of the following section .
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Globalization and Security
The Prospects of the Underclass

John B. Cobb, Jr.

The U.S. Situation
of upper, middle, and lower classes. The "lower" class
in this analysis is composed of workers with limited skills. In industrial societies, normally, more workers are available than needed, so that wages
set by the market are low. Indeed, if there is a shortage of workers in one
country, then arrangements are made to import them from countries
where they are numerous. The regular importation of farm laborers from
Mexico into the United States is a case in point.
A certain percentage of the lower-class workforce, thus, is normally
unemployed. This state of affairs is considered desirable by most economists, since full employment would put upward pressure on wages. Most
economists believe that rising wages lead to inflation and that inflation is
to be avoided. In the United States, the Federal Reserve Board raises interest rates to slow economic expansion when unemployment rates fall
below a set figure-usually 5 to 7 percent.
When those people without work are thought of as temporarily unemployed members of the workforce, they can still be considered part of
the lower class. But when many of them are unlikely ever to be employed,
when they give up seeking employment in the regular market, their class
status changes. We can define this group as the underclass.
When society recognizes that its policies generate permanent unemployment of potential workers and that, in addition, there are some who
WE OFTEN SPEAK
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do not have the mental or physical abilities required to take part in the
market economy, it may provide basic necessities for these people. In a
welfare society, provisions are made for everyone. No one goes without
food, clothing, and shelter. In such a society, the underclass is supported
by the government.
In the sixties and seventies, many European nations became welfare
states. The United States moved partway in that direction with numerous
ad hoc programs of aid to the needy. This pattern puts an end to extreme
poverty and has much to commend it from a humanitarian point of view.
There are also problems with this solution. The underclass generates a
culture in which no responsibility is felt toward the broader society. Even
when work is available, the habits and motivation needed to succeed in the
market are lacking. Furthermore, the economic recompense for unskilled
labor may be no more than welfare payments. In the United States, mem bers of the underclass who are ambitious and want to escape from poverty
are more likely to turn to crime. Today American prisons house 2 million
people, most of them members of the underclass.
Whereas Marx thought of class conflict as between the lower and
upper classes, in the United States today it is more often between the
lower class and the underclass. The lower class resents working hard for
modest wages when others receive almost as much for doing nothing. It
resents the personal danger brought about by the street crime in which the
underclass plays the major role.
Welfare "reform" designed to pressure the unemployed to work has
been popular. Since it was instituted at a time of high employment, a good
many of the unemployed, including some who were part of the culture of
the underclass, have entered the workforce. On the other hand, there has
also been growth in the number of the homeless and the hungry, and the
prison population continues to grow. As the rules ending welfare payments come into effect, the situation of the underclass will become more
desperate.
Projection of the consequences of current policies is gloomy. With drawal of support from the underclass while maintaining a considerable
amount of unemployment in order to fight "wage inflation" can only increase misery. People who cannot survive within the law will seek to survive by breaking the law. Resentment toward the underclass on the part of
the working poor will increase. Society as a whole will see this whole class
not only as superfluous but also as a cancer. The role of the police will be
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increasingly defined as protecting the rest of society from the underclass.
The prospects for the underclass are bleak.
The danger is even greater than indicated in class analysis alone . In the
United States, class and race are closely intertwined. Although the underclass includes persons of all races, blacks dominate the image of the class in
the minds of others. Racist feelings toward blacks on the part of whites,
and often of other minorities as well, are mixed with class feelings, and
make them worse. They also affect attitudes toward blacks of all classes.
Blacks react with rage to this continuing racism of U.S. society.
The most promising response to this threat to the underclass would
be a change of policy with respect to unemployment and wages. If the
government seriously sought full employment, the major cause of the
growth of the underclass could be eliminated. Every child could grow up
with the expectation of being wanted and needed by society.
In addition, a full-employment policy would lead to rising wages on
the part of entry-level workers. What is now called "wage inflation" and
successfully avoided by slowing the economy with higher interest rates
would be understood instead as allowing workers to participate in the
nation's prosperity. Well-paid workers would not resent welfare payments
at a lower level to those people who, for one reason or another, are unable
to become members of the workforce.
Of course, this policy would not immediately eliminate the culture of
the underclass. All that can be done is to begin a process of change that will
take at least two generations to complete. But a reversal of direction of this
sort would, in itself, immediately change the situation in beneficial ways.
The argument against this solution is that it causes inflation. That it
does so is not evident from history. The data can be read in quite a different way. It is significant that the low unemployment of the late nineties
was not accompanied by inflation. If inflation comes in the early 2000s, it
will, no doubt, be blamed on too little unemployment and the accompanying rise in wages. But it is just as likely to be the result of the repeated
raises in interest rates by the Federal Reserve Board imposed in order to
increase unemployment.

The Global Context
The problem is far more complex on a global basis. To whatever extent
economies are organized around national markets, a nation can establish
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its own policies. It can decide to aim at full employment and to allow
wages to rise, even to encourage this outcome. It can choose to take care
of those people who are unable to participate in the market. Because all
employers will compete for workers on an equal basis, all will have an equal
chance to succeed. Full employment at good wages means high demand
for goods . A stable prosperity is possible.
In a global economy, however, serious problems arise. Producers in
countries with high wages must compete with producers in low-wage
countries. In labor-intensive industries, they are forced to shift production
to the latter. Nations that have had high wages and have taken care of all
their citizens are under pressure to change. Either they must accept high
unemployment, as in much of Europe, or they must reduce the cost of
labor, as in the United States. Both of these policies lead to the growth of
the underclass.
It is often supposed that when the highly developed nations pay this
price, the less-developed nations benefit. Certainly, many of them are recipients of far more industrial development than they would otherwise
have received. As measured by the gross domestic product ( GDP), these
nations progress rapidly. Sadly, this growth is typically accompanied by the
emergence within them also of an underclass.
Developments differ from country to country. Some countries in East
Asia, following Japan, maintained tight national control over their industrial development. In these countries, there was little underclass. This underclass is appearing only now as they are forced to open themselves to
global market forces. The situation in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and
Singapore is more like that in Europe.
Other Asian countries, such as Thailand and Indonesia, have developed chiefly within the global market. This model has been typical in Latin
America, and in Africa as well, insofar as industrial development has occurred there at all. A few sweeping generalizations will indicate how an underclass grows in these countries.
Preindustrialized societies are labor intensive. There is work for most
people, with income sufficient to meet survival needs but little more . Almost everyone is poor, but almost everyone has a place in the economy.
Transnational corporations transform tl1ese economies with their investments. They may purchase the best land for agricultural production
for export, which displaces the subsistence farmers . Some of the farmers
are employed in tl1e new agribusiness, but because ofless-labor-intensive
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methods, fewer workers are needed. Similarly, retail chains introduce imported manufactured merchandise that undersells local handicrafts and
small neighborhood stores . Some former artisans and merchants are employed as clerks, but many are not needed. These workers, now separated
from the means of independent livelihood, are available as industrial labor.
Displacement from traditional economic life takes place more rapidly
than absorption of labor by the new industries. Social changes also generate new needs as well as new desires. Women, especially young women,
enter the workforce in large numbers. The population of unemployed and
underemployed explodes.
There is a vicious circle here. Because so many seek work, wages are
very low. Because one wage cannot support even a small family, more and
more family members must seek employment. This move adds to the pool
oflabor and further depresses wages. Further, if wages begin to rise in one
country, then there are other countries that attract industry by keeping
their wages low. This process dominates the global scene at present and
can be described as the "race to the bottom."
The problems of development in the global context are exacerbated
by the extreme mobility of capital. Capital flows create apparent prosperity
and even considerable indigenous economic development. But the withdrawal of capital, which sometimes occurs abruptly, undercuts tl1is development, bankrupts indigenous businesses, and often leads to the takeover
of productive facilities in a fire sale by transnational investors . Developing
nations are left witl1 large debts to be paid by further exploitation of their
workers . Defenselessness against these movements of international capital
contributes to the precariousness of the condition of the poor.
The description of the underclass used with respect to the United
States does not apply well here . In much of the global economy, employment does not lift one out of the underclass . Wages far below subsistence
combined witl1 the precariousness of the employment do not turn one
into a part of an authentic working class. Too often the only member of a
family who can find work is an adolescent daughter. In favorable circumstances, this work is in a factory, where young women constitute preferred
employees . Sad to say, millions of young girls work as prostitutes. The
global underclass is constituted of tl1e unemployed, the underemployed,
and the grossly underpaid who have been separated from their traditional
means of subsistence . In most cases, governments are unable or unwilling
to provide them with the necessities oflife.
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The type of "development" that produces this underclass is not the
only possible one . We have noted that Japan pioneered another model
that was successfully followed by South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. In
this model, national governments controlled development patterns by
working closely with indigenous businesses.
A third model has been much less tried. It can be called the community-development model. In this model, the unit of development is not
the globe or the nation but the village or local community. The goal is to
improve the life of the community rather than to undercut it. Simple technology is used to increase the productivity of farmers and artisans. They
are not displaced by agribusiness, imported goods, or large retailers.
Those people who favor the globalized economy repeatedly inform us
that there is no option, which is an exaggeration. The assertion is intended
to reduce interest in considering options such as the ones noted above.
There are places where these other models still have practical relevance,
and, if they gathered sufficient support, they could become far more important. Nevertheless, we must also consider whether the plight of the
global underclass can be alleviated within the dominant global economy.
There are various movements to influence the policies of transnational
corporations. Some leaders within corporations do what they can to help
their employees. Corporations have adopted codes of ethics governing
their operations in developing countries. Conscientious investors propose
to their corporations that they adopt the policy of paying a living wage.
Consumers organize to bring pressure on selected companies to the same
end. The most effective group has been college students who have persuaded colleges and universities to cease purchasing goods with institutional logos from corporations that do not cooperate . A few companies
have released information about the location of their factories and allow
independent inspections. The publicity will help to alleviate some of the
worst abuses . Conscientious U.S . investors and consumers also support
labor organizers in developing countries. There has been some success
here, too.
All of these efforts to humanize the global economy are worthwhile.
They can improve somewhat the plight of millions of members of the underclass around the world. Nevertheless, their limitations are apparent. In
general, meeting the demands of people of conscience increases costs.
Companies that do so are at a competitive disadvantage with those businesses that do not. Stockholder resolutions and consumer boycotts cannot

10

JOHN B. COBB

be effective across the board. The corporations that are most responsive
become the most vulnerable. Labor-union success in one country is frequently followed by the removal of production to another country that is
able to guarantee more passive workers.
Significant and secure gains require global rules somewhat like the
ones that labor won in most industrialized societies in the past. The organization in best position to implement such rules is the World Trade Organization. Thus far its policies have been supportive of corporate
interests in the free movement of goods and capital rather than in fairness
to workers. But the latter issue has been raised. The development oflabor
standards on a global basis cannot accomplish for world labor what national standards once did within nations, but it can reduce the worst
abuses of the present system.
Another proposal that could help is the Tobin tax. The suggestion is
that international-exchange transactions be taxed one-half of 1 percent,
with the proceeds going to the United Nations. These transactions
amount to $1.5 trillion a day, of which only 5 percent are for trade in
goods and services. Most is short-term speculation that makes little contribution to the economy but does contribute to the turbulence described
above.
The tax would both reduce the turbulence of the financial markets and
provide money to combat poverty around the world. It would provide
sufficient funds to improve education and health throughout the world
and create safety nets for the poor. There is considerable support for this
proposal, especially in Europe.
A final proposal is debt forgiveness. The story of how most of the
world has become indebted to the developed nations and the international
financial institutions is too complex to rehearse here. But there can be no
doubt that many have debts they can never pay and that the payment ofinterest on these debts reduces the ability of many nations to provide services to the poor. It also presses them to compete for investments by
holding wages down.
A movement of citizens in many countries, Jubilee 2000, has gained
considerable attention to the proposal to forgive the debts of the world's
poorest countries. Many governments have agreed to take steps in this direction. When examined carefully, not all of these agreements go as far as
the rhetoric suggests. Nevertheless, the idea has been accepted in principle, and progress toward its implementation has been made.
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The Larger Context
Thus far we have considered the situation of the underclass in the United
States and in the world as a whole as ifit existed in a physical vacuum. The
situation is more disturbing when we consider the larger context. It is the
earth system as a whole.
The chief argument for the globalization of the economy is that it is
the most efficient system for promoting overall economic growth. Many
economists of goodwill recognize that in the early stages of transnational
investment there is much suffering. The rich get richer and the poor get
poorer. But they argue that in time, production increases to the point that
all benefit. Patience is required. In the end, they believe, the underclass,
and indeed all poverty, will be abolished.
There are many reasons to be skeptical of this scenario. But of them,
the chief is that it ignores the physical limits of the planet. Viewed ecologically, the quantity of global economic activity is already unsustainable. If
current production were equally distributed today, then it could overcome
extreme poverty everywhere . But no one, certainly not the proponents of
economic globalization, proposes redistribution. The argument is that as
total production increases, all will gain proportionately.
An influential report prepared for the United Nations under the
leadership of Gro Brundtland argued that, given population growth, the
income for the poor of the world would need to increase at least sixfold
to eliminate miserable poverty. This rise cannot happen, the authors assumed, unless other segments of society also enjoyed a sixfold increase in
income. That means that, in a world in which economic activity is already pressing the ecological limits, production must be increased six
times!
The authors were somewhat aware of this problem. The solution, tl1ey
believed, was to become far more efficient in the use of resources and to
greatly reduce the emission of pollution. There is no doubt that important
gains can be made in these ways. Furthermore, some of the growtl1 can be
in services that do not stress the environment. Nevertheless, it is exceedingly doubtful, even theoretically, that the quantity of growth envisioned
could take place without catastrophic ecological consequences.
In any case, tl1ere is little possibility that ideal procedures will consistently be followed, which has certainly not occurred thus far. Rapid recent
industrial growth in China, for example, has already led to appalling pollu -
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tion and to the exhaustion of water resources. An additional doubling or
quadrupling ofindustrial production there is difficult to envision.
Among the most crucial forms ofimpact on the environment is global
warming. That it is already occurring, with concurrent increases in storms
and other disturbances in weather patterns, is now well established. That
increased industrial activity will worsen the situation is almost certain. At
some point, the damage will exceed the short-term gain even by the most
crass economic calculations .
The implication is that the ideal of global economic growth encouraged by a global market is in contradiction to the physical realities of the
planet. It cannot solve the problem of the underclass it creates.
Particularly disturbing is the prospect of what will happen to the underclass as the awareness of limits sinks in. Once the ruling class realizes
that the amount of economic activity that the planet can sustain will never
have need of the labor of billions of the earth's present inhabitants, interest in their survival will diminish. The world decision makers will find that
a greatly reduced population would be preferable. The underclass will appear not only as superfluous but also as an impediment to the well-being
of those people who are productive. If, in desperation, the underclass
turns to violence, then the powers that be will have the excuse they need to
eliminate many of its members.
Ways Out

Can we envision a less dreadful scenario? Yes, but it would require changes
now that are barely on the political map.
First, the meaning of economic growtl1 would require drastic rethinking. There are good reasons for rejecting the ways in which it is now measured. The GDP, whose increase is now used to justify economic
globalization, is in no sense a measure of human well-being-not even of
economic well-being. This fact has been shown in detail. When an alternative measure, such as the index of sustainable economic welfare or the genuine progress indicator, is used as a guide to economic activity, it turns out
that growth as measured by the gross domestic (or world) product often
fails to contribute to real economic welfare at all!
Second, we should recognize that economic well-being is only one
contribution to total well-being. The domination of the world by economic thinking in the past half century should be reversed. We should
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evaluate policies by their contribution to the health of the earth, including
all its inhabitants, with special attention to the human ones. This evaluation would lead, like the destructive prospects summarized above but by a
different route, to the judgment that further population growth is harmful to the human prospect. But it would focus on shifting priorities in
wealthy nations away from the consumption of goods to more important
human values and to positive means of encouraging small families in developing countries as proposed by the UN Cairo conference.
Third, we should affirm that the economic sector of society should
serve the people as a whole. This change would entail a shift of power from
economic institutions, guided primarily by the goal of economic profit, to
political, social, and cultural institutions through which people in general
can express their will. This move would reverse the trends of the past half
century, although it should not lead back to the extreme nationalism of
the past. National power should both be qualified by international organizations such as a strengthened United Nations and devolve to local regions in which people can participate more directly in decision making.
Fourth, economies should become much more national and, within
nations, more local. This suggestion is implied in the preceding points . If
economic power is global, then it cannot be subordinated to political, social, and cultural powers tl1at are national and local. Such global economic
power as remains should be subordinated to global political power. We
cannot avoid catastrophe unless people in general are able to feed, clothe,
and shelter themselves and unless human communities, national and local,
can order their lives for the benefit of all their members.
There is little doubt that, eventually, local economies will reappear.
The globalized economy becomes more and more fragile . Its assumptions-that it is benefiting humanity economically and that it can continue
to grow indefinitely-are both false. Such fundamental errors portend
collapse . But can such a shift occur without disaster?
Recent events in Cuba provide hope. Cuba had bought into standardized global-economy thinking even though the United States limited its
access. It became a part of the Soviet economic bloc, specializing in sugar
production and importing many necessities. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Cuba was left to its own devices. It was forced to reorganize its
economy so as to feed, clothe, and house its own people as well as meet
their needs for education and health care .
The United States responded to Cuba's crisis by intensifying its eco-
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nomic isolation, hoping to bring it to collapse. Nevertheless, Cuba survived. And despite all the misery imposed on its people by its own mistakes
and by the U.S . embargo, Cuba's condition overall is better than most
Latin An1erican countries. Because of the lack of oil, much agricultural
production is now organic. In general, Cuba's current economy is ecologically sustainable.
Our topic is the prospects of the underclass entailed in the dominant
policies in the United States and in the world. The condition of the underclass is already wretched. Its prospects are appalling. We are told that
the globalized economy is the solution. It is not. Even now it is far more
the problem than the solution. Continuing present policies leads toward
unimaginable horrors for the underclass. Cuba has many problems. It is
not to be romanticized. But in Cuba there is no underclass facing dire
threats.
Cuba moved toward a sustainable economy under extremely difficult
conditions. Perhaps the world can do better. Imagine that scores of nations around the world would seek self-sufficiency in food production, relying chiefly on organic means, not abruptly and out of painful necessity
imposed by the hostility of the United States, but because they were seeking a secure and sustainable future . Suppose they undertook to meet most
of their other needs as well without heavy dependence on imports such as
oil. Suppose that this endeavor involved more labor-intensive methods of
production. Suppose that at every stage, tl1ese countries gave serious consideration to the effects of their policies on the poor and on the natural
environment. Suppose further that the international community supported them in making these moves. Global warming and other environmental threats would diminish, the underclass would cease to exist in
these countries, and the prospects of the poor would not include unmitigated disaster.
The shift we need is not under discussion in the halls of power. On the
other hand, elements in this shift are coming to attention in the nongovernmental-organization (NGO) movement. Since 1992, in connection with tl1e Earth Summit UN conference, NGOs representing a wide
range of concerns began to find a common voice. Human-rights groups,
environmentalists, labor, community developers, indigenous people, and
others all recognized the threat to their concerns in mainstream globalization practices. Since then they have begun to work together, as in this
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country in Seattle in 1999 and Washington, D.C., in 2000. It is not impossible that their influence will grow.
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Global Industrial Civilization
The Necessary Collapse

Chris H. Lewis
Collapse is recurrent in human history; it is global in its occurrence; and
it affects the spectrum ofsocieties from simple foragers to great empires.

- Joseph A. Tainter, The Collapse of Complex Societies

witnessing the collapse of a globalized modern industrial
civilization. Far from being inevitable, globalization, the movement toward a globally integrated, free-market capitalist economy dominated by
First World nations and transnational corporations (TN Cs), is undermin ing the very foundation of global industrial civilization. Global populist
challenges in the late 1990s and early 2000s by First and Third World activists and peoples to the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the crippling burden of
Third World debt illustrate the increasing stresses and ruptures that are
even now undermining global industrial civilization. Just like the Roman
Empire, overexpansion and structural weaknesses are undermining this
emerging global civilization at the very height of its power. Smug, arrogant arguments about the inevitability of globalization, such as Thomas
Friedman's Lexus and the Olive Tree (2000), and the triumph of global industrial free-market capitalist civilization are symptoms of the very contradictions that are being exacerbated by "forced" globalization and will
cause the collapse of global industrial civilization. The seeds of its collapse
WE ARE NOW
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are even now being sown by First World elites' and TN Cs' efforts to impose a globalized, free -market capitalist economy on the world.
The most prominent of these increasing structural contradictions that
are tearing apart global industrial civilization are the increasing destruction of the global environment, increasing poverty and inequality between
First and Third World peoples, and increasing threats to national and
democratic governance by the World Trade Organization and by global financial markets. Global industrial civilization is collapsing because the
very economic growth and global development that it promises will address these structural contradictions are only making them worse. Our
hope lies in the creation oflocal and regional cultures and economies that
can truly solve these problems by focusing on sustainable development,
the health oflocal peoples and communities, and the redemocratization of
everyday life. Globalization will fail because it supports TNCs over peoples and communities, bolsters corporate profits over human rights
and the environment, and demands the reign of global corporations and
markets over people and nature. Led and supported by First World governments such as the United States, Britain, Germany, and Japan, globalization is swamping nation-states and putting nothing in their place but
global corporations and unregulated global financial markets (Athanasiou
1996, 173 ). The current debate over the WTO is really a debate about the
future of global industrial civilization.

The Rise and Fall of Global Industrial
Civilization
Globalization really began with the growth and expansion of a European
market economy starting in the seventeenth century and the development
of a global industrial economy in the twentieth century. This global economy has been dominated by European and U.S. imperialism. The goal of
this global imperialism, which First World elites call "development," was
to suck the wealth, labor, and resources out of their colonial dependencies
to increase First World wealth, freedom, and opportunity. Any Third
World peoples who stood in the way of this imperialist drive were either
enslaved or destroyed. The plight of American Indians, African tribes, and
Asian island nations illustrates the larger reality of this global imperialism.
By 1914, according to Craig Dilworth, the nations of Europe, and their
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offshoots such as the United States and Australia, controlled 84 percent of
the earth's surface (1998, 142) . The major wars of the twentieth century
have been about which powers, or military alliances, would dominate and
control this global economy. With the collapse of Soviet communism in
1991, the First World, led by the United States, Europe, and Japan, was
now freed to impose a global capitalist market economy on the world.
With the deregulation of global financial markets in the 1990s, the
creation of the WTO in 199 5, and increasing World Bank and IMF pressure on Third World nations to pay off their foreign debt in the 1990s and
early 2000s, we have witnessed the drive toward globalization, the creation of a First World-dominated global capitalist economy that serves
only to enrich the wealthy and large corporations of the First World at the
expense of the Third World poor, the global environment, human rights,
and democracy. Globalization is really an effort by First World elites and
global corporations to impose their neofeudal rule on the world. President
Clinton's chief trade negotiator, Carla Hills, all but said as much when she
admitted: "We want to abolish the right of nations to impose health and
safety standards more stringent than a minimal uniform world standard"
(Athanasiou 1996, 177). The director of the International Forum on
Globalization, Jerry Mander, argues,

The central operating principle of the WTO is that global commercial interests supercede all other interests. WTO suppresses obstacles to the expansion of global corporate activity such as national, provincial, state,
and community laws and standards that are made on behalf of labor
rights, environmental protection, human rights, consumer rights, local
culture, social justice, national sovereignty, and democracy. (Mander and
Barker 2000)

Both First World economic powers and TN Cs have "used the threat
of WTO action to roll back, block, or chill countless rules designed to
benefit workers, consumers, and the environment, and to promote human
rights and development in the world's poor countries" (Wallach et al.
1999, 13). World Bank and IMF structural adjustment loans have been
used to force Third World countries to cut workers' wages and government spending on education, health, and the environment; devalue their
local currencies; and reduce government regulation of TN Cs. This emerg-
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ing globalized world order is exacerbating the global destruction of the
environment, poverty and economic inequality, and the poor quality of
life of billions of people.
Globalization is creating record global corporate profits, increasing
wealth for a small global elite, and promoting corporate domination of
First and Third World governments. Using their increased wealth, TNCs
and the wealthy are buying and controlling First and Third World governments. Indeed, globalization is really the result of dominant U .S. and European elites creating a global capitalist economy after World War II . The
cold war was actually an effort by First World elites to crush all opposition
to the globalization of this free-market capitalist economy. With the collapse of Soviet communism and the increasing political and economic
weakness of Third World countries, First World elites are confident that
nothing now stands in their way.
Now let's look at the most important structural contradictions that
are undermining global industrial civilization: ( 1) environmental destruction, (2) increasing poverty and global inequality, and ( 3) increasing
threats to state and local democratic governance. All of these structural
contradictions reinforce each other and are creating positive feedback
loops that only accelerate the collapse of global industrial civilization . The
best example of this positive feedback system is West Africa. Increasing deforestation and soil degradation are undermining rural economies, which
forces rural refugees to swarm into exploding industrial cities, which in
turn creates massive urban poverty and underdevelopment, which further
stresses local and national resources, which often leads to the collapse of
African states and untold violence, anarchy, famine, and suffering, which is
now occurring throughout Africa. I agree with Robert Kaplan who warns
that "West Africa's future, eventually, will also be that of most of the rest of
the world" (2000, 7). Our global future will be like West Africa's unless
this uncontrolled globalization and accelerating positive feedback loop are
not ended with the collapse of global industrial civilization . The challenge
for the emerging local and regional cultures and economies will be to close
this positive feedback loop forever by creating local, sustainable
economies that support all their people, protect the environment, and
allow people to democratically control their lives and local communities .
In such a new world order, the health oflocal people, communities, environments, and economies would be paramount, not the profit and power
of First World elites and TN Cs.
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Globalization and the Destruction
of the Global Environment
With the growth and expansion of a European market economy since the
seventeenth century and the development of a global industrial economy
in the twentieth century, science has recorded the rapidly accelerating
human destruction of the earth (Turner et al. 1990). Since the 1950s,
with the aid of modern science and technology, the human population has
doubled, and scientists predict that the enormous transformations of the
earth in the last three centuries will be doubled, trebled, or more in
the centuries to come (Kates, Turner, and Clark 1990, 14). In 1999,
the world population hit 6 billion and is now growing at the rate of80 million people a year. If we are to feed the world's projected 8 to 12 billion
people by 2050, then we will need to increase agricultural production
three to four times and increase energy consumption six to eight times
(ibid.). Can global, modern industrial civilization sustain this rapid rate of
growth without destroying itself or greatly endangering the well-being of
future generations? How can we support growing populations in the
Third World and increasing affluence in tl1e First World without destroying the earth and undermining global industrial civilization? Tragically,
the struggle to feed exploding populations and improve living standards
throughout the world is only accelerating the global destruction of the
environment.
Since its birth in sixteenth-and seventeenth-century Europe, the
modern industrial First World, driven by the desire to accumulate wealth
and control human and natural resources, has waged a brutal war against
the earth. In Extinction) biologists Paul Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich note
that "never in tl1e 500 million years of terrestrial evolution has this mantle
we call the biosphere been under such savage attack" (1981, 8). In their
1993 "World Scientists' Warning to Humanity," signed by more than
1,680 scientists worldwide, concerned scientists warned that "human activities inflict harsh and often irreversible damage on the environment and
on critical resources" (Union of Concerned Scientists 1993, 3). Tragically,
the industrial world's relentless struggle to conquer and subdue tl1e earth
in the name of progress will bring its collapse and ruin. Its vain struggle to
control and defeat the awesome power of nature will, in the end, destroy
global industrial civilization.
Driven by individualism, materialism, and the endless pursuit of
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wealth and power, the modern industrialized First World's efforts to modernize and integrate the world politically, economically, and culturally
since World War II are only accelerating this global collapse. In the early
twenty-first century, global development leaves 80 percent of the world's
population outside of the industrialized nations' progress and affluence
(Wallimann 1994). When this modern industrialized world collapses,
Third World peoples will continue their daily struggle for dignity and survival at the margins of a moribund global industrial civilization .
With the collapse of global industrial civilization, smaller, autonomous local and regional civilizations, cultures, and polities will
emerge. We can reduce the threat of mass death and genocide that will
surely accompany this collapse by encouraging the creation and growth of
sustainable, self-sufficient regional polities. John Cobb has already made a
case for how it may work in the United States and how it is working in
Cuba. After the collapse of global industrial civilization, First and Third
World peoples will not have the material resources, biological capital, and
energy and human resources to reestablish global industrial civilization.
Forced by economic necessity to become dependent on local resources
and ecosystems for their survival, peoples throughout the world will work
to conserve and restore their environments. Those societies that destroy
their local environments and economies, as modern people so often do,
will themselves face collapse and ruin.
Thus, the rapid expansion of global industrial civilization since the
1600s, which modern peoples understand as progress and development, is
destroying the earth and threatening the human future (Hauchler and
Kennedy 1994) . Since the birth of the modern industrial world, we have
witnessed accelerating global population growth; air and water pollution;
destruction of forests, farmland, and fisheries; depletion of nonrenewable
natural resources; loss of biodiversity; and increasing poverty and misery
throughout the nonmodern world (Brown and Kane 1994). In her chapter in Worldwatch's State of the World, 1995, Hilary French concludes:
"The relentless pace of global ecological decline shows no signs ofletting
up. Carbon dioxide concentrations are mounting in the atmosphere,
species loss continues to accelerate, fisheries are collapsing, land degradation frustrates efforts to feed hungry people, and the earth's forest cover
keeps shrinking" (1995, 171). And in his own chapter in State of the
World, 1995, Lester Brown (1995) warns that eroding soils, shrinking
forests, deteriorating rangelands, expanding deserts, acid rain, Stratos-
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pheric ozone depletion, the buildup of greenhouse gases, air pollution,
and the loss of biological diversity threaten global food production and future economic growth. How could this rapid growth in wealth, population, science and technology, and human control over the natural world
have produced such catastrophic results?

Globalization and the Creation
of the First and Third Worlds
Globalization, development, and progress are proving to be dangerous
delusions, which modern peoples continue to support despite the overwhelming evidence that they have led to an escalating war against the
earth. Ironically, the modern industrial world's relentless pursuit of victory in this centuries-old war against nature will be the principal cause of
its defeat and collapse. In The Vanishing White Man, Stan Steiner argued:
The ruins of the Roman Empire, and the Mayan and Byzantine and Ottoman and Incan and Islamic and Egyptian and Ghanaian and Nigerian
and Spanish and Aztec and English and Grecian and Persian, and the
Mongolian civilization of the great Khans are visible for all to see. Is it
heresy to say that the civilization of the white man of Western Europe,
which has dominated much of the Earth for 400 years, is about to become one more magnificent ruin? Not because it has failed to accomplish
its goals, but because it has succeeded so well, its time on earth may be
done. (1976, 277)

The paradox of global development is that the tremendous success of
global industrial civilization will be the cause of its collapse and ruin. In
order to understand this paradox, we need to understand how modern
economic and political institutions are creating both the so-called developed and underdeveloped worlds, which I will refer to as the First and
Third Worlds (Escobar 1995 ).
Indeed, most people in the world are living on the margins of development. Three-quarters of the world's population lives in the 130 poorer
countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, and the majority of these people do not have either steady jobs or secure incomes (Barnet and Cavanagh
1994, 179) . In Global Dreams, Richard Barnet and John Cavanagh argue
that there is a growing struggle between "the forces of globalization and
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the territorially based forces oflocal survival seeking to preserve and to redefine community" (22 ). Barnet and Cavanagh conclude that "local citizens' movements and alternative institutions are springing up all over the
world to meet basic economic needs to preserve local traditions, religious
life, cultural life, biological species, and other treasures of the natural
world, and to struggle for human dignity" (429). This increasing conflict
between the demands of global industrial civilization and diverse peoples
and cultures to protect their way oflife and local autonomy is further evidence that the modern industrial world is collapsing.
By creating the specter of vast, untold wealth and freedom in the First
World and massive, desperate poverty and despair in the Third World,
global development is creating the contradictions that will undermine
global industrial civilization. On the one hand, global economic integration, which is known as globalization, is creating spectacular wealth and
progress for the 20 percent who live in the developed world, but, on the
other hand, it is creating massive poverty and social unrest for the 80 percent who live in the underdeveloped world (ibid.). Between 1960 and
2000, rather than shrinking, the income gap between the rich and the
poor actually grew. According to the 1999 UN Human Development Report, in 1960, the richest 20 percent of the world earned thirty times as
much income as the poorest 20 percent, sixty times as much income in
1990, and seventy-four times as much income by 1997. This UN report
also reported that the richest 20 percent of the world consumes 86 percent of the world gross domestic product, the middle 60 percent consume
just 13 percent, and the poorest 20 percent consume just 1 percent of the
world GDP. In 2000, according to the World Bank, a sixth of the world's
people produced 78 percent of the world's goods and services and received 78 percent of the world's income, whereas three-fifths of the
world's people in the poorest sixty-one countries received 6 percent of the
world's income.
Instead of trickling down, global wealth and resources are being
sucked out of the Third and First Worlds, creating only more poverty and
underdevelopment. First World elites' answer to this poverty and underdevelopment is more development, which the reader should now understand will cause only more poverty and underdevelopment.
In his book When Corporations Rule the World, David Korten argues
that the world's money, technology, and markets are controlled and managed by gigantic global corporations (1995, 131). In 1999, worldwide
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corporate mergers reached a new record of $3 .4 trillion. This global
merger movement reflects the increasing concentration of corporate
power into larger and larger TNCs . According to the 1999 UN Human
Development Report, the 1990s witnessed the "increasing concentration
of income, resources, and wealth among people, corporations, and countries ." Faced with this growing structural contradiction, First World elites
are calling for even more development in the Third World, arguing that
only development will improve the lives of underdeveloped peoples. Of
course, as we have seen, more development increases the wealth of only
the First World at the expense ofThird World peoples, the global environment, and human rights and democracy. Moreover, more development
leads only to the further concentration of wealth and greater global inequality. By the late 1990s, of the world's one hundred largest economic
entities, forty-nine are nations and fifty-one are corporations. In 1970
there were seven thousand TNCs, whereas in 2000 there were more than
sixty thousand TNCs. The five hundred largest corporations account for
70 percent of world trade . In the 1990s, according to the 1999 UN
Human Development Report, there was increasing concentration of income, resources, and wealth among peoples, corporations, and countries.
By 1997, the richest 20 percent had eighty-two times as much income as
the poorest 20 percent. By 1995, 358 billionaires enjoyed a combined net
worth of $760 billion, equal to the net worth of the poorest 2.5 billion of
the world's people (Korten 1995, 83).

The Withdrawal of the Third World
from the Global Corporate Economy
If sustainable development and the further integration of the global economy are not the answers to the increasing problems confronting both the
First and the Third Worlds, then what is the solution? The answer, as John
Cobb has already argued, lies in the remarkable ability of peoples and cultures to adapt to constantly changing local and regional environments .
Thus, if Third World peoples find that development and their dependence
on the global economy are creating poverty, suffering, and political turmoil, then it would, in fact, be very adaptive for them to withdraw from
the global economy and refuse to accept First World efforts to develop
them. Of course, this reaction would further undermine the myth of de velopment, tl1e mytl1 that human progress can be achieved only through
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modernization. Whether we call it civilizing, progress, modernization, development, sustainable development, or now globalization, modern peoples have imagined that it is the developed world's "manifest destiny" to
teach the rest of the world that modernity is the only course open to them .
But this belief is simply not true. There are just too many diverse cultures,
religions, and ways of life for modernization and global industrial development to finally triumph. By refusing to disappear into history, despite
innumerable attempts to civilize and teach them to be modern, nonmodern peoples demonstrate the resilience and strength of their cultures and
societies to survive and adapt in a complex and chaotic world.
I need to be very clear here. I am not arguing that human overpopulation and the resulting destruction of global resources will be the primary
factors causing the collapse of global civilization. It is the rich, not the
poor, who are destroying the earth. Tom Athanasiou argues that "if current patterns of consumption do not change, the 5 7 million Northerners
born in the 1990s will consume and pollute more than the 971 million
Southerners born in the 1990s" (1996 ). The global environmental crisis is
the result of the expansion of global industrial civilization and the development of the First World and the underdevelopment of the Third World
since the 1600s. In Sustaining the Earth, John Young argues that "people
constitute an environmental problem, not because of their existence, but
because of what they do, and the parts of the environment they use up or
damage" (1990, 107). The culture of the modern world-its individualism, materialism, scientism, and faith in progress-and the global expansion of that culture are the central causes of the collapse of global
industrial civilization (Ehrenfeld 1978). And surviving polities and nations must keep these facts firmly in mind if they are to avoid future collapses themselves.

The Collapse of Global Industrial Civilization
as an Opportunity
The First World's failure to modernize and civilize the world should be
seen not as a tragedy, but as an opportunity. With the increasing recognition of the inability of development to resolve the economic and political
contradictions it creates, whether you call it sustainable or not, peoples
and communities will be once again forced to draw on their own cultures,
histories, religions, and intimate knowledge of their local environments to
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improve their lives and ensure a "reasonable life" for their children. For
most of history, successfully adapting to changing local and regional environments was the fundamental challenge facing human societies.
The only alternative we now have is to recognize the very real, imminent collapse of global industrial civilization. Instead of seeing this collapse as a tragedy, and trying to put "Humpty-Dumpty" back together
again, we must see it as a real opportunity to solve some of the basic economic, political, and social problems created and exacerbated by the development of global industrial civilization since the 1600s. Instead of
insisting on coordinated global actions, we should encourage selfsufficiency through the creation oflocal and regional economies and trading networks (Norgaard 1994). We must help political and economic
leaders understand that the more their countries are tied to the global
economic system, the more risk there is of serious economic and political
collapse. The First World's effort to impose the WTO and globalization
on the rest of the world in the 1990s and early 2000s is a last-ditch effort
to keep global industrial civilization from unraveling. Who knows, but the
recent collapse of the WTO Third Ministerial meeting in Seattle in November 1999, the Jubilee 2000 movement to cancel all Third World debt,
and increasing challenges to World Bank and IMF policies might be harbingers of this global collapse. Indeed, we are witnessing the increasing
collapse of global industrial civilization. My guess is that sometime between 2010 and 2050 we will see its final collapse.
In the case of the collapse of Mayan civilization, those city-states and
regions in Central America that were not as dependent on the central
Mayan civilization, economy, and trade were more likely to survive its collapse. Those city-states who were heavily dependent on Mayan hegemony
destroyed themselves by fighting bitter wars with other powerful citystates to maintain their declining economic and political dominance
(Weatherford 1994). Like the collapse of Mayan and Roman civilizations,
the collapse of global civilization will cause mass death and suffering as a
result of the turmoil created by economic and political collapse. The more
dependent nations are on the global economy, the more economic, political, and social chaos they will experience when it breaks down.
In conclusion, the only solution to the growing political and economic chaos caused by the collapse of global industrial civilization is to encourage the uncoupling of nations and regions from the global industrial
economy. Unfortunately, millions will die in the wars and economic and
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political conflicts created by the accelerating collapse of global industrial
civilization. But we can be assured that, on the basis of the past history of
the collapse of regional civilizations such as the Mayan and the Roman
Empires, barring global nuclear war, human societies and civilizations will
continue to exist and develop on a smaller, regional scale. Yes, such civilizations will be violent, corrupt, and often cruel, but, in the end, less so
than our current global industrial civilization, which is abusing the entire
planet and threatening the mass death and suffering of all its peoples and
the living, biological fabric oflife on Earth.
The paradox of global economic development is that although it creates massive wealth and power for First World elites, it also creates massive
poverty and suffering for Third World peoples and societies. The failure of
global development to end this suffering and destruction will bring about
its collapse. This collapse will cause millions of people to suffer and die
throughout the world, but it should, paradoxically, ensure the survival of
future human societies. Indeed, the collapse of global industrial civilization is necessary for the future, long-term survival of human beings. Although this future seems hopeless and heartless, it is not. We can learn a
lot from our present global crisis. What we learn will shape our future and
the future of the complex, interconnected web oflife on Earth.
Ways Out: What You Can Do to Help Create
a Better Future
1. Support groups challenging globalization such as the International
Forum on Globalization, the People-Centered Development Forum,
Third World Network, Fifty Years Is Enough, Focus on tl1e Global Soutl1,
and Public Citizen.
2. Support local businesses and local and regional economies through
purchases and public support. Boycott global chain stores and transnational corporations, which are the driving forces behind globalization.
3. Simplify your life. Reduce your consumption, reduce your use of
energy and material resources, and focus on the quality oflife in your local
community.
4 . Support sustainable local economies and local farmers and businesses. Support your local farmers' markets and recycling programs . Reduce, reuse, and recycle materials in your local community.
5. Challenge the national and global rights of corporations. Work to
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end the legal fiction that corporations should have the same rights as individuals. Make corporations responsible to their local and regional governments and economies.
6. Demand campaign finance reform and end the selling oflocal and
national governments to the highest bidder. Get corporations and "big
money" out of politics.
7. Recognize and restore the rights oflocal communities and peoples
to control their lives, their environments, their economies, and their cultures. Challenge globalization's "race to the bottom" by encouraging
local communities to set their own standards for human rights, environmental quality, and quality oflife.
8. Support efforts to restore local and regional environments. Work to
create what Paul Hawken calls "restorative economies" (1993),
economies that protect, support, and restore the environment while at the
same time supporting local communities.
9. Support solar and alternative technologies that reduce energy and
material resource use. Try to find ways to support alternative technologies
in your daily life and in your community.
10. Accept the collapse of global industrial civilization as an opportunity. Instead of focusing on the tragedy of this collapse, focus on what
you can do to help your local community and economy survive and prosper in this emerging new world of small local and regional economies and
cultures.
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Part Two

SCARCITY AND

CONFLICT

Introduction

of the broad global trends discussed in the preceding section, we should not be surprised if there is a relationship between scarcity
and internal and regional conflict. It is also appropriate to ask whether
there is a gender component to this violence. Are women particularly vulnerable and targeted as victims? With population pressures building in various parts of the globe, the struggle for resources intensifies, and with the
end of the cold war, we may expect to see old ethnic animosities and religious conflicts come to the surface with greater intensity, particularly in
the poorer parts of the world. We have already seen this outcome in Central America, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, the Middle East, the Balkans,
Africa, and the rimlands of the former Soviet Union.
The optimists argue that natural resources are not a finite entity that is
steadily being depleted; they see the creation of new or modified resources
that are the result of human inventions and labor, and they believe technology has an infinite capacity for solving the earth's problems. They also
have abiding faith in the resiliency of the earth itself and its human inhabitants. Just as Malthus was wrong in his predictions, so are today's doomsayers. If the optimists are correct, then the world will just be a more
prosperous place with more "stuff" distributed to larger numbers of people. If they are wrong, as the contributors in this section argue, then the
human race may be in for more conflict and suffering if it does not change
its course of the relentless pursuit of growth, accumulation, and waste.
IN THE LIGHT
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Biophysical Limits to the
Human Expropriation of Nature
John M . Gowdy

and among biologists and ecologists in
particular, the view is widely held that the current level of human activity is
unsustainable . The human population has reached 6 billion and is still
growing rapidly. Per capita incomes are rising exponentially in the consumption-driven nations of the North. And technological advances are allowing the ruthless exploitation of the earth's biological and mineral
resources on an unprecedented scale . Thus, all three elements of Paul
Ehrlich's environmental impact equation (Impact = Population x Afflu ence x Technology [PAT]) seem to be increasing with no end in sight. The
environmental-impact side of the PAT equation seems to be reaching crisis proportions. According to prominent biologists, the current loss of biological diversity is reaching the level of the five other mass-extinction
episodes in the 600 million-year history of complex life on earth. Best estimates are that the current rate of species extinction is between one hundred and one thousand times the pre-Homo sapiens background rate. The
rate of loss is accelerating with the clear-cutting of the world's remaining
tropical forests, exacerbated by massive forest fires in the Amazon Basin
and Indonesia. Edward O . Wilson estimates that by the middle of this century, more than 20 percent of existing species will be extinct ( 1992) .
Another widely reported potential environmental calamity, global climate change, also appears to be accelerating at an alarming rate. Atmospheric CO2 is expected to increase from its preindustrial level of270 PPM
to 600 PPM by the middle of this century, raising average global tempera-
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tures from 3.5 C to 7 C and raising sea levels one to two meters by thermal expansion alone. Very recent indications are that the eventual degree
of global warming may be in the high range of current predictions. Global
warming is most pronounced in the polar regions, which may lead to dramatic shifts in climate. A particularly alarming piece of news is that the
total mass of Arctic ice shrunk by 40 percent in the last three decades of
the twentieth century. Like many other environmental perturbations, the
ultimate effects of global climate change are unknown and probably unknowable until they happen. Some scientists warn that the Antarctic ice
cap may be melting so fast that it could cause a sudden catastrophic rise in
sea levels . Others predict that the melting of the Arctic ice mass could
change the course of the North Atlantic current and paradoxically cause a
sudden cooling of Europe and eastern North America. Whatever the ultimate consequences of global warming turn out to be, if they are sudden
then a tremendous strain will be placed on the world's agricultural system,
a system increasingly fragile because of its growing dependence on ever
more complex technology.
Many other less-publicized environmental crises loom, including
water shortages, disruption of ecosystems because of rising levels of atmospheric nitrogen, and disruption of endocrine systems of higher animals, including humans, because of rising levels of dioxin in the ambient
environment. The adverse consequences of any of tl1ese phenomena may
be overstated. The likelihood, however, that all the dire predictions are
fundamentally wrong is virtually zero. From many different perspectives,
it is clear that we are pushing the limits of the ability of the biophysical
world to absorb the continued expansion of human activity. Evidence
from many independent sources leads us to the conclusion that industrial
production will be drastically reduced, either because of constraints on energy and resource use or because of the limits of the environment to absorb the by-products of economic growth. It is increasingly likely that
sometime this century, the "industrialization project," to use Isidor Wallimann's term, will come to a halt with unforeseen but most likely negative
consequences for tl1e human species . What are the prospects for getting
off the industrial-growth path before social disintegration and mass death
occur?
We who are alive today are in a unique position in human history. Not
only do we exist at a critical instant in the biophysical history of the planet,
but we also have an unprecedented understanding of the details of our
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place in the history of our world. We are beginning to understand how the
biophysical boundary conditions for human activity are irreversibly changing, and we are beginning to recognize the human role in that process.
The advance of scientific knowledge in the past few decades has been staggering. Models designed to predict the pattern and consequences of climate change are being continually refined and are becoming increasingly
accurate. Ecological research showing the value of biodiversity to ecosystem stability is also advancing rapidly. Even more important, perhaps, we
are beginning to understand the connections among social phenomena,
such as class stratification and the generation of economic surplus, and environmental degradation.

The Importance of Economic Growth
within the World Sociopolitical System
It is now obvious that the promise of utopia through the creation of an
ever more abundant array of material possessions is a hollow one. Not only
is continued economic expansion impossible in a finite world, but opinion
surveys in industrial societies also indicate that despite rapid economic
growth, people are becoming less, not more, satisfied with the quality of
their lives. Even the relatively small percentage of the world's population
who have reaped the benefits of material abundance are increasingly unhappy, are less secure, and have less leisure time to enjoy their lives. Furthermore, the promise of extending northern prosperity to the poor
nations of the South is a fading dream. An increasing number of countries
are being added to the list of what are cynically termed failed nations.
If it is physically impossible for economic growth to continue for
much longer without irreparably undermining the life-support systems of
the planet, and if this growth is making its supposed beneficiaries less
happy, then why is the goal of economic growth not only accepted but also
relentlessly promoted by every existing government? Two answers to this
question are: ( 1) economic growth does benefit the tiny minority who
make the basic decisions about resource use and the distribution of economic surpluses, and (2) economic growth and expansion are an essential
feature of the self-organizing market system that now dominates human
cultures throughout the world.
From the international to the local levels, the leading proponents of
economic growth are, not surprisingly, those people who directly benefit
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from it. These people are the ones most willing to sacrifice environmental
quality and long-run social stability for economic expansion. The people
making investment decisions that will inevitably degrade the environment
and the quality of life are the ones who can best insulate themselves from
the adverse consequences of those decisions. World leaders across the political spectrum must be assured that "development" can continue before
environmental issues are even discussed. Any interference with national
sovereignty on ecological grounds is met with a self-righteous declaration
of the "right to develop." At the local level, economic growth at all costs is
promoted by the most conservative growth-oriented segments of the
economy, as represented by local chambers of commerce. The adverse side
effects of growth at the local level-including increased congestion,
sprawl, and higher taxes to pay for new services demanded-are borne by
others. The blind march toward increasing "rationalization" of the economy through privatization offormally collective activities is eliminating the
last vestiges of social control over investment and resource-use decisions.
Economic growth seems to be indispensable to the world economy as
it currently functions . Economic growth makes it possible to reap the benefits of technological advance by ensuring a more rapid turnover of capital
stock, by alleviating the need to deal with questions of unequal income
distribution, and by allowing firms to increase productivity through increasing returns to scale. When worker productivity increases, the resulting higher incomes generate a need for new products to absorb the
increase in demand. Expansion due to increased demand enables producers to capture economies of scale, resulting in more productivity improvement, higher incomes, and so on, ad infinitum. These positive-feedback
mechanisms mean that economic growth perpetuates more economic
growth and that socioeconomic and political institutions that promote
growth are constantly reinforced. The points of conflict between the prerogatives of economic growth and the prerogatives of maintaining an environmentally stable planet and socially stable communities are clear:
1. Population growth is good for the economy because it creates new
markets for goods, but the human population has greatly surpassed the
level oflong-term sustainability.
2. Increasing per capita consumption is good for the economy but re quires increasing amounts of resources and generates increasing amounts
of waste products.
3 . Income inequality increases productivity and economic growth by
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funneling resources into their economically most productive uses ( cumulative causation), but the cost is increasing income inequality and social
instability.
4. New technologies increase productivity and stimulate the expansion of economic activity, but many of these technologies have negative
consequences for society and the environment.
5. The expansion of markets is good for the economy, but it brings
new parts of the natural world as well as diverse human cultures under the
peculiar and shortsighted logic of market exchange.
When economic growth slows, income distribution becomes more
unequal, as it has within the northern countries and between the North
and the South since the mid-1970s. When economic output actually declines, as in the global and local economic depressions of the twentieth
century and currently in much of Africa and Latin America, the result is
usually social upheaval and mass destruction. Within the present world
economic system, economic growth is essential to keeping the incomes of
the wealthy high and keeping the lid on those people at the bottom. The
problem is that biophysical laws will, sometime this century, halt the expansion of this human-created system.

The Entropy Law and the Human Economy
In the past twenty-five years, the dominance of neoclassical economics has
been challenged by a number of alternative schools of economic thought,
including post-Keynesian, institutional, social, and ecological economics.
A basic insight of ecological economics is that economic activity is possible
only by extracting low entropy from the larger biophysical system. The pioneer of this approach to economic theory was Nicholas GeorgescuRoegen who published his monumental work The Entropy Law and the
Economic Process in 1971. Georgescu-Roegen used the entropy metaphor
to develop an economic theory based in historical time and grounded in
the fundamental laws of physics and biology. He called his theory "bioeconomics." He argued that low entropy, bound energy and matter, is not
only the taproot of economic value but also the ultimate source of social
conflict. His great contribution was to use the entropy metaphor to show
that the economic process is not a reversible, self-contained circular flow,
as depicted in standard economics texts, but rather an irreversible system
dependent upon and constrained by the laws of physics and biology. Not
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only is economic activity constrained by larger systems, but by degrading
the biophysical systems that surround the human economy, we limit the
future possibilities for human activity as well. Thermodynamic analysis
shows clearly the potential for chaos in far-from-equilibrium systems such
as the modern economy.
The history of the human species since the widespread adoption of
agriculture some ten thousand years ago has been one of playing out a farfrom-equilibrium process of expansion and collapse. The agricultural way
of life became dominant within a few millennia after its inception about
ten thousand years ago, and with it came a profound shift in human social
evolution. Societies became increasingly hierarchical and based on religious beliefs centered on the necessity of mobilizing a large workforce for
the agricultural enterprise. This new hierarchical organization of society
and the emergence of religious and political elites favored the continuance
of a way oflife that benefited the dominant and controlling social group,
regardless of the consequences for the majority of the population. The relationship between humans and the natural world also changed dramatically. The adoption of agriculture ushered in the age of human-dominated
ecosystems. This move meant homogenization and control of nature, on
the one hand, and destruction of that part of nature not useful to humans,
on the other. It is true that a characteristic of early agricultural societies
was the increasing capacity to buffer environmental disturbances. But this
ability to anticipate and plan for environmental disturbance came at a
price. A growing body of evidence indicates that a variety of cultures in
very different climates, regions, and epochs temporarily escaped environmental constraints by tapping scarce low entropy, only to collapse as the
boundary conditions invariably changed. As Joseph Tainter (1988) has
documented, societies as different as the Sumarians, the Mayans, and the
Easter Islanders have followed a remarkably similar pattern of colonization, rapid growth, intensification of resource exploitation, and collapse.
For these early agricultural societies, technological advances proved to be
poor long-run substitutes for the biophysical processes upon which they
ultimately depended.
The second great divide in economic history is the Industrial Revolution, which began some 250 years ago. In the relatively short period of
time since industrialization began, the human population has increased
sixfold, from about 1 billion to 6 billion people. The impact of the human
species has become truly global in nature. The Industrial Revolution not
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only drastically altered the relationships among people and between hu mans and nature, but also set in motion an ongoing process of economic
change with an inner logic of its own. It is important to keep in mind,
however, that the basic pattern of resource exploitation in industrial societies was established with the widespread adoption of agriculture, that pattern being input substitution and intensification of production through
technological advance in the face of diminishing resources. This pattern is
not one of a self-renewing circular flow but rather a one-way, irreversible
path toward chaos and collapse.
An instructive example of the entropic process of resource exploitation in the global market economy is the Pacific island of Nauru. Little is
known about the island's prehistory, but it was apparently settled by several groups of Melanesian and Polynesian peoples over a period of several
thousand years. Traditionally, the small island supported a population of
about one thousand people living on fish and a wide variety of native and
domesticated plants and animals. Because of its geographical isolation,
Nauru experienced little contact with Western cultures until the late
1800s. In 1900, it was discovered that the island was composed primarily
of one of the highest grades of phosphate rock, an essential requirement
for plant growth and an ingredient in fertilizer. Under various German,
British, Japanese, and Australian colonial administrations, and under independent rule beginning in 1968, most of the island of Nauru has been severely degraded by phosphate mining. Today, most of the island is
uninhabitable and unreclaimable, except for a narrow strip ofland around
the coastal perimeter.
As the natural resources of Nauru were degraded, the inhabitants
came to rely more and more on trade with the outside world for necessities
that were once plentiful locally. A diet of fresh fruit, coconuts, vegetables,
and fish has been replaced with imported canned goods . Even water now
has to be imported from the mainland. The once vibrant and selfsufficient culture, living within the constraints of a local ecosystem, has
been transformed into one totally dependent on imports from the world
market economy. Not only have the cultural traditions of Nauru suffered,
but the increased consumption of highly processed foods has given Naumans one of the highest rates of diabetes in the world as well. Very high
rates of hypertension and heart disease are also present, and in spite of a
high per capita income, life expectancy on Nauru is one of tl1e lowest in
the Pacific.
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In return for selling their island, the people of Nauru, in spite of gross
injustices perpetuated by colonial powers, received substantial monetary
rewards. A trust fund was established to provide for the day the phosphate
would be exhausted, and the value of the trust fund was estimated to be
more than $1 billion in the early 1990s. Unfortunately, most of the trust
fund disappeared because of bad investments and in the Asian financial
meltdown of the mid-1990s. Today the people ofNauru are left with few
environmental resources and no income flow to provide for their livelihoods . The Nauru experience can be interpreted as an isolated case or as
yet another contemporary example of the pattern of intensification of production, overshoot, and collapse that has prevailed in complex societies
for the past several thousand years.

Ghosts from the Past: Is It Possible
for Humans to Live in Harmony with Nature?
Our species, Homo sapiens, is the last remaining member of a genus that
first appeared some 3.5 million years ago in East Africa. For almost all the
time humans have lived on earth, our economic and social institutions
were based on a hunting-and-gathering lifestyle . People lived directly on
the flows from nature with a simple material technology and, judging from
historical accounts of hunter-gatherers, a complex set ofinstitutions favoring environmental stability and social equality. The hunter-gatherer way of
life has been dubbed by Marshall Sahlins as "the original affluent society"
( 1972, 430-43 ). According to Sahlins, hunter-gatherers were affluent because they had everything they wanted: not because they had more but
because they wanted less. An examination of the characteristics ofhuntergatherers can illuminate the connection between social equality and environmental integrity and give some insights as to how we might alter our
existing institutions and move to a path leading to a just and environmentally sustainable society.
James Woodburn, based on field studies of the Hadza, a huntergatherer culture of Tanzania, describes some of the characteristics of that
society tl1at promoted social equality:
1. Social groups are flexible and fluid.
2. Individuals are completely free to choose with whom they associate,
reside, and trade and exchange.
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3 . Individuals are not dependent on specific others for access to the
basic requirements oflife.
4. All relationships stress sharing and mutuality without requiring
long-term binding commitments.
In these types of societies, individuals have no real authority over one
another. Furthermore, all of the above characteristics are consciously protected as part of what Woodburn calls an "aggressively egalitarian" social
strategy (1982, 432) . He distinguishes between "immediate-return" and
"delayed-return" cultures (433-40). In immediate-return societies, people receive an immediate and direct return from their labor. Food is eaten
soon after it is gathered or hunted, and material technology is very simple.
In delayed-return systems, people hold some property rights associated
with wild products that have been improved with human effort, such as selectively culled wild herbs or wild plants that have been cared for. Al though both types of hunter-gatherer societies are much more egalitarian
than agricultural-or industrial-based societies, the immediate-return cultures are the most egalitarian in terms of wealth, status, and power over
others. Inequalities of wealth are not tolerated, and women have more independence than in delayed-return systems. In immediate-return systems,
access to the means for making a living is free and open to all. Material
technology is limited; the basic requirement to get along is not the possession of a collection of material objects but rather an extensive knowledge
about the specific ecosystems within which each society operates . This
knowledge is freely available and is given to all members of the group . In
delayed-return hunter-gatherer systems, although they are still egalitarian,
we see the beginnings of class differences based on access to technology
and the resulting control of an economic surplus .
To the Western way of thinking, the most remarkable thing about the
economic output of hunter-gatherer societies is that its distribution is independent of who produces it. In societies such as the Hadza and !Kung,
most of the meat is provided by only a few hunters. It is reported that
among the Hadza, there are healthy adult men who have scarcely killed an
animal in their entire lives, yet they are provided for just like everyone else
and suffer no ostracism . The !Kung have elaborate rules of behavior dissociating the hunter from his kill. For example, it is the owner of the arrow
that killed the animal who is entitled to distribute the meat, not the successful hunter himself. A study of the Ache of Paraguay found that on average, about three-quarters of the food that individuals consumed came
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from nonmembers of the immediate family. Successful hunters actually re ceived smaller portions for themselves than they would have if the distribution had been random .
The fact that there is no connection between production and distribution in some societies, nothing like the "marginal-productivity theory of
distribution" of neoclassical theory, exposes the fiction of "economic
man." There is nothing inherently selfish and greedy about our species.
Humans are capable of a wide variety of behavioral patterns depending
upon tl1e material basis of their particular societies and the ideological beliefs necessary to support specific ways of living. Judging from historical
records of hunting-and-gathering societies, the "natural" state of hu mankind may be much closer to Marx's "primitive communism" than to
contemporary capitalism.
Another relevant feature of hunter-gatherer economic systems is that
there frequently exist sanctions on the accumulation of personal possessions. The lack of possessions is not merely due to the nomadic nature of
the hunter-gatherer life. Sanctions apply to even the lightest objects, such
as beads or arrowheads. It appears that a central feature ensuring egalitarianism is that people are disengaged from property and thus from the potential for property rights to create dependency. This idea could not be
more subversive to tl1e standard economic way of thinking that equates
"freedom" with an ever greater expansion of property rights.

Ways Out: Maintaining Options
for the Twenty-First Century
What can be learned from the fates of past civilizations and the knowledge
we have about the precariousness of our own global market economy1
Can we use the concepts and scientific evidence gleaned from records of
past successful and unsuccessful cultures to break the pattern of overshoot
and collapse and prevent the collapse of our current civilization/ First of
all, two simple facts follow from the above discussion:
1. The economy is a subsystem of a larger social system that is, in turn,
part of and dependent upon an enveloping biophysical universe. Past civilizations collapsed because their institutions ignored this basic fact .
2. Strong connections exist between power and distribution of economic surplus, environmental degradation, and social collapse. Past societies have collapsed because decisions about resource use were made by a
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minority whose power and prestige depended on the unsustainable exploitation of people and nature .
Taking these two observations as a starting point, we can begin to formulate a minimal program for environmental and social sustainability.
First we should begin with a clear objective of what it is we wish to sustain.
Following the suggestion of Georgescu-Roegen, a reasonable objective is
to ensure the existence of the human species for as long as possible, recognizing the fact that humans, like all species, will someday become extinct. With this in mind, the following steps toward sustainability seem
reasonable:
1. Distinguish between ecological and economic sustainability and
adopt a no-substitution rule between human-made capital and the lifesupport systems of the natural world. Ecological economists argue that
economic and environmental accounts should be kept separate. This separate accounting should also include ecological systems and species that
have no apparent economic use or even no apparent value at all to humans. It has become a dangerous cliche to say that there is no conflict between the market economy and environmental protection. The conflict,
however, is clear. In the global market economy we have created, humans
can improve their economic well- being by destroying parts of the natural
world. In the long run, however, human survival depends on protecting
other species and the ecosystems they inhabit. The basic argument of ecologists is that when we trade nature for economic growth, we are destroying the life systems upon which all human life depends to achieve a
short-run gain. Destroying the basis for future human survival should be
no more acceptable to help the poor than to help the rich. This view is
consistent with the anthropocentric goal of preserving the human species
for as long as possible despite its "biocentric" appearance. We should keep
the biosphere intact because it is in our long-run interest of all humankind
to do so.
2. Define ( or describe) ecological sustainability in terms of preserving
evolutionary potential. Life on earth depends on complex relationships
and the ability to respond to changing biological and physical conditions.
In ecosystems, seemingly redundant species play important roles in system
resilience and may assume the role of existing keystone species when environmental conditions change . Preserving humans for as long as possible
necessitates preserving the biological potential of ecosystems to adapt to
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changing conditions. The long-run survival of our species depends on
preserving the environmental boundary conditions under which we
evolved, including the potential of ecosystems to adapt to change.
3. Define or describe social sustainability. What are the necessary conditions for a socially just, smoothly functioning society having the ability
to adapt to changing environmental conditions/ Just as humans evolved
under rather specific environmental conditions, so too did our social systems (our varied cultures) evolve under specific local biological and environmental constraints. We are only just beginning to understand the
relationships between human biology and human culture.
4. Define and delineate conditions for economic sustainability. The
field of economics is changing rapidly, and long-held notions of the sanctity of the market are changing. Spurred by massive policy failures in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America, economists are beginning to
recognize that unregulated markets are not consistent with economic sustainability. The recognition of this fact has far-reaching implications for
the sustainability debate because it calls into question the efficacy of market-based environmental and social policies.
These points call for policies that bring the way humans currently live
in line with the biological and social requirements oflong-run sustainability. This change will not be easy because some of these policies will undoubtedly conflict witl1 ideas of progress, individualism, and materialism
enshrined in the fundamental belief systems of the modern world. By recognizing tl1e conflict between human well-being based solely on market
output and long-run environmental integrity, we can begin to make policies for sustainability consistent with biological and physical reality. We
must go beyond arguments for "limits to growth" and find "alternatives
to growth." The difficulty of this task should not be underestimated, but
by beginning to formulate ways to decouple human well-being from consumption and economic growth, we can be ready with workable alternatives when the majority is willing to consider them seriously.
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Our Unsustainable
Society ... and the Alternative
Ted Trainer

IT IS WIDELY UNDERSTOOD that our industrial, affluent consumer society is ecologically unsustainable, unjust, and deteriorating fast . Almost all
social and economic problems are getting worse, and measures show that
the quality of life is failing. The argument below is that these problems
cannot be solved in a society that is driven by obsession with high rates of
production and consumption, affluent living standards, market forces, the
profit motive, and economic growth. A sustainable and just world order
cannot be achieved until we undertake radical change in our lifestyles, values, and systems, especially in our economic system. There are now many
people in many groups around the world working for a transition to the
Simpler Way.
There are two major faults built into our society that are causing the
main problems we are facing.

Fault 1: The Market
Markets do some things well, and in a satisfactory and sustainable society
there could be a considerable role for them, but only if they are kept under
careful social control. It is easily shown that the market system is responsible
for most of the deprivation and suffering in the world. The basic mecha nisms are most clearly seen when we consider what is happening in the
Third World.
The enormous amount of poverty and suffering in the Third World is
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not due to lack of resources . There is, for instance, sufficient food and land
to provide for all. The problem is that these resources are not distributed
well. Why not? The answer is that this way is how the market economy inevitably works.
In a market, scarce things alwaysgo mostly to the rich, that is, to those peocan bid the most for them. That's why we in rich countries get most
who
ple
of the oil that is produced. It is also why more than 500 million tons of
grain are fed to animals in rich countries every year, more than one-third
of the total world grain production, although perhaps 1 billion people are
malnourished.
Even more important is the fact that the market system inevitably brings
about inappropriate development in the Third World, that is, development
of the wrong industries. It will lead to the development of the most profitable industries, as distinct from the ones that are most necessary or appropriate. As a result, the Third World has mostly had development of
plantations and factories that will produce things for local rich people or for
export to rich countries. Thus, the Third World's productive capacity, its
land and labor, is drawn into producing for the benefit of others. These consequences are inevitable in an economic system in which what is done is
whatever is most profitable to the few who own capital, as distinct from what
is most needed by people or tl1eir ecosystems. Consequently, conventional
Third World development can be seen as a form oflegitimized plunder.
We in rich countries could not have our high living standards if the
global economy was not enabling us to take far more than our fair share of
world wealth and to deprive Third World people of their fair share.
It is likely that the Third World will accelerate into squalor and chaos
from here on. The United Nations has reported that 1.6 billion people, almost one-third of all the world's people, are getting poorer. The market
system is now giving the corporations and banks much more freedom and
power than ever before to develop in the Third World only those industries that will maximize corporate profits. There is no possibility of satisfactory Third World development until we develop a very different global
economic system.

Fault 2: The Limits to Growth
The most alarming mistake built into the foundations of our society is the
commitment to an affluent, industrial consumer lifestyle and to an economy
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that must have constant and limitless growth in output. Our levels of production and consumption are far too high to be kept up for very long and
could never be extended to all people. We are rapidly depleting resources
and damaging the environment. We can achieve our present "living standards" only because a few rich countries are grabbing most of the resources produced. By consuming so much, we cause huge ecological
damage. Our way oflife is grossly unsustainable. Yet, we are obsessed with
economic growth, with increasing production and consumption, as much
as possible and without limit! Following are some of the main points that
support limits to growth conclusions.
Rich countries, with about one-fifth of the world's people, are consuming about three-quarters of the world's resource production. Our per
capita consumption is about fifteen to twenty times that of the poorest half
of the world's people. World population will probably stabilize around 10
billion, somewhere after 2060 . If all those people were to have Australian
per capita resource consumption, then annual world production of all resources would have to be eight to ten times as great as it is now. If we tried
to raise present world production to that level by 2060, we would by then
have completely exhausted all probably recoverable resources of one-third
of the basic mineral items we use. All probably recoverable resources of
coal, oil, gas, tar sand and shale oil, and uranium (via burner reactors)
would have been exhausted by about 2045.
Petroleum is especially limited. World oil supply will probably peak
between 2005 and 2020 and could be down to half that level by 2025,
with big price increases soon after the peak. If all the people we will have
on earth by 2025 were to have Australia's present per capita oil consumption, world oil production would have to be fifteen times what it will probably be then. There are strong grounds for thinking that it will not be
possible for renewable energy sources to provide sufficient energy for richworld lifestyles.
If all 10 billion people were to use timber at the rich-world per capita
rate, we would need 3.5 times the world's present forest area. If all 10 billion were to have a rich-world diet, which takes about 1 hectare ofland to
produce, then we would need 10 billion hectares of food-producing land.
But there are only 1.4 billion hectares of cropland in use today, and this
amount is likely to decrease.
Recent "Footprint" analysis estimates that it takes at least 4.5-5
hectares of productive land to provide water, energy settlement area, and
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food for one person living in a rich-world city. So ifl0 billion people were
to live as we do in Sydney, then we would need about 50 billion hectares of
productive land. But that amount is seven times all the productive land on
the planet.
These limits are some of the main reasons for growth arguments that
lead to the conclusion that there is no possibility ofall people rising to the living standards we take for granted today in rich countries such as Australia.
We must accept the need to move to far simpler and less-resourceexpensive ways.

Hence the Environment Problem
The reason we have an environment problem is simply because there is far
too much producing and consuming going on. Our way of life involves the
consumption of huge amounts of materials. More than twenty tons of new
materials are used by each American every year.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has concluded that
in order to stop the carbon content of the atmosphere from rising any further, we must reduce the use of fossil fuels by 60-80 percent. If we did cut
it by 60 percent and shared the remaining energy among 10 billion people, then each of us would get only 1/18 of the amount we now use in
Australia per capita. Most people have no idea of how far beyond sustainable levels we are, and how big the reductions will have to be.

The Absurdly Impossible Implications
of Economic Growth
The foregoing argument has been that the present levels of production and
consumption are quite unsustainable . They are far too high to be kept
going for long or to be extended to all people. But we are determined to
increase present living standards and levels of output and consumption, as
much as possible and without any end in sight. Few people seem to recognize the absurdly impossible consequences of pursuing economic growth.
If we have a 3 percent per annum increase in output, by 2060 we will
be producing 8 times as much every year. (For 4 percent growth, the multiple is 16.) If by then all l 0 billion people expected had risen to the living
standards we would have then, the total world economic output would be
more than 100 times what it is today! Yet, the present level is unsustainable.
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(For a 4 percent per annum growth rate, the multiple is 220.) In the
1980s, Australia had a 3.2 percent per annum growth rate, which was not
sufficient to prevent virtually all our problems from becoming worse .
Globalization
We have entered a period in which all these problems will rapidly accelerate, because of the globalization of the economy. Since 1970 the world
economic system has run into crisis. It has become much more difficult for
corporations and banks to invest their constantly accumulating volumes of
capital profitably.
Thus, the big corporations and banks are now pushing through a massive
restructuring of the global economy, the development of a more unified and
deregulated system in which they have swept away most of the arrangements that previously hindered tl1eir access to increased business opportunities, markets, resources, and cheap labor. The pressure is on
governments to remove the protection, tariffs, and controls that they once
used to manage their economies; to sell government enterprises to the
corporations; to cut government services; to reduce taxes on corporations;
and above all to increase the freedom for market forces, that is, the free dom for corporations to operate. These changes are enabling the transnational corporations to come in and take advantage of more business
opportunities. A huge critical literature now explains how these changes
are devastating the lives of millions of people, especially in the Third
World, and their economies and ecosystems, but they are a delight to the
corporations and banks (see especially Chossudovsky 1997).
Conclusions on Our Situation
It should be obvious from the above discussion that our socioeconomic
system is extremely unsatisfactory and cannot solve our problems. There is
no possibility ofhaving a just and morally satisfactory or ecologically sustainable society if we allow the economy to be driven by market forces, the profit
motive, and economic growth. In a satisfactory economy, the needs of people, society, and the environment would determine what is done, not
profit.
We have allowed ourselves to be misled into thinking that we need
more production, more efficiency, more GNP, more science and technol-
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ogy, and harder work. But we already produce far more than would be necessary to give a high quality oflife to all, and we work much harder than is
necessary. We could easily develop a society in which we do much less work
and producing and have much more time to enjoy life, without stress and
insecurity, knowing that we are not damaging the environment or depriving
the Third World. We do not need better technology or more GDP to solve
our problems. We need radical change in systems, lifestyles, and values.

The Alternative: The Simpler Way
There are now many books and articles dealing with the general form that
a sustainable society must take. If the foregoing limits to growth analysis
are basically valid, then some of the key principles for a sustainable society
are clear and indisputable .
Material living standards must be much less affluent. In a sustainable
society, per capita rates of resource use must be a small fraction of the ones
in Australia today.
There must be small-scale) highly self-sufficient local economies.
There must be mostly cooperative and participatory local systems
whereby small communities control their own affairs, independent of the
international and global economies .
There must be much use of alternative technologies that minimize the
use of resources .
A very different economic system must be developed) one not driven by
market forces or the profit motive, and in which there is no growth.
The alternative way is the Simpler Way; we can and must all live well
with a much smaller amount of production, consumption, work, resource
use, trade, investment, and GNP than there is now. Doing so will allow us
to escape the economic treadmill and devote our lives to more important
things than producing and consuming. Living more simply does not mean
deprivation or hardship. It means focusing on what is sufficient for comfort, hygiene, efficiency, and so on.
We must develop as much self-sufficiency as we reasonably can at the
national level (meaning less trade), the household level, and especially the
neighborhood, suburban, town, and local regional levels. We need to convert our presently barren suburbs into thriving regional economies that
produce most of what tl1ey need from local resources . They would contain
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many small enterprises, such as the local bakery, enabling most of us to get
to work by bicycle or on foot . Much of our honey, eggs, crockery, vegetables, furniture, fruit, fish, and poultry could come from households and
backyard businesses engaged in craft and hobby production. It is much
more satisfying to produce most things in craft ways rather than in industrial factories. However, it would make sense to retain some larger massproduction factories.
Many market gardens could be located throughout the suburbs and
cities, for example, on derelict factory sites and beside railway lines. This
change would reduce the cost of food by 70 percent, especially by cutting
its transport costs. More important, having food produced close to where
people live would enable nutrients to be recycled back to the soil through
compost heaps and garbage gas units.
We should convert one house on each block to become a neighborhood workshop, recycling store, meeting place, surplus exchange, and library. Because there will be far less need for transport, we could dig up
many roads, greatly increasing city land area available for community gardens, workshops, ponds, forests, and the like .
There would also be many varieties of animals living in our neighborhoods, including an entire fishing industry based on tanks and ponds. In
addition, many materials can come from the communal woodlots, fruit
trees, bamboo clumps, ponds, meadows, and so on. They would provide
many free goods. Thus, we will develop the "commons," the community
land and resources from which all can take food and materials.
It would be a leisure-rich environment. Suburbs at present are leisure
deserts; there is not much to do. The alternative neighborhood would be
full of interesting things to do, familiar people, small businesses, common
projects, animals, gardens, forests, and alternative technologies. Consequently, people would be less inclined to go away on weekends and holidays, which would reduce national energy consumption.
The alternative way must be much more communal and cooperative.
We must share more things. We could have a few stepladders, electric
drills, and the like, in the neighborhood workshop, as distinct from one in
every house . We would be on various voluntary rosters, committees, and
working bees to carry out most of the child minding, nursing, basic educating, and care of aged and handicapped people in our area, as well as to
perform most of the functions that councils now carry out for us, such as
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maintaining our own parks and streets. We would therefore need far fewer
bureaucrats and professionals, reducing the amount of income we would
need to earn to pay taxes and for services.
Especially important would be the regular, voluntary community
working bees. Just imagine how rich your neighborhood would now be if
every Saturday afternoon for the past five years there had been a voluntary
working bee doing something that would make it a more pleasant place
for all to live.
There would be genuine participatory democracy. Most of our local
policies and programs could be worked out by elected nonpaid committees, and we could all vote on the important decisions concerning our
small area at regular town meetings. There would still be some functions
for state and national governments, but relatively few.
There is no chance of making these changes while we retain the present economic system. The fundamental concern in a satisfactory economy
would simply be to apply the available productive capacity to producing
what all people need for a good life, with as little bother and waste and work
as possible, and witl1out ecological damage. The basic economic priorities
must be decided according to what is socially desirable and democratically
decided, mostly at the local level, not dictated by huge and distant state
bureaucracies-what we do not want is centralized, bureaucratic big-state
socialism. However, much of the economy might remain as a ( carefully
monitored) form of private enterprise carried on by small firms, households, and cooperatives, so long as tl1eir goals were not profit maximization and growth. Market forces might operate in carefully regulated
sectors. For example, local market days could be important, enabling individuals and families to sell small amounts of garden produce and craft
items.
One large sector of the new economy would be cashless, involving
barter, working bees, gifts (in other words, just giving away surpluses),
and totally free goods (for example, from the commons, such as the roadside fruit and nut trees).
Unemployment and poverty could easily be eliminated. (There are
none in the Israeli Kibbutz settlements.) We would have neighborhood
work-coordination committees who would make sure that all who wanted
work had a share of the work that needed doing. Far less work would need
to be done than at present.
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Above all in the new economy, there would be no economic growth.
In fact, we would always be looking for ways of reducing the amount of
work, production, and resource use.
When we eliminate all that unnecessary production, and shift much of
the remainder to backyards, local small businesses and cooperatives, and
the noncash sector of the economy, most of us will need to go to work for
money in an office or a mass-production factory only one or two days a week.
In other words, it will become possible to live well on a very low cash income. We could spend the other five or six days working and playing
around the neighborhood, doing many varied, interesting, and useful
things every day.
We would have all the high-tech and modern ways that made sense, for
example, in medicine, windmill design, public transport, and household
appliances. We would still have national systems for some things, such as
railways, telecommunications, and taxes, but on nothing like the present
scale. We would have far more resources for science, research, education,
and the arts than we do now because we would have ceased wasting vast
quantities ofresources on the production of unnecessary items, including
arms. The quality oflife in this very frugal and highly self-sufficient Simpler Way could be much higher than it is for most people now in consumer
society.
It must be emphasized here that if the limits to growth analysis are basically correct, then we have no choice but to work for the sort of alternative
society outlined here . In rich and poor countries, a sustainable society can
be conceived only in terms of simpler lifestyles, mostly in highly selfsufficient and participatory settlements, and zero growth or steady-state
economic systems.

The Way Out
I think our chances of making the transition to the sustainable Simpler
Way are very slight. Since the 1960s, many have been attempting to get
public attention given to the limits to growth, the gross injustice of the
global economy, and the need for radical change . However, there is now
even less willingness to face up to these issues than tl1ere was thirty years
ago. Governments, economists, educational institutions, and the general
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public all flatly refuse to think about the viability of affluent living standards and the obsession with economic growth.
What then can we do? I think we must continue trying to get attention given to these issues, but the much more important thing to do now
is to work to establishgood examples ofalternative ways, especially whole settlements, so that when industrial, affluent consumer society starts to run
into really serious problems, people will be able to see here and tl1ere examples of settlements in which people are living well in just and ecologically sustainable ways.
Over the past twenty-five years, many small groups all around the
world have begun to develop settlements of tl1e required kind, witl1in the
Global Eco-village Movement. We who are within the movement live with
the burden of knowing that our way is the sustainable way, that it is a
highly satisfying way of life, that we must get the mainstream to see this
fact, that doing so will be extremely difficult, and that there is not a lot of
time left. We know that it would be easy to defuse the terrible problems
now threatening to destroy civilization, that it would be easy to form
highly self-sufficient and cooperative local economies in which people can
live very simply but with a very high quality of life, while preserving the
benefits of modern medicine and so on.
Governments will not, and indeed cannot, help with this task. It has to
be done at the grassroots level, as ordinary people begin exploring how
they can come together to build the new communities. Where the task is
most urgently needed and difficult is not at the level of rural intentional
communities, where the Global Eco-village Movement is making most
progress. The main problem is to gradually transform existing towns and
suburbs within cities into local self-sufficient communities. The most
promising beginning point for doing so is the formation of small community cooperatives that begin gardens, workshops, small businesses, recycling, and organizing of services to enable their participants, especially
unemployed people, to begin producing for themselves many of the
things they need. In time, tl1ese cooperatives must work to integrate with
the existing surrounding economy, and move it in more sustainable directions, for example, by helping to reduce imports.
The fate of the planet depends on whetl1er tl1ese things can be done.
For anyone concerned about the global crisis, there is nothing more important to do than to get more people to grasp these issues, and to help alternative ventures flourish.
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Population and Immigration
Sliding into Tribalism

Virginia Deane Abernethy

for law appear to be taking root in the
United States . Continuation of the destructive process that has led this far
will be detrimental to people of every class and ethnicity. Disintegration of
the society into competing groups could occur along ethnic, religious,
class, or geographic lines where, already, an identity separate from the
national identity is forming. The alternatives appear to be reversal of the
destructive process, containment of separatism through repressive authoritarian government, or civil wars.
Disintegration and fragmentation of a society can be traced, minimally, to explosive population growth, diversity, and exceeding the environment's carrying capacity. The two parts of the present discussion are:
( 1) the demographic sources of social fragmentation, and (2) the carrying capacity. Especially if the cohesive forces of a society are weak, competition for shrinking shares of resources can escalate into violent
confrontations.
Other factors, of course, have a role to play. A strongly pacific religious orientation might dampen or redirect public disorder. On the
other hand, lethal attacks on both domestic and foreign civilian populations, ordered during the 1990s by the highest officials of the U.S. government, modeled violence that arguably became a source of culture
change.
IN C IVILITY AND DISRESPE C T
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Scarcity, Diversity, and Conflict

The incapacity of natural systems to support the resident population in the
manner to which they feel entitled is almost always an underlying issue in
domestic and international conflict. Nevertheless, opposing factions in violent upheavals are often identifiable by class, ethnic, or religious grouping. Group identity and the lines along which a society fractures are salient
to many analysts and commentators and to the participants themselves. In
the present ideological climate, cleaving to one's group on grounds ofloyalty and as the basis of discrimination against other groups is applauded or
castigated depending upon the identity of groups involved.
But emphasis on how lines are drawn obscures the root causesmaller shares of valued resources than people consider fair or adequate.
Numerous autl1ors show how population growth triggers conflict.
Journalist Robert D. Kaplan, who writes for the Atlantic Monthly, observes that environments collapsed by the "impact of surging populations" are the frequent root cause of political chaos (1994, 73-74) . As
overtaxed environments fail , Kaplan expects to see "re-primitivized man:
warrior societies operating at a time of unprecedented resource scarcity
and planetary crowding .... Crime and war become indistinguishable."
Security of sorts is found only in private guards, armies, and alliances .
Some areas are further advanced along these lines than others. But Kaplan sees all as vulnerable. Collapsing or invaded nations on every continent are potentially threatened by sociopolitical disintegration, refugee
migrations across international borders, ethnic mixing, and loss of a cultural center.
Conclusions of this ilk are usually avoided because they break a number of cultural taboos. They suggest limits, the almost "un-American"
idea that economic growth and resource extraction cannot endlessly continue. They suggest that some people may remain "better off' than others. And they suggest that people might not give so freely if they saw that
altruism materially reduced their own well-being.
A number of Canadian political scientists have taken note of attempts
to deny the role of population and resource imbalances as the cause of
conflict, and they explicitly reject the denial- seeing it as a misguided effort to foster altruism. Analyzing civil and international wars on several
continents, they show how population growth aggravates resource
scarcity and contributes directly to conflict. Shares become smaller as a re -
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sult of population growth unless economic growth keeps pace-which is
not always possible. Competition turns into resource grabs, often with alliances providing both manpower and legitimacy. The alliances, naturally,
are formed along recognized criteria that may include ethnicity and religion. ( One wit suggests football conferences as new regional political
units after the coming dissolution of the United States.)
Population becomes a particularly uncomfortable subject when it suggests limitations of either family size or immigration. Family size is seen as
a personal decision in Western culture, and certain means oflimiting fam ily size- such as abortion- are widely viewed as unacceptable. Similarly,
limits on immigration are considered heartless in some political sectors
and an impediment to economic growth in others.
Nevertheless, in many countries- especially the ones that are particular targets of immigration because of being wealthier than neighborslarge majorities of citizens and tl1eir representative governments want to
end immigration . They perceive that they-or fellow countrymen whose
welfare they value and for whose support they are ultimately responsible-are progressively impoverished by an influx of strangers who are
mostly poor.
A common result of immigration, ethnic mixing, is a particular concern of political scientist Milton Esman . He focuses on the risks, sources of
conflict or accommodation, and likely channels of protest that accompany
the presence of several minorities together, or, alternately, a minority residing alongside a majority group within one territory. Esman's thesis is
that the presence of minorities invariably creates strain, so the implicit or
explicit goal of a vigorous society is the minimization of diversity. He
writes that the "classic approach to depluralization is the encouragement
of individual assimilation" ( 1994, 255 ). An example, cited by Kaplan, is
Saul Bellow's description of his immigrant family in turn-of-the-century
Chicago: "The country took us over. It was a country then, not a collection of cultures" (1994, 75-76).
Esman's perspective, his acute worry about ethnic diversity, is rejected
by many U .S. so-called intellectual elites. This stratum professes to deny
the reality of ethnicity. Sociologist Kevin MacDonald summarizes their apparent operating principle: "[E]thnic interests are simply delusions imposed by exploitative ethnic leaders."
Indeed, insistence upon the worldwide mixing of ethnic and religious
groups has become a major item on the globalist agenda. This goal carries
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pure altruism-much applauded in UN and psychiatric circles-to its logical and ridiculous conclusion: ridiculous because it amounts to denial that
ethnicity is an ubiquitous organizing principle within society, and denial
that individuals and ethnic groups compete.
Rudimentary history shows that denial of the importance of ethnicity
is dangerously misguided. Political scientist Milica Bookman describes the
Balkan struggle as one relatively typical example offestering ethnic competition. The struggle began more than five hundred years ago when ancestors of the present-day Albanians and Serbs split over resistance or
cooperation with the conquering Turks of the Ottoman Empire. A parallel
split occurred within the Serbian community, leaving some as Christians
whereas others converted to the Moslem faith of the Ottomans. She describes the former Yugoslavia, today, as engaged in "a dirty civil war, in
which neighbor has turned against neighbor, and each group is trying to be
the first to cleanse undesirables lest they cleanse him instead" (1997, 47).
The frequent absence of historical perspective and the double standard that sometimes characterizes discussion of ethnicity confuse the
emotional issue of population growth. The fears and frustrations of nativeborn people who see their traditional homeland and ethnic group overwhelmed may be underestimated. Debate about differential birthrates ( a
factor in both Israel and the former Yugoslavia, for example) and immigration (a rising issue in Europe, the United States, and more affluent
Arab and Asian countries) is sometimes stifled with indictments of
"racism" that leave this explosive term undefined.
As it pertains to traditionally white populations in Europe and British
colonies, "racism" appears to be a charge leveled at whoever objects to
cultural or physical displacement by foreign peoples. On the contrary,
those people who founded alien colonies within Western countries are
given a moral pass. Newcomers are even commended and targeted for special assistance by nonprofit groups such as the Ford Foundation, despite
the growing evidence that many of the people being displaced are the
poor, including established minorities.
The match to the tinder of ethnic competition is shortage or perceived
maldistribution of resources. Conflicts among groups seem not to escalate
into dangerous confrontations so long as wealth is growing at a rate
acceptable to large or powerful majorities, or even entitled-feeling minorities who believe that they have legitimate claims. Unfortunately,
economies often do not have straight-line rising trajectories sufficient to
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satisfy all expectations. Boding badly as well, resources and the capacity of
natural systems to cope with pollution have limits that, from time to time,
also cause a hiatus in the general improvement of the human condition.
Poverty is sometimes noted as a cause of escalating competition, competition that sometimes turns violent, but the underlying causes of
poverty tend to be brushed aside. The causal role of population growth is
routinely omitted in discussions of poverty. This omission is particularly
noticeable when the focus is industrialized countries, and the commentators are advocates for high levels of immigration.

Population Growth and Carrying Capacity
Carrying capacity refers to the number of individuals who can be supported without degrading the environment. Not degrading the environment means protecting its capacity to sustain the population at the desired
quality oflife over the long term.
A degraded environment produces less. Exceeding the carrying capacity today reduces tomorrow's productivity, so that the number that can be
supported without doing further damage gets smaller and smaller. Population growth combined with the high consumption levels to which all
Americans and immigrants aspire are the ultimate threats to the carrying
capacity-the topsoil, forests, energy, clean air and water, and other resources-of our national home.
Technological and market adjustments alter pressure points in the system, which means that one cannot predict which of several factors will ultimately limit national well-being. Agronomist David Pimentel et al. have
found that U.S. topsoil is being eroded fifteen to thirty times faster than its
natural formation rate, and that each year 3 million U.S. acres are being
paved over or made useless for agriculture ( 199 5). If present trends continue, arable land will shrink from the nearly 1.8 acres per person now
available in the United States to only 0.6 acres per person by 2050. That
amount would be just half of what is needed to provide a diverse diet.
Major U.S. sources of underground water, aquifers, are also being depleted at an alarming rate. Their water is being used up 25 percent faster
than the replenishment rate. It is expensive and difficult to transport water
from distant sources, and remaining water is becoming a source of friction
between competing urban and rural users. Agriculture in key areas, espe-

Population and Immigration

63

cially California, could lose out-with severe ramifications for the nation's
supply of fresh fruit and vegetables.
A further threat to the food supply comes from agriculture's dependence on petrochemicals (for fertilizer and pesticides, and to run ma chin ery). Indeed, agriculture accounts for 17 percent of U.S. petrochemical
use. However, domestic oil (including Alaskan oil) will probably be effectively gone in thirty years (meaning that the energy recovered will be less
than the energy used to get, refine, and distribute the oil). Moreover, a
number of respected geologists expect that the worldwide production of
oil will peak and then decline within the next seven to twenty years.
Already, 60 percent of the oil used in the United States is imported.
Reliance on foreign sources could greatly impact food production, domestic food prices, tl1e foreign exchange earned through food exports,
and policy options vis-a-vis oil-producing nations, especially Iran, Iraq,
Egypt, Libya, Kuwait, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia.
Demography explains the U.S. growing thirst for oil and energy.
Nearly all (93 percent) of a 25 percent increase in energy use between
1970 and 1990 was driven by population growth. That is, consumption
per capita leveled off because of increased efficiency and conservation,
but these gains were, and continue to be, overwhelmed by the growing
population.
Population growth is also endangering whole U.S. ecosystems, primarily by infringing on the habitats of native species. Ecologists suggest that
most species find a niche as some land converts to agriculture. The critical
shift is from agricultural to more intensive uses ofland as population density increases.
Biodiversity contributes more to our lives than just moral and aesthetic goods . Many species have economic value. Honeybees, for example,
pollinate billions of dollars worth of crops, and we have no good substitute! (When a major die-off of honeybees occurred in tl1e mid-1990s,
major resources were committed to discovering the source of the problem
and treating surviving hives-an expensive technological substitute for
what had been a free good of nature.)
Otl1er factors (such as deforestation, pollutants, tl1e collapse of fisheries and infrastructures, traffic congestion, and park and recreational congestion) could be chosen to illustrate carrying-capacity limits. Resources
are being depleted even at the present rate of use; more people demand
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more resources; in using them, people often create more pollution. Expensive remedial efforts certainly reverse much environmental damage,
but some systems have no substitute, and once used up or degraded, the
loss is irretrievable. Remedying man-made environmental problems,
problems made worse by population growth, soaks up public and private
funds that might otherwise be available for making net social and economic gams.
Population Growth in the United States
As natural resources dwindle, the hardship that citizens endure depends
on the population-growth rate, the distribution of wealth, and economic
competitiveness.
The United States has the fastest population-growth rate in the industrialized world. Estimated ( before the 2000 census) at more than 1.1 percent per year, the U.S. rate approaches that of some Third World countries
and puts the population on track to double in approximately sixty years.
That is, the estimated year-2000 population of approximately 280 million
would become 560 million (larger than China's population when the
Communists took power) by 2060. In fact, a 1990 publication by two re spected demographers foresaw this result. The 2000 census results will
show how far along into this future the country has gone .
Historically, the U.S. Census Bureau projections have been too low.
Their array of projections ( not predictions, because they are couched in assumptions) was revised upward in 1989, 1990, and 1992 because assumptions about immigrant numbers and subsequent family size had been too
low. A 199 5 array of projections escaped revision by altering assumptions
about departures from the United States each year. Moreover, asylum
claimants (similar to refugees except that they are in the United States
when they make their claim), which are estimated at about 150,000 per
year, were overlooked. This omission resulted in a greater than 10 percent
underestimate of immigration numbers in the "1995 Report of the U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform."
The distribution of wealth is second in importance for determining
national well-being. How is the man-made as well as the (inherently limited) natural wealth divided up?
The question can become muddy if the possibly desirable distribution
of wealth is confused with what is probable. Historical studies, sociobiol -

Population and Immigration

65

ogy, and principles of market economics suggest that equality in economic
results is incompatible with either freedom or shrinking resources per
capita.
Governments can alter for a time the identity of "winners," but equality of results is not-and never has been-achievable. As an anthropologist, I conclude that every society where there is population growth
without offsetting growth in resources arrives at an advanced state of stratification. Some people become very rich, but the middle class shrinks and
most people are poor. For example, the later Mayan, Aztec, and Incan civilizations preyed upon their neighbors and developed elaborate class systems probably including slavery, which is especially well documented for
the Incas . Neolithic peoples in Great Britain evolved from egalitarian to
stratified social structures as their communities became more densely populated. Class structures became more visible in both India and Algeria
about the time that these societies became significantly more crowded.
Women became chattel property in Europe's overpopulated middle and
late Middle Ages. The overpopulated New Guinea Enga tribe victimized
women, unlike neighbors whose land-to-people ratio remained favorable.
So it goes through the ancient and modern worlds. The gap between privileged and powerless appears to widen as overpopulation grows and resources dwindle.
Growth in the labor force is a principal mechanism by which population growth widens the gulf between rich and poor. In economic terms,
labor is a commodity. Therefore, a large supply of workers relative to the
availability of jobs (demand for workers) drives down the price (wages and
benefits) that employers are willing to pay. The larger the supply of labor
relative to jobs, the more that compensation for labor falls.
Historian Ronald Lee shows that, in Western Europe from 1260 A.D.
until the Industrial Revolution, a growing labor force reduced wages. He
found that wages fell by 16 percent, on average, whenever population shot
10 percent above its long-run trend line ( 1987, 448). That finding for the
amount of wage depression is an average for Germany, Austria, Spain, and
France. The population effect on working persons in preindustrial England was equally dramatic. According to Lee, "Reckoning in terms of
agricultural goods, a 10% increase in population depressed wages by 22%
and lowered labor's share of national income by 14%" ( 1980, 547). The
part of society that suffered most from an increase in the labor supply was
the workers themselves . Labor received less of the national income when
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the supply of labor was growing, and much more during periods of depopulation, for example, when Europe was being ravaged by epidemics.
Wages fell by 60 percent in the century of rapid population growth after
Europe was at last free of the Black Plague. Population growth appears to
depress wages and benefits regardless of the source of growth. Economist
Claudia Goldin's study of the 1897-1917 period during which 17 million
Europeans immigrated to the United States shows displacement of lessskilled native-born workers by immigrants who would work for less. She
concludes that a 1 percent increase in a city's foreign-born population decreased wages, for everyone, by 1.5 to 3 percent (1993, 21-22).
Effects were probably more far-reaching than Goldin imagines, because the large labor supply imported from overseas stifled internal migration toward jobs. Booker T. Washington's well-remembered "Put Down
Your Buckets Where You Are" address at the 1895 Atlanta Exposition
states the case. Washington pleaded for an end to immigration because it
contributed to continuing unemployment in rural and small-town America. Indeed, it is a matter of record that African Americans began to take
advantage ofindustrial job opportunities in the Nortl1 only after immigration was effectively ended in 1924.
Computer-technology jobs are the modern-day equivalent of industrial jobs. Not surprisingly, older computer scientists and engineers and
professional associations of black engineers are among those people who
oppose bringing in more high-tech workers under an enlarged HlB visa
program. Immigration is displacing both older men and upwardly mobile,
young black Americans. It is setting back forty years of social policy designed to raise all Americans into the mainstream.
The plight of unskilled U.S. workers is arguably the worst, because tl1e
close match between their labor characteristics and those traits of many
immigrants throws them into direct competition for jobs, education,
housing, health care, and further social safety-net protections provided by
local and federal governments. Opportunities for unskilled labor are very
limited in the modern economy, and the numbers of unskilled are being
swelled by immigration.
By 1990, immigrants were 10 percent of the total U.S. labor force and
a quarter of all workers without a high school diploma. Cornell labor
economist Vernon Briggs Jr. ( 1990) testified before the Congressional Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law
that immigration victimizes the lower end of the U.S. labor pool, includ-
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ing both citizens and established earlier immigrants whose labor force
characteristics resemble those traits of newcomers. Frank Morris ( 1990)
testified in the same hearings that "the black community ... may find that
any encouraging assumptions we had about opportunities for young black
workers and prospective workers have been sidetracked by hasty immigration policies .... It is clear that America's black population is bearing a
disproportionate share of immigrants' competition for jobs, housing and
social services."
The late Richard Estrada, a respected Texan journalist who served on
the Congressional Committee for Immigration Reform under the leadership of an icon of the African American community, Barbara Jordan, concurs. In 1991 he wrote: "Apologists for massive immigration appear to
blame the large-scale replacement of black workers by Hispanic immigrants in the hotel-cleaning industry of Los Angeles on the blacks themselves, instead of acknowledging the obvious explanation that the
immigrants depressed prevailing wages and systematically squeezed thousands of citizens out of the industry" (1991, 25).
Earlier immigrants also lose, even when newcomers are part of their
own ethnic group. Estrada attributes unemployment among established
Hispanics to new arrivals from Mexico and elsewhere who undercut
wages, that is, they will work for less and with fewer benefits.
Harvard economists George Borjas and Richard Freeman (1992) also
find that the economic position of high school-educated U.S. workers has
deteriorated because of competition from immigrants who will work for
less money and fewer benefits. High school dropouts are harmed still
more. Immigration and the overseas-trade imbalance together raised the
1988 effective labor supply by 28 percent for men and 31 percent for
women. This rise accounted for up to half of a 10 percent decline in the
wages of unskilled labor between 1970 and the late 1980s, a loss that has
not been recouped.
As a contributor to the National Research Council's 1995 study ofimmigration, Borjas quantified the income effect on U.S. workers. As part of
its costs, immigration accounts for working Americans' loss of $133 mil lion annually in job opportunities, depressed wages, and deteriorating
conditions of work.
Not everyone loses from immigration. The other part to Borjas's findings is that the lower labor costs put $140 billion annually into the pockets of employers . A clear social cost of the net $7 billion added to the
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aggregate economy is the increasingly large gap between the incomes of
the rich and the poor (1995, 49).
This analysis does not count taxpayer costs, as someone picks up the
tab for the education and health care of mainly poor immigrants. Economist Donald Huddle ( 1995) estimates that K- 12 education is the largest
single cost of immigration. The school-age populations in states that re ceive large immigrant flows have exploded, with a corresponding increase
in state and local budgets and taxes. In addition, an estimated 2 million
Americans were unemployed in 1992 because of immigration, and the resulting $11.9 billion in social safety-net costs was borne primarily by state
and local governments. This latter type of cost wanes and waxes with unemployment rates.
The National Research Council estimated in 1995 that "nativeheaded" households in California pay an additional $1,178 per household
in state and local taxes in order to offset the deficit of $3,463 incurred in
public services on behalf of each immigrant-headed household (Marshall
199 5). California has the most extreme redistribution of wealth from native-headed to immigrant-headed households, in part because California
is the principal target for immigration. In addition, many of California's
immigrants are Mexican or Central Americans, whose average educational
achievement is less than eighth grade.
Steve H. Murdock's testimony on March 22, 1995, before the U.S.
Commission on Immigration Reform suggests that immigration adds to
aggregate national income but without corresponding benefit to individual U.S. families . Jobs are systematically downgraded by cut-throat competition from the growing labor force so that the nostrum that "There are
some jobs that Americans won't do" becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Bring in Third World labor, and the wage, benefit, and safety conditions to
which jobs devolve attract neither native-born Americans nor established
immigrants. Supply and demand operating in the workplace means that a
surge in immigration guarantees that the less-skilled service-sector jobs remain low paid.
Black and white Americans flee states that are heavily affected by immigration, so data from local labor markets understate the extent to which
Americans are displaced. Moreover, Donald Huddle surmises that the
present ideology, which treats immigration as a win-win situation for all,
limits press coverage of the negative effects of immigration and population
growth (1993, 532).
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Never to be forgotten as one heads down this road is the widening
gulf between rich and poor, and the squeeze on the middle class. In a
democracy, the benefit of cheap labor to employers may be transient because it fosters the rhetoric of class warfare and demagoguery. The electoral process can then spew up tax and regulatory policies designed to
redistribute wealth, but these very policies penalize everyone because they
stifle wealth-creating business activity.
Lower compensation for work and heavier taxation eat at the middle
class, which is the bulwark of the domestic consumer market, political stability, and democracy. Not only dissatisfaction among ordinary Americans
but also pathological behavior can spread. Despair of ever joining (or remaining in) the mainstream fosters crime, riots, vigilantism, intolerance,
scapegoatism, and other signs of disappointment and anger. All erode civil
society and generate instability.

Stability
Failing assimilation, ways to manage ethnic conflict depend upon the
strength of the state that mediates between parties. The strength of a cen tralized government depends on multiple factors, including the citizenry's
tolerance for authoritarianism. For example, Marshal Josip B. Tito held
Yugoslavia together, in part through the force of his personality and his
World War II record, in part through authoritarian police measures, and in
part because the Soviet Union created an external threat that induced Yugoslavs of varied ethnicities to cooperate. Tito died in 1980. I visited Yugoslavia two years later; already it was being said that the country would
soon disintegrate.
Ultimately, the viability and legitimacy of government ride on the
health of the national economy and the environment, which is the lifesupport system for the economy. In the words of former U.S. senator and
the founder of Earth Day, Gaylord Nelson, the economy is a "whollyowned subsidiary of the environment." A state is fatally weakened by environmental collapse, seen, for example, if food production begins to fail.
The legitimacy of a state is further affected by whether majority or minority interests are in control. Analyst Benjamin Schwarz ( 1995) suggests
that dominance by a single mainstream culture is a precondition of national stability. The argument is both logical and supported by case studies. Schwarz points out that claims made by diverse elements in a society
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cannot be resolved by "reasonable" divisions of resources and power, because minorities are seldom satisfied by distributions that do not entail significant ( therefore unacceptable) losses to the dominant group.
Diversity becomes a more severe problem if a nation's institutions
allow or even encourage the mobilization, in Esman's terms, of "ethnic
entrepreneurs" (1994). For example, certain elites in U.S. society encourage not only "hate-crime" but also "hate-speech" legislation. Such legislation is strongly favored by some minorities in the United States, not
surprisingly, because it is widely assumed that such laws would be used to
punish only whites. In the turn-of-the-century political climate, they
could be correct. But how long whites will acquiesce in their own dispossession remains an open question.
A unique type of problem arises when a minority regards shared territory as its homeland. Noel Malcolm suggests that "aggressive nationalism
is typically a syndrome of the dispossessed, of those who feel power has
been taken from them" (1995, 55 ). This description surely fits the minority Serb population in Kosovo, where as recently as post-World War I they
had been a clear majority.
The description "aggressive nationalism" also matches the profile
emerging among Hispanics in the U.S. Southwest. A typical incident occurred outside the Westwood (Los Angeles) federal building on July 4,
1996. Here, a multiracial and multiethnic gathering of U.S. citizens celebrating Independence Day, carrying American flags and demonstrating
against immigration, was confronted, then physically attacked, by a much
larger group of mostly Hispanic immigrants organized by La Raza Unida
(The United Race). The attackers carried Mexican flags, posters showing
severed "gringo" heads, banners with hammer and sickle, and words including "Fight for Communism; Power to the Workers" and "Este Puno
Si Se [unreadable] Los Obreros Al Poder." This group chanted epithets
against the United States and such slogans as "Viva, Aztlan." The Hispanic attack turned physical while several police looked passively on. A few
elderly Americans with bloodied heads were carried away on hospital
stretchers, and the episode ended soon after, with no arrests, although the
scene had been captured on videotape.
Aztlan is the name of the irredentist nation that is to be formed out of
present-day California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and soutl1ern Colorado . The May 1995 issue of the Voz Frontera approvingly describes the
intention of the "brown berets of Aztlan" to establish a "revolutionary
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people's government" that will prepare for armed struggle in order to oust
"the pigs . . .. The revolution has begun. Which side are you on?" In the
same vein, a February 6, 1998, seminar at the Southwestern University
School of Law in Los Angeles featured an address by the Mexican consul
general to the United States, Jose Angel Pescador Osuna. He declared,
"We are practicing reconquista in California."
In California, Hispanics already make up one-third of the population,
and demographer William Frey ( 199 5) finds that both white and black native-born An1ericans are fleeing. Demographic projections for the United
States, as a whole, suggest that Hispanics have almost overtaken blacks as
the largest minority and will soon be a full 25 percent of the population .
Immigration and differential birthrates will leave the white population as a
minority by midcentury.
Esman warns that diversity and democracy are intrinsically antagonistic because "where the state loses control of ethnic relations, the result is
likely to be protracted violence and civil war, as in Bosnia, Sri Lanka, and
Sudan" (1994, 104). He might have added to his short list Kosovo, Ireland, Somalia, Burundi, Rwanda, Indonesia, Sri Lanka (Ceylon), the
Philippines, and Mexico.
The response to fulminating hostilities between groups is often an increasingly authoritarian state . An embattled state prefers an unarmed citizenry because weak factions can be opportunistically sacrificed in order to
maintain quiet.
Citizens may have a different interest. If the state is ( 1) unable to keep
order, ( 2) captured by a hostile faction, or ( 3) itself poses a threat to liberty, self-defense may be the best remaining option. Individuals and
groups who perceive growing interethnic tension rightly fear losing the
capability for self-defense.
Esman's predictions seem, at first glance, to be contradicted by the example of the United States, which is sometimes called "a nation of immigrants." Yet, most of U .S. history has proceeded against a backdrop of
growing wealth . The acid test of shrinking shares has only begun to strain
its democratic institutions.
The importance of broad access to wealth as the basis of democracy
can hardly be overestimated. In the early nineteenth century, Alexis de
Tocqueville observed that the roots of American liberty are planted in the
natural wealth of the continent. He wrote that "the chief circumstance
which has favored the establishment and maintenance of a democratic sys-
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tern in the United States is the nature of the territory that the Americans
inhabit. Their ancestors gave them a love of equality and freedom; but
God Himself gave them the means of remaining equal and free by placing
them upon a boundless continent."
Recent U.S. history bears out, unfortunately, the de TocquevilleEsman-Kaplan-Schwarz analysis. In the early 1990s, Kaplan's Atlantic
Monthly article ( 1994) described multiethnic riots in poorer sections of
Los Angeles as "blacks v. brown," but, in addition, recently immigrated
Koreans became a major target of attack. Shopkeepers who had the artillery for self-defense escaped being burned out, but others were not so
lucky. Other major cities including Philadelphia and Miami also had multiethnic riots.
Esman's observation that authoritarianism becomes indispensable to
control ethnic relations foreshadows several political currents in the turnof-the-century United States. Calls for hate -crime legislation and criminalization of "hate speech" ( an attack on the First An1endment), attempts
to narrow the scope of tl1e Second Amendment (which guarantees citizens' rights to keep and bear arms), and the use of the police and National
Guard to quell disturbances are each, in their own way, an attack on constitutionally guaranteed liberties.
These developments were punctuated by questionable uses of federal
forces against citizens by the Clinton administration. These events include
the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) and the Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms' (ATF) fatal shooting of a boy, a woman, and a baby-in-arms
at Ruby Ridge, Montana, and the incineration of more than eighty men,
women, and children at Waco, Texas.
Without missing a beat, the year 2000 began with U .S. Attorney General Janet Reno ordering the FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to break into a Miami home in order to grab Elian Gonzalez,
who was to be turned over (probably rightly) to his Cuban fatl1er. But
Reno ordered tl1is raid on the strength of a search warrant (an attack on the
Fourth Amendment) instead of a duly sworn-to court order as required by
the Constitution. Moreover, just twenty seconds elapsed between the
FBI's 5:00 A .M. knock on the door and the break-in. Respected Harvard
Law School professor Lawrence Tribe said that the raid "strikes at the
heart of constitutional government and shakes the safeguards ofliberty."
As a society slides into chaos and a disregard of law, warns Kaplan,
democracy becomes "less and less relevant to the larger issue of govern-
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ability... . It is not clear that the United States will survive the next century in exactly its present form . Because America is a multiethnic society,
the nation-state has always been more fragile here than it is in more homogeneous societies" (1994).
Liberty, tolerance, and democracy are delicate flowers. Civic virtues
may not survive population growth and shrinkage of the ordinary person's
portion. But the unwanted trade-off between liberty and order can be resisted. Much of the population growth results from immigration, a de
facto population policy. Many Americans think that an immigration policy
that results in approximately 1 million legal, and possibly half that many illegal, immigrants annually is both arbitrary and unnecessary.
Conclusion

Many of the environmental, economic, and cultural problems that the
United States faces are being worsened by population growth. Many
Americans resent the changes, having believed almost since the founding
of the colonies that the American legacy was abundance and liberty. In the
modern context, the tradition teaches that the U .S. birthright is the opportunity for honest work that will produce a good living. Population
growth is not alone in changing the environment in which most Americans work and play, but certain negative tendencies become visibly worse
as more people press upon the environmental, social, and cultural carrying
capacity.
Most Americans are far ahead of their leaders in trying to stop population growth. Native-born Americans limit family size to 1.8 children. (The
average national rate of 2.1 reflects the significantly higher fertility rate of
the immigrant sector.) Roper and other polls of a cross-section of Americans also affirm most Americans' dislike of high levels of immigration.
Similarly, the 1988-1990 Latino National Political Survey-released by
the Ford Foundation in December 1992, two months after passage oflegislation that raised legal immigration by 40 percent- suggests that more
than 75 percent of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans residing in the United
States agree or strongly agree that "there are too many immigrants."
The general public is not xenophobic in its rejection of immigration.
Nevertheless, a growing number perceive a link between the large inflow
of aliens and population growth. Growth in the size of the national population is felt locally as crowding (for example, of schools, roads, and na-
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tional parks), dilution of the traditional culture, higher numbers without
health care insurance, and higher taxes. On the national level, one sees
that the looming collapse of Social Security is brought nearer by the inflow
of impoverished populations.
One should note that Social Security is a redistributive system. Lowincome participants accrue much higher benefits (will receive more) than
the lifetime contributions they make. The shortfall must be made up, now
or later, by middle-and high-income workers. With continuation of the
current trend, which favors family-reunification immigrants who are predominantly undereducated, poor, and rarely speak English, resentment
among native-born Americans could rise sharply, redefining whom is unwanted and what is un-American.
The perception that natural resources are being used up or degraded,
and tl1at liberty is giving way to authoritarianism where a chief goal is
management of ethnic relations, could give rise to a sense of being cheated
out of what is commonly seen as a birthright. Mutual tolerance many not
survive the realization that government and the media elite have governed
in their own interests, in disregard for the well-being of the average loyal
citizen.
In the declining phase of any economic cycle, less sophisticated sectors
of the public will sense mainly their own alienation from society and a
near-total absence of a stake in its peacefol continuance. Demagogic leaders could mobilize this mass in the usual way-scapegoatism, myths,
promises-and the United States that has been so honored would become
history. A descent into genocide as gangs, tribes, and factions war over
spoils seems farfetched, it is true, but the lessons of history warn of the
alarming potential.
The further tragedy of the present liberal immigration policy is that
the sacrifice of the national interest is based on self-delusion. It is based on
the persistent belief that open-arms immigration policies help countries
from which immigrants come. Such policies do not help. On the contrary,
holding out the promise of rescue often promotes harmfolly false perceptions. Believing that local limits do not apply, foreign governments and
people conclude that reproductive self-discipline can be disregarded. This
misperception is devastating, because only by limiting natural increase can
an overpopulated society come into balance with the carrying capacity of
the environment.
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Ways Out

Stopping the momentum of population growth in the United States is a
daunting goal. Albert Bartlett and Edward Lytwak ( 1995) explain that attaining zero population growth means that the total of deaths and emigration must equal (or be greater than) the total of births and
immigration. Given the 1992 estimates for the United States of 2.2 million births and 0.2 million emigrants per year, the total of birtl1s and immigration should not exceed 2.4-a problem to say the least because
births alone were 4.1 million in 1992! Time is not making these statistics
come out better.
The array of instant zero-population-growth scenarios can be represented by two extreme possibilities. One hypothetical arm would give the
whole 1992 allowance to births (2.4 million) while placing immigration at
zero. Doing so would entail a 42.5 percent reduction in the actual number of births in 1992 and, of course, a 100 percent reduction in immigration. The other hypothetical no-growth scenario would leave immigration
at its estimated actual level for 1992, or 1.3 million immigrants, which
would leave room for just 1.1 million births (a 73 .2 percent reduction in
U.S. fertility).
This exercise reveals the strength of the forces producing population
growth. It also points up the risk of delay in formulating and implementing policy. Delay now could contribute to crisis later, a high-stakes gamble. Never ( one prays) will individual decisions about childbearing be
overruled by government, but China, of necessity, provides precedent.
Immigration numbers, unlike childbearing, are historically and appropriately within the public-policy arena. An all-inclusive cap of one hundred
thousand annually would serve the national interest. Visas might be allocated, for example, by giving continuing priority to spouses of American
citizens, although nowhere is it written that only the United States should
accommodate family reunification-couples can reunite elsewhere. Perhaps twenty-five thousand places could be reserved for refugees and those
immigrants seeking asylum, giving substance to America's valued role as a
refuge oflast resort. Beyond that, skilled immigrants and citizens' nuclear
families (but not collateral relatives) complete tl1e list of tl1ose people who
might receive priority under a reformed immigration policy. Alternately,
visas could be allocated according to a point system that preferentially
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counted skills, then family connections in the United States, and so on.
The total is what counts, and it should take priority over negotiations to
determine how visas should be allocated.
Americans could be proud of a policy that explicitly and rationally
committed tl1e nation to balancing population size with the long-term
carrying capacity of tl1e environment. It is sensitive and restrained, and designed to minimize friction among existing residents and citizens of the
United States. Given the population growth to which we are unavoidably
committed given the demographic base, moderation is especially needed.
In the words of elder statesman George Kennan, it is essential to not violate "the interests, and limitations of our country" ( 199 5, 116).
Present immigration policies are driving the United States to a population increase of approximately 1.1 percent annually. This rate of increase
foretells a doubling time of about sixty-three years, yielding a population
of 560 million shortly after the year 2060. At this rate, the United States
reaches approximately one-half billion at midcentury.
On the contrary, an all-inclusive cap of one hundred thousand immigrants annually would produce a slight increase and then gradual decline
in population size ( through attrition) beginning in about 2050. It would
come none too soon to mitigate the very likely social and political fallout
from the crowding, multiculturalism, and alienation from the mainstream
that seem increasingly upon us.
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Population, Technology,
and Development
The Vicious-Circle Principle and the Theory
ofHuman Development

Craig Dilworth

of human development is a conceptual picture that explains
human development as distinct from the development of other life forms.
Darwin's theory of natural selection explains the development of the
world's various life forms, including ours, but it does not explain what is
particular about the development of our species.
Though to the best of my knowledge no other theory of human development has ever been put forward, there is a good deal of "conventional wisdom" about how we got where we are. This conventional
wisdom tells us such things as that we humans have been successful as a
species, and that a large part of that success is thanks to our ability to find
technological solutions to problems of survival. The idea is that through
technological change, we have continuously been progressing toward a
better way of life, and that human inventiveness can solve virtually every
problem, whether it be an environmental problem or one of scarcity. Conventional wisdom also tells us that we brought about the agricultural and
industrial revolutions in order to improve our living conditions, and that
economic growth increases our welfare while at the same time being necessary for dealing with our environmental problems. It also tells us such
things as that the consumption of goods and services is the motor of our
economy, that having a surplus is a good way to avoid the full impact of
THE THEORY
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natural disasters, that ethnic differences are a fundamental cause of war,
and that recycling goods should be part of a sustainable society. On the
theory to be presented here, conventional wisdom will be seen to be
wrong on all of these points.
Where Darwin's theory of natural selection is based on the principle of
evolution, the theory of human development, which presupposes
Darwin's theory, is based on the vicious-circle principle. And where the
principle of evolution came to constitute the core of biology, the viciouscircle principle is intended to constitute the core of human ecology.
The vicious-circle principle is both easy to understand and in keeping
with common sense. Briefly put, it says that increasing population size leads
to technological innovation, which allows more to be taken from the environ ment while leaving less behind, while at the same time promoting further population growth. Or, seeing as it is a matter of a circle, it could, for example,
be expressed as: technological innovation allows more to be taken from the
environment while leaving less behind, the increase promoting population
growth, which in turn creates a demand for further technological innovation. I describe it in more detail below.

The Vicious-Circle Principle
(or, What We Are Up Against)
Human population growth
increases consumption,
which leads to scarcity,
which increases the chance of war at the same time as it creates a demand
for new technology,
which is developed and employed,
which allows previously inaccessible resources-renewable, nonrenewable,
or both-to be drawn from the environment (or, in the case of military
technology, allows the destruction of goods produced using resources
drawn from the environment),
which reduces the quantity of resources remaining,
while allowing the production of a surplus of goods or services or both
normally of lower quality than the ones they are replacing,
which can mean increased work for individuals, a worsening of their quality of life, and a lowering of their standard ofliving,
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both the taking of resources and the production of a surplus of goods and
services increasing the use of energy (itself a resource),
while the existence of the surplus leads to increased trade,
which is the same thing as economic growth,
while the goods and transformed energy become polluting waste
at the same time as the surplus supports further population growth.
Note that the vicious-circle principle constitutes a paradigm of human
development, not a law. In other words, it is intended to capture the main
thrust of human development to date, and is not a description of how all
instances of human development always have been and always must be.
Some societies have, for varying periods of time, not gotten caught up in
the vicious circle. But at present, the vast majority of humankind is caught
up in it. But seeing as we are rational animals ( as they say), we should have
it in our power to break the circle and get on to a sustainable path. In not
being sustainable, the vicious circle will sooner or later collapse anyway.
But if we wait until it collapses of itself, it could very well take us with it.
In order to investigate the viability of our theory, we will consider the
extent to which actual human development to date can be understood in
its light.

The Human Revolution (ca. 100,000 BP)
Our species, the Cro- Magnons, or Homo sapiens sapiens, first appeared in
Africa around 150,000 years ago. From there, we gradually wandered
northward, coming first to the Near East about 100,000 years ago, and
eventually to Europe and as far east as Australia about 40,000 years ago.
When we arrived in Europe, the Neanderthals (Homo sapiens neanderthalensis) had already been established there for about 100,000 years.
Due to the many technological innovations occurring in the Near East
about 100,000 years ago, many archaeologists refer to this time as that of
the "human revolution." These innovations include the use of bone for
tools, the making of tools with built-in handles, and probably the use of
skin clothing. On the theory of human development as based on the vicious-circle principle, it is just this innovativeness of our species and its
predecessors that is responsible for the ecological and demographic
predicament in which we find ourselves today. What this statement means,
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unfortunately, is that the problem lies in our genes, which makes it all the
more difficult to come to terms with.
Starting about 40,000 years ago, there occurred another spurt in
human technological development. It included the systematic hunting of
selected animals; the widespread use of blade tools; the ability to create
fire; and the invention of lamps, needles with eyes, spoons, pestles, axes,
the spear thrower, and, about 12,000 years ago, the bow and arrow. At the
same time as these technological innovations were made, the human population started to increase noticeably, as is to be expected in the viciouscircle principle.
Note that in the vicious-circle principle, all of these technical changes
contribute to the number of humans that the environment can sustain in
the short term, whereas the innovations that allow for the greatest shortterm increase in population are the ones most likely to reduce the possible
population size in the long term. That is, such innovations are the ones
that, due to their enabling a greater exploitation of the resource base, are
most likely to diminish the environment's carrying capacity for humans.
Perhaps what is most notable with regard to human technological development during the last ice age (ca. 80,000 to 10,000 BP) was the improvement in weapons, particularly the development from the wooden
thrusting spear, to the stone-pointed throwing spear, to the throwing
spear that could be hurled a greater distance with tl1e aid of a spear
thrower, and finally on to tl1e bow and arrow. It may in fact have been the
case that the demise of the Neanderthals about 28,000 years ago was a direct result of the latter phase of this development occurring earlier with us.
The Neanderthals were not the only large mammals to go out of existence toward the end of the last ice age. Somewhat before 12,000 years
ago, but after our arrival, all megafauna in Australia, including the giant
kangaroo, became extinct. And shortly after 12,000 years ago, in Eurasia
and America, such large mammals as the mammoth, the mastodon, the
woolly rhinoceros, the giant deer, the saber-tootl1 tiger, the giant wolf, the
native American horse, the gomphothere, and the giant ground sloth all
became extinct. All in all, by 10,000 years ago, more than fifty genera of
large mammals had become extinct over a period of a few thousand years.
This number is greater than what had become extinct during the preceding 4 million years!
We humans with our weapons were undoubtedly directly or indirectly
responsible for virtually all of these extinctions. Primitive man's attitude to
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and effect on his environment have not been so benign as, for example,
some Native Americans would have us believe. Here we see just how deep
the ecological problem is. It did not start with the Industrial Revolution or
later. It started when our ancestors began to fashion and improve tools.

The Horticultural Revolution (ca. 10,000 BP)
The horticultural revolution was not a response to the wanning climate at
the beginning of the Holocene leading to a focus on gardening rather
than hunting as an easier way to obtain a livelihood. Archaeological evidence suggests rather that food production developed in response to problems caused by the undue success of the hunter-gatherers, which led to not
only an increase in their numbers, but at the same time a reduction in the
amount of available food. The development of horticulture was an adjustment that human populations were forced to make in response to this situation of scarcity.
Hunter-gatherers of our species had continuously increased in population right from their first appearance, fully occupying those portions of
the earth, including Australia and the Americas, that could support their
lifestyle with reasonable ease. After they had undermined their own food
resources by eradicating so many genera of large mammals, they were
forced to become more eclectic in their food gathering, to eat more and
more unpalatable foods, and in particular to concentrate on foods that,
though being of lower nutritional value, were more abundant. Human
populations throughout the world were forced to adjust to further increases in their numbers by increasing not the food resources that they
preferred, but the ones that responded well to attention, and could be
made to produce the greatest number of edible calories per unit ofland.
The form of agriculture that developed was swidden, or slash-andburn, cultivation. This form was coupled with the domestication of ani mals, first in western Asia, starting with the dog some 12,000 years ago or
earlier; and succeeded by goats and sheep around 9,000 years ago; then cattle, pigs, and bees; and then the horse and donkey about 6,000 years ago.
To explain the origin of food production ( and economic change in
general), many scholars now assume that the people most likely to adopt a
new subsistence strategy are the ones who are having trouble following
the common subsistence practices of their group. Societies that had no
need of horticultural techniques resisted their introduction for centuries
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after first becoming acquainted with them. In the Middle East, it was
those people who lived outside the zone where wild foods were most
abundant that began to experiment with horticulture . Recent archaeological finds suggest that domestication began in marginal areas rather than in
the optimal zones, such as the Hilly Flanks, where traditional foods were
most abundant. Early cultivation began as an attempt to copy, in a less favorable environment, the dense stands of wheat and barley that grew wild
in the Hilly Flanks .
Here we have a clear case for the application of the vicious-circle principle. Technological advance in the form of the invention of such
weapons as the bow and arrow made sources of food available that were
previously inaccessible, paving the way for an increase in population at the
same time as it led to resource depletion . And the greater population coupled with the diminished resources created the need for new technology-in the form of horticulture-capable of extracting even more from
the environment.
Regarding the idea that technological advance leads to an improvement in standard of living-as is suggested by "conventional wisdom"both archaeological and anthropological evidences indicate that quite the
opposite occurred in the case of the revolution from the hunter-gatherer
period to the horticultural, as is in keeping with the vicious-circle principle . The horticulturists' diet, based on crops and dairy products, was less
varied and nutritious than the foragers', which was higher in proteins and
lower in fats and carbohydrates. Whereas foragers were relatively disease
free, stress free, and well nourished, protein deficiency and dental cares increased with the shift to food production, whereas people's average height
decreased and the physical well -being of the population declined. Human
life expectancy at birth fell from around thirty years for hunter-gatherers
to about twenty years during the whole of the horticultural era, in spite of
the resultant change from hand-to-mouth feeding to the storing of food .
Apart from the effects of war, the dependence on specialized food production meant a lack of flexibility that could lead to starvation when crops
failed , for example, as a result of drought. Higher population density and
trade links also contributed to the increase in the spread of infectious diseases, and the sedentary lifestyle led to more unsanitary conditions and the
spread of parasites, all of which worsened humans' quality oflife.
Other disadvantages accompanied food production. Social inequality
increased, as elaborate systems of social stratification replaced the egalitar-
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1a111sm of the hunter-gatherer society. Slavery was invented. Poverty,
crime, war, and human sacrifice became widespread, and the rate at which
humans degraded their environment increased.
Another notable aspect of the lowering of the quality of human life
with the coming of the horticultural lifestyle is the drudgery it involves.
The development of the Neolithic culture that accompanied the revolution to horticulture meant an increasing division of labor and the beginning of actual work. Whereas women worked in gardens, a task involving a
good deal of drudgery itself, men worked grinding, polishing, and boring
holes in stone tools for use in the gardens: the beginning of boring work
and the daily grind!
But this result is not all. Further in keeping with the vicious-circle
principle, we see that not only did horticulture allow for the sustenance of
a population that had overexploited its environment with the aid of
weapon technology, but also the new technology it involved actually allowed the size of that population to grow. During the 5,000 years of the
horticultural period, the human population, in spite of undergoing a lowering in its standard of living, grew from some 10 million to around 80
million. This growth was not solely thanks to the use of the hoe in horticulture, but further supported by such technological innovations as animal domestication, and such inventions as sickles, cloth, woven baskets,
sailboats, fishnets, fishhooks, ice picks, and combs.
Here I want to emphasize an important aspect of the difference between humans and other species. Given no technological change to allow
increasing environmental exploitation, the population sizes of nonhuman
species are limited by external factors alone, and fluctuate about a mean
determined by the carrying capacity of their environment. As mentioned
above, some human population sizes have also been rather constant over
relatively long periods of time. In such societies, it has virtually always
been the case that there has been little or no technological development to
fuel population growth. So you might think of such societies as being similar in this respect to nonhuman populations. But there is an important
difference. Societies that have not experienced population growth over
longer periods of time have almost invariably maintained this state of affairs through tl1e use of internal population checks, more particularly, cultural ones, which other species never use. These checks can be preventive)
as in the case of contraception and late marriages, or positive, as in the case
of abortion and infanticide. As is clear, preventive checks reduce fertility,
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whereas positive checks lower life expectancy (from conception). Such internal checks can be contrasted with external checks, which are virtually
the only sort that exist for other species and can never be totally eradicated
from human societies. External checks almost always lower life expectancy,
and can take the form of disease or famine, for example. Both internal and
external checks may be normally operative even when the size of a population is increasing. But where nonhuman populations always fill their biological niches, some human societies, thanks to the greater intellectual
sophistication of humans, have actually been able to keep their populations below the carrying capacity of the environment, thereby being able
constantly to reap the benefits of abundance.
Another positive check to population size, which is external to a society, but internal to humankind, is war. With the accelerated population
growth resulting from the horticultural revolution, when the previous internal checks of the hunter-gatherer period were no longer in play, warfare
became one way in which the size of tl1e population was restrained in its
rate of growtl1. As the horticultural period advanced, and populations and
population pressure grew, so did tl1e amount of warfare, as suggested by
the vicious-circle principle.
As has been pointed out by a number of authors, warfare was virtually
impossible for hunter-gatherers, not only due to their small numbers, but
also because of their not being able to accumulate sufficient food to see
them through such engagements. (Not that hunter-gatherers did not
manage to use their weapons to kill one another anyway, only on a smaller
scale.) Thus, it was only with the horticultural era, when food could be
stored, either as grain or livestock, that warfare became possible. Furthermore, it was the existence of property, which hunter-gatherers lacked, that
constituted the immediate cause of war, as well as being a prerequisite for
commerce.
Apart from the direct loss oflife resulting from such conflicts, warfare
also functioned as a check on population size through its giving rise to female infanticide. By reducing the number of girls in a society, the group
could devote its resources to the nurture of its male soldiers-to-be.

The Agrarian Revolution ( ca. 5000

BP)

In the vicious-circle principle, as is in keeping with the archaeological and
historical record, the most important technical development after the be-
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ginning of the employment of horticultural methods was the invention
and use of the plow. The only way the constantly growing human population of 80 million some 5,000 years ago could be sustained was by exploiting the environment more thoroughly, and the plow was the primary
means of doing so. With the plow, seed crops could be grown on a large
scale, largely replacing the hand-planted tubers of the horticulturists . The
resultant harvest per unit land in terms of calories increased tremendously.
The vicious circle of population growth, technological innovation, and resource depletion was about to be repeated on a massive scale.
Once again, technological advance was not the result of a search for a
better life, but the response to need imposed by increasing numbers of
people. Though the average age at deatl1 did not change notably in the
transition to the agrarian period, remaining at about twenty years, such
phenomena as the drought and flooding resulting from changing weather
were more widespread in their effects . Similarly, the spread of infectious
diseases had a greater impact due to increased population and greater interaction among groups, coupled with worsening hygiene . The most devastating instance was the Black Plague in the middle of the fourteenth
century, which killed about a third of the population of Europe over aperiod of four years. And just as the human workload grew with the move to
horticulture, it grew again with the move to agriculture . Though oxen
were eventually used to plow fields, at the beginning of the agrarian era it
was humans who drew the plows. Large areas ofland became the property
of kings, and the vast majority of the population worked as peasants or
slaves to produce the foodstuffs that constituted the kings' wealth, to create the monuments that would stand as everlasting tributes to the kings'
greatness, and to fight in the kings' wars . In this last regard, it may be
mentioned that at the beginning of the agrarian era, the time of the year
directly after taking in the harvest was known as "tl1e season when kings
go forth to war." War was just a part of life. With the amassing of greater
amounts of property, society became more stratified, there was a greater
division of labor, and the distance between the rich and the poor constantly increased.
While the standard of living of the vast majority of the people declined, so too did the quality of the land, both changes being in keeping
with the vicious -circle principle . Farmers first moved into thinly forested
regions with light soils, especially along river valleys. Later, as these soils
became depleted and populations continued to grow, they cleared forests .
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The clearing of forests-with iron axes-in itself caused the leaching of
nutrients from the soil, as well as its erosion, which altered both vegetation
and soil quality. And this situation was only exacerbated by the use of the
plow, which exposed the topsoil to wind and rain. In areas that were too
hilly or deficient in nutrients for agriculture, goats were left free to roam,
in effect exterminating all but the hardiest bushes. The results of these activities remain with us today, and can be seen, for example, over the whole
Mediterranean area. The use of irrigation to supply water to fields located
in areas that were otherwise too dry to support agriculture led to salinization, leaving the soil unusable for cultivation for thousands of years-as
can be witnessed today in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. Wastelands developed around cities, where the area was picked clean of fuel and building
materials, and vegetation disappeared due to the constant tread of human
feet. The increase in the numbers of people not only made the move to
agriculture necessary, but also made its ecologically disastrous effects
more widespread. As regards other species, the spread of agriculture and
the human population forced many from their natural habitats, and some,
such as the wild ox, were hunted to extinction.
For the last 100,000 years, humans' adaptation to the environment
has taken the form of cultural change rather than biological change. With
the evolution of commerce and warfare, much of that cultural change has
consisted in adapting to the activities of other humans rather than to nature. By the time we reached the agrarian period, we no longer had to fear
other predators, and for the most part had a dependable source of food
through the domestication of plants and animals. Major successes and failures consisted in the results of exchanges on the market or on the battlefield, rather than in the results of the hunt. Nature became less the
"habitat" for the farmer and more a set of economic resources to be managed and manipulated by the controlling group. This effect was particularly true of cultures where the dominant class was urban based, as in early
Greece and Rome. With the continual distancing of nature from humankind came a gradual change in our conception of the world, with reality increasingly being thought of in terms of other people and their
actions, as though we were not ourselves animals dependent on the ecosphere for our survival.
As human population size and pressure grew due to a paucity ofinternal checks, coupled with the increased short-term productivity of the soil
tl1rough the use of the plow, warfare also increased. In this regard, the de-
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velopment of bronze weapons played a key role. For the first time in history, people found that the conquest of other people could be a profitable
alternative to the conquest of nature. Thus, beginning in advanced horticultural societies and continuing in agrarian, we expended almost as much
energy in war as in the more basic struggle for subsistence. You could say
that bronze was to the conquest of people what agriculture was to the conquest of nature: both were decisive points in our sociocultural evolution.
As in the horticultural period, in the agrarian era one of the reactions
to population pressure was infanticide in the face of the threat of severe
deprivation. When crops failed and famine was imminent, families often
abandoned their newborn by the roadside, or left them at the door of a
church or monastery in the hope that somebody else might raise them.
Sometimes even older children would be abandoned by their parents. The
story of Hansel and Gretel is based in the reality of scarcity. In some districts in China, as many as a quarter of the female infants were killed at
birth-signs were put up near ponds, "Girls Are Not to Be Drowned
Here."
The length of the agrarian period was extended by the discovery of
America, which also allowed a continuing increase in the size of the
human population, first through emigration from Europe. At the same
time, however, population also increased in Europe.
By the end of the agrarian period, about 250 years ago, the vicious circle had taken a gigantic turn. The technologies involving the plow and
other inventions such as the wagon wheel, animal harnesses, the crossbow,
gunpowder, horseshoes, stirrups, the lathe, the screw, the wheelbarrow,
the spinning wheel, printing, water mills, and windmills all supported an
increase in the human population from about 80 million to 730 million, at
the same time as agricultural techniques drastically reduced the productivity of the land. The only way such a huge population could continue to be
supported were if a new resource could be mined. There was such a resource in the form offossil fuels. And the innovativeness to devise the technology necessary to mine that resource was not lacking.

The Industrial Revolution ( c. 250

BP)

With the Industrial Revolution began the largest of all turns round the vi cious circle, giving rise to the use of vast quantities of fossil fuels, which
have indirectly sustained almost an eightfold increase in world population in
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the last 250 years, that is, in the last 1/400th of our species' short existence!
From an ecological point of view, this statement bodes very ill indeed.
Increasing population pressure in Britain around 1750 led to a shortage of both land and wood, the latter being used as both a building material and a fuel. The possibility of using coal as a substitute fuel for wood led
to the development first of the Newcomen engine, and then Watt's steam
engine, to pump water out of coal mines.
Coal is an inferior substitute for wood, a fact that required the invention of other devices and processes such as the use of coke ( derived from
coal) as a substitute for wood-charcoal in the iron-smelting process. With
these changes and the implementation ofWatt's engine, the use of coal increased tremendously, a result of the vicious circle moving from need (of
an energy source for heating and manufacturing) to innovation (in the
form of the invention of the steam engine, among other devices) and on to
resource depletion ( through the extraction and use of coal) .
The next phase in the vicious circle followed directly, namely, greater
economic activity, spurred by the profit motive of capitalists; with this
greater economic activity came increased use of energy and production of
waste. Here we have an excellent example indicating why economic
growth, the goal of so many of today's decision makers, ought rather be
seen as an integral feature of our present failure to live in ecological equilibrium with our environment. The inability to husband an ecologically viable resource in the form of wood led to the need to tap a non-ecologically
viable resource in the form of coal. Due to the existence of coal only in
particular places, it was necessary that a means of distribution be found.
This means- again involving innovation-consisted in the construction
ofrailways and canals, and the development of hard surfaces for roads. All
this construction activity demanded the expenditure of energy and constituted economic growth, while at the same time it involved ecologically regressive changes in the landscape and increasing pollution.
In history, each major technological advance has made possible our
digging deeper and faster into the barrel of natural resources, the accelerated rate of exploitation increasing the size of the human population at the
same time as it manifests itself as economic growth. So altl1ough more and
more people are becoming dependent on the contents of the barrel, our
constantly increasing consumption speeds us ever faster to the day when
we will be scraping its bottom. We have to learn to live in such a way that
the contents of the barrel are being replenished at the same rate as they are
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being consumed. In other words, to live in equilibrium with our environment, we must create a stable economic system, and not continue trying to
support a growing one.
The Industrial Revolution also brought with it a further decrease in
the standard of living of the common people. Instead of working out-ofdoors or in cottages and enjoying the many holidays in the medieval calendar, people had no alternative but to work in mines or factories for
longer hours at even more specialized tasks and with virtually no holidays.
Child labor also increased, with children being used, for example, in
mines, where they could squeeze into spaces too small for adults . The
quality of clothing also became lower, with cotton largely replacing linen,
wool, and leather.
Also in keeping with the vicious-circle principle, wars have become
larger and more destructive since the Industrial Revolution, partly due to
the invention and use of more powerful weapons, the latest on the list
being nuclear weapons. The twentieth century involved greater destruction and loss oflife from war than any previous 100-year period.
What will make tl1e aftermath of the Industrial Revolution so devastating is the fact that it has led to the use of such huge, yet finite, quantities
of fossil fuels, tl1e second of major importance being oil. Whereas coal
began to be used in response to a scarcity of wood, petroleum began to be
used in response to a scarcity of whale oil. At present, 88 percent of the
commercial energy used in the world comes from fossil fuels, about 40
percent of the total commercial energy coming from oil. And the use of
fossil fuels is almost five times what it was fifty years ago, and is increasing
each year, in spite of international conventions intended to reduce carbon
emissions into the atmosphere .
The technological innovations during the industrial era most directly
responsible for supporting the huge increase in the size of the human population are related to agriculture, and almost invariably involve the use of
oil. They include farm machinery, pesticides, and fertilizers. Other innovations that have supported population growth, though in a less direct man ner, include all machines used in manufacturing, as well as such
better-known inventions as the telephone, tl1e electric light, radio, television, the automobile, and the airplane . Many of these innovations have
been dependent on the prior invention of tl1e internal -combustion engine .
And so the vicious circle continues, with the newly available sources of
energy allowing a further increase in population, in the present case a truly
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tremendous increase, one that is still continuing. But whereas the population of the world has increased by about a factor of five since the 1850s,
the world's consumption of energy, mainly in the form of fossil fuels, has
increased sixtyfold. For the wealthy 20 percent of the world's population,
the Industrial Revolution has also led to an increase in leisure time, the
reason being that the fossil-fuel resources constitute not only a tremendous
surplus of energy, but one that is unequally distributed as well. And it is to
be noted that average life expectancy in the world has risen to as high as
sixty-five years. But even now we are seeing a change in these regards, as
the size of the population continues to grow while the availability of energy decreases. Whereas in our parents' generation a household could be
supported by only one working person, now two are required, and the
length of the actual working day and the stress involved in work are both
increasing. And life expectancy has now started to decline, the most proximate causes having to do with economic failure and disease.
As pointed out above, virtually the whole of the eightfold increase in
the human population since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution is
being maintained by the use of fossil fuels. When these fuels are no longer
available, either because of the environmental effects to which their use
gives rise or because they become exhausted, or when agricultural production drastically drops due to the overuse of these fuels, the world will be
facing a situation in which billions of people will experience real need, a
need that there will be no way of satisfying.

Ways Out
The above considerations lead to the realization that it is imperative for
humankind that we get out of the vicious circle, and as fast as possible.
That this demand is in principle possible is clear from the fact that various
societies have existed that have actually managed to do so. Their preconditions, however, were better than our own: they were invariably less
densely populated, never had anything near populations that doubled in
less than a lifetime ( as the whole world population has just done), and had
lifestyles demanding relatively little from the environment. Furthermore,
they were not dominated by a growth ethos, as the decision-making world
is today.
But given that that ethos can be broken, and tl1at we have not already
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gone too far in the vicious circle, at what point or points should we attempt to get out of it, and in what way?
A key aspect of the vicious circle is population growth. We must drastically reduce the size of the human population, in both more-and lessindustrialized countries, and begin to do so with the least possible delay.
One way this feat might be accomplished is through the implementation of exchangeable birth licenses. The idea is that each woman in a particular country is given the right by the state to have a certain number of
children . This number is decided upon on the basis of ecological and other
considerations, but it is the same for everyone of a certain age. It could be,
for example, 1.4 children. In that case, if a woman wanted to have two
children, she might buy or receive as a gift six deci-licenses from somebody
else; or, if she wanted only one child, she could sell or give away her four
extra deci-licenses- receiving them from or giving them to another person living in the same country. Such a system would, of course, have to be
supported by a program offamily planning and immigration, and be keyed
with statistics regarding the degree of success of their implementation.
Similarly, human consumption of resources is far too great, and it too
must be drastically reduced, independently of population reduction. What
is needed is a fundamentally different economic system, operative in the
less-industrialized as well as the more-industrialized countries, in which
the idea of economic growth is replaced by one of economic conservation.
On the conception of economist Herman Daly ( 1992 ), the quantity
of stocks in such an economy is to be held constant, while the throughput
is minimized and tl1e service maximized. Some of the actual changes in
the present economy that are necessary to transform it to such a steadystate economy include: politically supervising and limiting the size and
monopoly power of corporations, setting upper and lower limits on income and upper limits on wealth, implementing quotas for the extraction
of natural resources, taxing resources higher than income, charging at
least as much for nonrenewables as for their nearest renewable substitutes,
stopping the subsidizing of energy production, and setting up tariffs to
protect local industries .
One particular aspect of such an economy as Daly envisages may be its
not allowing the accruing of interest. This topic has been developed by
Margrit Kennedy (1988), according to whom a reduction ofinterest rates
lessens the pressure for growth in an economy, zero interest being a pre-
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condition for the zero growth of a steady-state economy. In order that a
zero-interest economy also be an ecologically sustainable one, however,
there must be a land reform and a tax reform. The land reform would put
ownership of the land in the hands of the local government, from whom it
may be leased, thereby removing the threat of land speculation, and the
tax reform would be similar to that recommended by Daly, whereby products rather than incomes would be taxed.
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Scarcity and Its Social Impacts
Likely Political Responses

Kurt Finsterbusch

is an exercise in prediction. It predicts the societal responses
ofinstitutionally developed societies to two possible scenarios for the next
half century: one oflong-term economic growth and one of nongrowth or
decline due to environmental constraints and problems. The latter I label
scarcity. This chapter explores the scarcity scenario more fully, because
much more is known about the impacts of economic growth on society
than the impacts of scarcity. My analysis is based on a macrotheory of social change that I have developed over the years (Finsterbusch 1973,
1983). My conclusion is that economic growth tends to have far more
beneficial impacts on society than does scarcity. Economic growth tends
to increase equality, integration, democracy, the rule oflaw, and freedoms,
whereas scarcity tends to increase inequality, conflict, authoritarianism,
and repression. What is uncertain, however, is how nation-states will respond to these negative impacts of scarcity. It is conceivable that society's
responses to scarcity will involve progressive reforms. More ominous responses, however, seem more likely.

T HIS E SSAY

Impacts of Economic Growth and Scarcity
on Inequality
Until recent globalization weakened the power oflabor relative to capital,
economic growth has decreased inequality whereas scarcity has increased
inequality, as empirically demonstrated in the painstaking work of Simon
93
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Kuznets (1955) .. Although economic growth may have had negative effects on equality up to the nineteenth century, as the majority of the people in many countries remain at a subsistence level and the new wealth
goes mainly to a small elite, the longer-term impact of economic growth is
to increase equality. The main reason, as expounded by Gerhard Lenski in
Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification ( 1966 ), is that economic growth provides a positive climate for business that makes it worthwhile for elites to highly reward professionals and skilled workers as a
means to enlarge their own incomes through the resulting increases in
productivity. Put in economic terms, Lenski's thesis is that economic development after some threshold of industrialization results in diminishing
and even negative returns to elites for their monopolizing the surplus. He
also points out that educated workers are not as vulnerable to exploitation
as unskilled workers who must compete with masses of other unskilled
workers. Educated workers have a better bargaining position that translates into higher incomes for the middle class. Finally, he discusses how
economic growth facilitates the rise of democratic institutions, and they in
turn increase the political power of lower groups, which usually translates
into more favorable policies and economic benefits for them.
The above arguments point to elite concessions for their greater absolute benefit and lower groups wresting benefits from upper groups
through democratic mechanisms. Another equalizing force is the diffusion of education that greatly expands the middle class and upgrades the
occupational structure so that it no longer is a bottom-heavy pyramid but
bulges in the middle .
Economic growth also increases equality in terms of changes in the
consumption system . The consumption gap between classes declines as
the lower class gets medical care, electricity, indoor plumbing, refrigerators, telephones, television, and possibly even cars . The rich have more
and higher-quality goods, but their lifestyles do not differ so markedly as
elites and peasants in less-developed countries.
In contrast to the positive effects of economic growth, scarcity has
negative effects. There is consensus among scholars that scarcity increases
inequality. Five arguments support this proposition . First, because scarcity
is the opposite of economic growth, it should have the opposite effects.
Economic growth expands jobs and opportunities. This expansion generally allows lower groups choices between jobs and reduces the number
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who must accept truly exploitative wages. In contrast, scarcity shrinks the
job market, especially for marginal, unskilled jobs, and greatly increases
tl1e competition among the unskilled for the remaining jobs that tend to
be offered at depressed wages. Economic growth also provides an expanding pie that can finance concessions of various kinds made to lower
groups, including welfare for the needy and training for the unemployed.
Scarcity, on the other hand, limits society's ability to address tl1e needs of
the needy. In political terms, the demands oflower groups for better lives
in times of scarcity cannot be satisfied without threatening the favorable
circumstances of the upper groups. Because the upper groups usually have
considerable political power, the demands and needs of the lower groups
are not likely to be met. Furthermore, the lack of assistance for the lower
groups can be justified by claims that such redistributive policies would divert resources from those people who would invest in economic growth;
thus, these redistributive policies would harm the lower groups in the long
run (the trickle-down theory). What about the times when welfare policies
have been instituted in depressions? Gurr (1985) points out that these
policies were always premised on the depressed times lasting a short period. He argues that a relatively permanent scarcity would greatly limit
welfare policies.
The second explanation for scarcity's negative impact on equality is
that scarcity translates into inflation, which more adversely impacts lower
groups. They spend a greater percentage of tl1eir income than do upper
groups on consumer goods that have high resource inputs and will inflate
substantially with scarcity. Upper groups buy greater quantities of goods
but less proportionally. They also spend more on quality, which increases
the value of most goods without using much more resources . Quality
goods need not inflate as much from resource scarcity as lower-quality
goods. In addition, upper groups buy bigger homes and estates that will
inflate with scarcity because they involve considerable resources, but as
owners they will benefit when these properties appreciate in value . On the
other hand, the poor pay rent and will experience a marked decline in their
standard ofliving even if they manage to stay employed.
The third explanation of why scarcity increases inequality is that upper
groups are better able to protect themselves from the negative effects of
scarcity. They organize faster and more effectively to advance and protect
tl1eir interests. The managerial and professional classes and unionized
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labor have some control over the terms of their remuneration and will try
to keep them up to the level of inflation, which increases inflation even
more for the politically and economically weak.
The fourth explanation is that the controllers of resources, who are
predominantly the rich, will actually gain in times of scarcity while the rest
of the population suffers. Just as home owners and renters profit from inflation and scarcity, so do those people who control the natural resources
that are becoming scarce .
Finally, tl1e fifth explanation is based on the few empirical studies connecting scarcity with inequality. They show that when resources become
more scarce, they become more unevenly distributed. On the whole, the
empirical linkage between scarcity and inequality is not strong. The consensus on this proposition, however, is largely due to the absence of a
counterargument.

Impacts of Economic Growth and Scarcity
on Integration
Economic growth increases integration, and scarcity decreases it. Eco nomic growth does not eliminate group identities and intergroup conflict,
but it does mitigate the conflict between groups, reduces its violent expression, and channels it into legal political actions and compromisable
demands. Economic growth leads to expectations that each generation
will be better off so the system will be perceived as relatively effective. Discontent will be low and the system of inequalities that becomes identified
with rising standards of living will not be seriously challenged. Thus, class
conflict will be low and system legitimacy high.
The effects of scarcity are the opposite. Although there is widespread
agreement that scarcity is likely to reduce integration and system legitimacy, the empirical evidence is again not strong, because there has not
been much long-term scarcity in industrializing countries in the past two
hundred years. Scarcity decreases integration by increasing competition,
conflict, and disturbances and decreasing regime effectiveness and system
legitimacy. These impacts in turn tend to increase repression and undermine or weaken democracy. Five explanations have been advanced in support of this proposition. First, scarcity negates the positive functions of
economic growth for integration.
Another problem with a shrinking pie is that the conflict between
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classes and groups becomes a zero-sum game in which someone must lose
if someone else gains. When the contest results in big winners and little
winners, as with the distribution of the expanding pie, the conflict is not as
intense as when it results in winners and losers or big losers and little losers. Furtl1ermore, scarcity removes the justification for inequality which is
that the inequality is needed to produce economic growtl1. If economic
growth is not possible due to environmental limits, then this argument
loses force, gross inequality becomes less tolerable, and conflict increases.
The second explanation of why scarcity decreases integration is derived from deprivation theory as developed by Ted Gurr in Why Men Rebel
(1970). Unless scarcity arrives very slowly to allow for gradual adjustments, scarcity will cause strong feelings of deprivation as reality falls far
short of expectations. The deprivation-induced anger and collective action may at first be deflected away from political institutions toward competitors or opponents or into self-destructive and antisocial behavior. In
tl1e long run, however, the anger will be directed toward tl1e polity, the
powerful, and the system of inequality, and more radical demands and
forms of political action will become more legitimate and prevalent.
The third explanation is derived from Charles Tilly's mobilization theory of collective action (see From Mobilization to Revolution [1978]). In
times of economic decline, competition increases and groups that organize to protect or advance their special interests will do far better than individuals or weakly organized groups. Those people who act first will gain
the most benefits, because scarcity will rapidly deplete the government's
capacity to confer benefits. Furthermore, governments will increasingly
respond to challengers with repression as it is less costly in the short term
than concessions. Collective action, therefore, will become more costly,
but the costs of inaction are likely to increase even faster. Scarcity, therefore, spurs interest-group organization and the intensification of conflict
among groups. Tilly also uses the cost-benefit logic to argue that scarcity
fosters conditions that greatly favor revolutionary conflict, particularly the
withering of support for the government and the shifting of tl1e previously
uncommitted to support challengers of the status quo .
The fourth explanation focuses on the legitimacy problems of governments in times of economic decline. Unpopular governments can often
stay in power and the public remain acquiescent in times of economic
growth, but economic failure will likely facilitate a government breakdown and tl1e growth of challenging groups. Established democracies
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generally have a reservoir of popular support and may survive economic
decline for a while. Over time, however, scarcity erodes legitimacy, making
even democracies vulnerable to growing unrest and authoritarian move ments, as in the 1930s.
Another link between scarcity and eroding legitimacy is the type of
government policies that scarcity requires. They will require sacrifice.
People will have to bear costs and consume less to protect the environment and adjust to scarcity, and these policies will be unpopular, as evidenced by the public's rejection of President Carter's five-cent-a-gallon
gasoline tax during the energy crisis of the late 1970s. A likely scenario is
that the government will institute many relatively painless policies that
will not deal adequately with the problem and allow the crisis to get worse
and more costly to deal with. Its failure will decrease its legitimacy and
spawn challengers.
Our attention has been mainly on the developed democracies. When
we consider the Third World, the scarcity-induced declines in integration
can lead to government collapse and anarchy. Robert Kaplan ( 1994) provides vivid images of current anarchic situations in West Africa that make
societal breakdown seem a very plausible impact of scarcity in societies
with weak institutions. He describes countries where the government cannot provide law and order over most of the country and not even in many
parts of the capital at night.
The fifth explanation is that scarcity aggravates all fissures in society.
The shrinking pie intensifies the class struggle as discussed earlier, but Paul
Blumberg in Inequality in an Age ofDecline adds that scarcity "will almost
inevitably increase the overall level of social nastiness" and aggravate all fissures and cleavages, "creating social conflict amid a general scramble for
self-aggrandizement" (1980, 220). He goes on to describe how racial,
gender, educational, generational, and regional conflicts are likely to intensify in the United States.
Another common speculation is that war and international conflict
will increase greatly under scarcity. Not only will the powerful nations use
military power if necessary to obtain resources from weak nations, but
also, according to Robert Heilbroner ( 1992 ), underdeveloped countries
or terrorist groups might also make war on or terrorize rich countries, demanding a greater sharing of world wealth and resources. Nuclear
weapons are spreading, and nuclear blackmail could occur at any time. As
national and subnational identities heighten, they make nonviolent reso-
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lution to conflicts less feasible. If this analysis is right, then the prospects
are terrifying. Nuclear materials have become widely available through
leaks from the former Soviet Union, and nuclear bomb making is within
the capabilities of many terrorist groups. Biological and chemical weapons
are even easier to acquire, and their results can be far more destructive .
Terrorist actions are predicted by experts to increase in number and in destruction, even if economic growth continues . With increasing scarcity,
the developed world will be in great danger. Democracies may have to
tread on civil rights and greatly increase police powers to deal with the
danger of terrorism. This trend is likely to move the United States further
in the direction of autl1oritarianism.
Impact of Economic Growth and Scarcity
on Democracy

Economic growth strengthens democracy, and scarcity threatens it. The
explanation, in part, is due to the positive effects of economic growth on
equality and integration because both strengthen democracy. Economic
growth also expands the middle class, the educated, and the percentage of
the population that has a stake in the system, and, therefore, would be adversely affected by political instability. With the class pyramid bulging at
the middle instead of polarized between a small elite and the poor masses,
power holders have much less to fear from losing the reigns of government
in an election as the change in policies would not be very radical. Democracy is usually well served by a large middle class that dampens conflict,
supports moderate politics, and generally opposes extremists. Economic
growth and the expansion of education also increase intermediary organizations and tolerance toward those citizens with different views, both of
which are essential to the effective functioning of democracy. Finally, economic growth reduces the intensity of conflict, as pointed out above, and
accommodates the resolving of issues and handling of demands through a
democratic bargaining process.
There is widespread agreement that scarcity is a threat to democracy. I
give five explanations for this view. First, as with equality and integration,
scarcity cancels the positive effects of economic growth . However, it does
not necessarily produce the opposite effects . For example, it does not necessarily shrink the middle class . On the other hand, it could stimulate radicalism, which a large middle class tends to inhibit. Scarcity also increases
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inequality and decreases integration, which in turn threaten or weaken
democracy. The aggravated conflict and loss of legitimacy that scarcity is
likely to cause are particularly troublesome for the survival of democracy.
The second explanation of why scarcity weakens or threatens democracy is that it creates problems and crises that are hard for democracies to
solve . Then when a democracy fails and the problems deepen, the public
is tempted to jettison democracy for a more decisive, forceful, active, and
authoritarian government. The strength of democracy is its responsive ness to the will of the people. This strength becomes a weakness in times
of scarcity. Dealing with scarcity problems requires sacrifice, restraint, regulation against ecologically harmful behavior, and coercion in enforcing
ecologically helpful behavior. These requirements, however, are not likely
to be popular. Politicians in democracies, therefore, to retain the support
of their constituents, generally do not pass the tough legislation that is required. For example, the U.S . response to the oil crisis in 1973 was to
lower the speed limit to fifty-five miles per hour and urge the public to
voluntarily lower their thermostats in winter. Later the government gave
tax deductions for some insulation costs and required better gas mileage
for cars with a very leisurely implementation schedule. Great sacrifice,
such as an increase of three dollars per gallon gasoline tax, was not even
considered.
The third explanation is that scarcity generates many technical issues
that lend themselves poorly to participatory decision -making procedures.
Considerable scientific inputs are required for sound environmental policies, so many important decisions with significant distributional side effects are best handled by experts. We would expect, therefore, that some
amount of democracy would be sacrificed to technocracy as a practical
matter.
The fourth explanation is that scarcity can cause fear and potentially
even panic that can undermine the confidence in democratic institutions,
which is required for them to function without a strong show of force.
This line of argument is more speculative than the others but still highly
plausible . Heilbroner observes:
As the historians of ancient and modern democracies illustrate, the pressure of political movement in times of war, civil commotion, or general
anxiety pushes in the direction of authority, not away from it . . .. The
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passage through the gauntlet ahead may be possible only under governments capable of rallying obedience far more effectively than would be
possible in a democratic setting. If the issue for mankind is survival, such
governments may be unavoidable, even necessary. (1992, 132- 34)

The fifth explanation is that lower groups in times of scarcity are ineffective in getting their demands met by peaceful means, so some of them
turn to more radical and even violent means. The state is likely to become
more authoritarian and repressive to deal with the dynamics of the resulting civil conflict.
Scarcity would have many other impacts on society that I do not cover
in this short article. I can report, however, that the literature on scarcity
generally concludes that they will be quite negative as a whole. In sum, I
have not come across any good news about the impacts of scarcity.
Societal Response to Scarcity
It goes without saying that predictions about how society will respond to
relatively long-term scarcity are speculative . They are contingent upon
many factors, including the nature and extent of the crisis, public readiness
for change, degree of government autonomy from control by the economic elite, and the idiosyncrasies of the leader( s). Accordingly, I offer the
following comments as an initial exploration of the topic for democratic
capitalist societies.
It is safe to predict that society will respond to scarcity problems by
collecting information on the issues, because there would be little opposition to such low cost and relatively nonthreatening actions. In fact, some
people will call for research as a way to delay action . Individuals on their
own would also produce information on the issues, so public and private
actions should increase public awareness of and concern about scarcity.
The result would be that environmental issues will be perceived as getting
worse and requiring more collective action.
The second societal response that we predict is technological innovation to reduce the costs of depleting resources and to protect the environ ment. Businesses will respond to rising costs of resources by using
resource -saving technologies and practices . Market forces should spur the
development of new conserving technologies . Other innovations will be
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directed at protecting the environment in ways that do not threaten current lifestyles. Many of the innovations will be stimulated by subsidies or
by regulations concerning pollution, recycling, conservation, and hazardous substances. Regulations that are politically feasible are likely to have
relatively low costs to industry or be widely perceived as important enough
to pass over industry resistance. Often regulations are necessary to make it
worthwhile for industry to develop new technologies and practices for
protecting the environment or more efficiently use and reuse resources.
Another source for new technologies is the academic research community
that is subsidized by government and foundation contracts and grants. As
awareness of the crisis increases, it is likely that subsidies for research addressing relevant environmental issues would increase substantially.
The third response that I predict is a range of minor behavioral
changes on the part of individuals. Increasingly, the public wants to do
something to help solve the problems. They participate in recycling programs, buy "Save the Bay" license plates, and contribute in other relatively
costless ways.
The crucial question is whether the above responses will be sufficient
to improve the environment and set society on the course of sustainable
development. One group of scientists judges environmental problems as
less severe than the view developed here and has immense faith in the inventiveness and adaptiveness of humans . According to this group, such actions would go a long way toward solving any problems that actually exist.
Perhaps a few new governmental policies that are not too disruptive to the
economy might be helpful, but no dramatic changes would be needed.
These scientists argue that environmental problems are often exaggerated
by environmentalists and that tl1ere is considerable scientific uncertainty
about their extent and potential impacts. They are sanguine on energy
availability because fossil fuels could provide for the world's energy needs
far into this century and because nuclear fusion could provide all the energy that will be needed when fossil -fuel production declines. Though this
view is plausible, it is highly speculative and does not convince most people that the environment is not in crisis.
A second group of analysts views the environmental crisis as far more
severe than the above optimists, but prescribes actions for dealing with it
that minimize disruption to the economy and demand only modest behavioral changes from the public. Al Gore's recommendations in The
Earth in Balance ( 1992) are called a "Global Marshall Plan" to indicate
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how daring it is, but it relies heavily on market adjustments, voluntary actions, and nonradical changes in government policies to remove subsidies
for environmentally destructive actions and to provide more incentives for
environmentally helpful actions. Gore also emphasizes information gathering and learning. His program is ambitious and unacceptable to the controllers of Washington today, but does not step hard on anyone's toes.
Except for population control in the Third World, his plan avoids the really painful actions that will be necessary. In like manner, Lester Brown,
Christoper Flavin, and Sandra Postel in Saving the Planet: How to Shape an
Environmentally Sustainable Global Economy ( 1991) are cautious in their
suggestions for saving the planet. Nevertheless, both books are rich in
helpful policies and actions for addressing environmental problems.
A much larger group of scientists who write on the sustainable society
does not think like the optimists that new technologies and minor behavioral changes will overcome environmental scarcity, nor does the group
think like Gore and Brown, Flavin, and Postel that an ambitious government environmental program that avoids significant costs can do the job.
Most scientists concur that more significant changes are needed to achieve
sustainability. Following in this line of thinking, the crucial question is
what additional responses are likely or even feasible. Will people make sacrificial changes in their lifestyles? Will businesses risk some profits to protect the environment? Will governments pass tough environmental
legislation? The dominant answer provided by these analysts to all three
questions is "No!"
This pessimistic view is based on four arguments: the public-goods
and free-rider problem, the business of business is profits, special interests
have the power to resist tough new policies, and the public will not support painful solutions. The public-goods argument is that it is not in the
rational self-interest ofindividuals or nations to voluntarily sacrifice for the
good of the environment or for the conserving of nonrenewable re sources, because they will lose out to others who continue to exploit the
environment or use the scarce resources. People will not voluntarily reduce their travel miles by automobile to preserve petroleum; they must be
encouraged to do so by high gasoline taxes or forced to do so by gasoline
rationing. Nations will not voluntarily reduce their use of fossil fuel to
slow down global warming unless other nations do the same, because they
would pay heavy costs without getting any more benefits than those nations that paid no costs .
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The business-of-business-is-profits argument asserts that solutions to
environmental problems will not come from businesses unless government policies change their incentives. On their own, they will conserve in
order to save money and invent technologies that help them do more with
less, but they will not stop doing harmful things from which they benefit,
nor will they do rightful things that cost them. They must be made to do
these things by government policies, but, according to the third argument, they will prevent the passage of such policies, and according to the
fourth argument, the public will likewise oppose the policies. Most commentators, therefore, are pessimistic about the government's ability to
take the necessary actions. They believe, therefore, that environmental
problems will worsen until an acute crisis forces a change in direction. At
that point, democratic societies are predicted to become much more authoritarian, as pointed out earlier.
Thus, the probable outcome of long-term scarcity is the weakening
and ultimate demise of democracy. Under the right circumstances, however, democracies could survive. If the democracy has a fairly high degree
of equality and justice and is lead by a charismatic leader in a crisis that is
perceived as requiring radical change to avoid certain disaster, it could act
decisively and with considerable unity to achieve sustainability. The high
degree of equality and justice is necessary to avoid destructive polarization
and conflict. The right kind of crisis is one that is dramatic and sudden, because democracies can act decisively in emergencies, such as in wars or
economic crises. Normal politics that are conflictful, incremental, and relatively impotent would be temporarily suspended while the conflicting interests and parties suspend their ambitions and allow the leadership to save
the nation (pursue the common good). The charismatic leader is needed
to inspire the widespread belief that the painful remedy will be good medicine for the whole nation and that it will be fair ( all will share in the hardship). Roosevelt in the 1930s and Thatcher in the 1980s are examples of
such leaders.
In sum, the societal response to scarcity will include research on the issues, technological innovations, and minor behavioral changes. These responses are likely because they will face little opposition. I also predict (in
line with most commentators) that these responses will fail to adequately
deal with environmentally induced scarcity with the result that democracies will drift into severe crises, and the resulting political struggles will
probably, but not inevitably, end in authoritarianism.
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Ways Out: Social and Political Changes
Required for a Sustainable Democratic Society
I now offer some ideas about major institutional changes for creating a
sustainable democratic society. Each would have many profound impacts
that cannot be evaluated here, so these proposals are simply for discussion.
The first requirement for a sustainable democracy is to increase the capacity of government to macromanage the economy to the extent that it
needs to be macromanaged, thus, a national industrial policy. A common
suggestion for this purpose is a planning agency that would be a fourth
branch of government. It would make long-term plans for America's fu ture, recommend legislation to Congress to implement needed macroconstraints, and sponsor the research necessary for creating these plans
and legislation.
The second requirement for a sustainable democracy is for corporate
power over the government to be reduced and for the power of major corporations to be brought under some measure of public control. They present the greatest threat to pluralist democracy today and are responsible for
much of the damage to the environment. Presently, they possess unaccountable power. Campaign finance reform is required to reduce corporate influence over government, and I suggest two reforms to make the
corporations more accountable. These reforms, however, would encounter immense opposition from corporations. The first is the federal
chartering of all corporations that do interstate business and exceed some
minimal size. Presently, corporations are chartered by states, and the competition among states in courting corporations has led them to abandon
the oversight function that is legally tl1eirs. The resulting unaccountability
of corporations can be reversed by federal chartering and making charters
contingent upon their demonstration of service to the public. In this way,
environmental impacts, plant closings, safety records, treatment of workers, and so on, could be monitored and the corporations disciplined more
effectively than at present.
Another reform that is directed at the corporations is that corporations that are larger than some minimum size and conducting interstate
business would pay government taxes in stock shares instead of money.
This change would cause a gradual dilution of the company's stock until
the government owns 50 percent of its shares. Then what is good for General Motors would be good for the United States . The board of directors
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would be restructured to contain representatives of the government, communities containing its facilities, and other interests. In this way, values
other than profits would have to be honored, though profits would still be
the corporations' main goal.
The above reforms have addressed the issues of the capacity and fairness of the political economy but have not included reforms that directly
deal with environmental problems. The major recommendations have
been developed by Herman Daly in Steady-State Economics: The Economics
of Biophysical Equilibrium and Moral Growth ( 1977) and are included
here (and in many other lists of proposals for sustainability). They are: (1)
setting of minimum and maximum limits on income and a maximum on
wealth to discourage excessive consumption and mitigate inequality, (2)
transferable birth licenses allocated 2.1 per woman by the government in
order to achieve zero population growth, and ( 3) depletion quotas for all
nonrenewable resources, set by the government to regulate the annual
consumption of each resource, and auctioned to resource buyers. The
birth licenses allow every couple to have two children. If they wanted
more children, they would have to buy a license from someone who will
not use botl1 their licenses. The quotas would slow depletion and lead to
higher prices, which would encourage efficiencies and innovations. All
three procedures provide macroconstraints but do not interfere in the microprocesses that are governed by free markets and individual choices
within those constraints.
Because the major natural resource in a country is its land, the final
recommendation is a national land-use plan that would synchronize with
state land-use plans. Real-estate interests would provide formidable opposition to this policy in order to protect their financial interest in using or
selling land for the highest price. Nevertheless, it is necessary to preserve
agricultural lands, forests, and complex ecosystems and to deal with a wide
range of environmental problems. Zoning is necessary in urban areas and
now is necessary in other areas for many of the same reasons. A current
land-use trend that the plan would try to contain is the increasing dispersion of population to low-density housing that causes high energy and
transportation consumption, infrastructure inefficiencies, and greater
ecosystem disruption.
The above recommendations are radical by current standards of political change . They could not be enacted except in an acute environmental
crisis. Many other changes would also be needed for sustainability, includ-
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ing a major realignment of the culture and value system from an emphasis
on material consumption and individualism to an emphasis on environmental vitality, inner development, and connections with others. I do not,
however, specify further the changes required to attain the sustainable society, because the problem is not a dearth of knowledge about what needs
to be done, but the current lack of support for the needed changes .
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Foundations and Context
of Contemporary Conflict
Joseph A. Tainter

of the cold war, culturally defined conflicts have seemed
to spring up everywhere and come from nowhere . They have emerged
with such sudden intensity, in so many places, that superficially they appear entirely novel. When journalists try to explain that these conflicts are
not truly new, they typically reduce them to stock phrases, such as "ancient
tribal feuds." Such terms conceal more than they reveal. In fact, the origins of today's conflicts lie in historical events and processes far removed in
time and space.
History is substantially a chronicle of reactive processes. For most societies and many people, the primary context to which they must adapt is
other societies and other people. Reactive processes have been responsible
both for the formation of much of today's world political system and for
what seems like its impending dissolution. Today's conflicts can be understood in the historical context of competition among European nations,
their global expansion and colonization, and the reaction of much of the
world to Euro-American domination. Politicians, diplomats, and international workers who confront today's violence are working with a great
handicap if they do not understand the origins of these problems, nor their
reactive nature. Historical processes have shaped contemporary violence
and must be understood in order to comprehend that violence .
Two types of reactive historical processes clarify many problems that
confront the world today. The first of these types is the competition that
forms when polities with equivalent military abilities contend for domiWITH THE END
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nance. The second is the pattern by which much of the world has reacted
to 500 years of European expansion, and 150 years of Euro-American
domination. These processes in combination have set the foundation for
the disintegrative forces of contemporary world politics.
Competition in European History
For at least the past 4,000 years, one of the fundamental historical
processes has been competition among societies organized at approximately equivalent levels of population, territory, technology, organization, per capita product, and military capability. Such societies have been
termed peer polities. Examples include the warring states of post-Chou
China; the Mycenaean polities; the city-states of classical Greece; the Italian city-states of the ancient, medieval, and Renaissance periods; the
southern lowland Maya; medieval and Renaissance Europe; and our current era. It is characteristic of peer polities that their evolution is stimulated primarily by their own interaction, rather than by reaction to a
dominant power or by relations between cores and peripheries.
The relations among peer polities typically involve both trade and
competition. Where natural or fiscal resources are sufficient, peer polities
may engage in conflict that stretches over generations or even centuries.
Such conflicts may involve endless maneuvering for advantage, forming
and dissolving of alliances, and continual striving to expand territory or influence at a neighbor's expense, or prevent the neighbor from doing the
same . Peer-polity competition stimulates growth in the size and complexity of military systems; increases in the scale of warfare; innovations in
technology, strategy, tactics, and logistics; and the reorganization of society to support competition.
Europe before 1815 was almost always at war somewhere. From the
twelfth through the sixteenth centuries, France, England, and Spain were
at war from a low of 47 percent of years in some centuries to a high of92
percent in others. In the whole of the sixteenth century, there was barely a
decade when Europe was entirely at peace. The seventeenth century enjoyed only four years of total peace; the eighteenth century, sixteen years.
The development of siege guns in the fifteenth century ended the advantage of stone-built castles, and required changes in the strategies and
technology of defense . From the early fifteenth century, fortification
builders designed walls that could support defensive cannons . A short
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time later, walls were built that could also withstand bombardment. By
1560, all the elements of the trace italienne had been developed: a fortification system of low, thick walls with angled bastions and eventually extensive outworks. It was effective but expensive. The city of Siena in 1553,
for example, found it so expensive to build such fortifications that no
money was left for its army or fleet. Siena was annexed by Florence, against
which, ironically, its fortifications had been built.
To capture a place fortified in this way could take months or years. Offensive tacticians designed more complicated siege methods, and their
costs rose as well. A besieging force of perhaps 50,000 had to be kept in
place for weeks or months. Each day, such an army needed 165,000
pounds of flour and 2,500 sheep or 250 cattle. This amount was more
than was required to feed all but the largest cities of Europe. Local lords
could no longer afford to build and defend an effective fortress, nor to attack one. The resources for war were no longer found in the feudal countryside but in capitalist towns.
There were parallel developments in open-field warfare. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, massed archers and the pike phalanx made
the mounted knight obsolete. These innovations in turn were gradually
superseded by firearms. As commanders maneuvered for battlefield advantages, tactics were developed to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of firing. Training and battlefield coordination became more
important. Uneducated soldiers had to be familiar with what were, at the
time, history's most advanced weapons. Ranks had to open and close on
signal. Victory came to depend on the right combination of infantry, cavalry, firearms, cannons, and reserves, and textbooks of drill sprouted
across the continent.
The naval powers of the time were England, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, France, and Spain. From 1650 to 1680, the
five nortl1ern powers increased their navies from 140,000 to 400,000
tons . This naval strategy also led to problems ofincreasing complexity and
cost. In 1511, for example, James IV of Scotland commissioned the building of the ship Great Michael. It took almost one-half of a year's income to
build, and 10 percent of his annual budget for seamen's wages. It ended its
days rotting in Brest harbor, having been sold to France in 1514.
War came to involve ever larger segments of society and became correspondingly more burdensome . Several European states saw the sizes of
their armies increase tenfold between 1500 and 1700. Louis XIV's army
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stood at 273,000 in 1691. Five years later, it was at 395,000, nearly onefourth of all Frenchmen. Between 1560 and 1659, Castile lost about 11
percent of its adult male population in the constant wars.
As the sizes of armies continued to grow through the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, new fields of specialization were needed. There was
demand for skills such as surveying and cartography. Accurate clocks and
statistical reporting were needed. In the eighteenth century, some armies
carried their own printing presses. Organization became more complex.
Staff and administration were separated. Armies no longer marched as a
unit, but could be split into smaller elements that traveled, under instructions, on their own. Battles came to last up to several months. In France,
tl1e levCe en massewas begun in 1793. In 1812, NapolCon invaded Russia
with an army of 600,000, including 1,146 field guns, on a 400-kilometer
front.
Yet, for all these developments, land warfare was largely stalemated .
There were few lasting breakthroughs. The new military technologies,
and the mercenaries to use them, could be purchased by any power with
enough money. No nation could gain a lasting technological advantage.
When a nation such as Spain or France threatened to become dominant,
alliances would form to counter its power. Major wars of the time were
therefore long, and tended to be decided by cumulative small victories and
the slow erosion of the enemy's economy. Defeated nations were soon
ready to fight again. Land warfare had to be augmented by what
amounted to global flanking operations. European wars turned into contests for power and influence overseas.
In 1499, as he was embarking on a campaign in Italy, Louis XII asked
what was needed to ensure success. He was told that three things alone
were required: money, money, and still more money. As all things military
grew in size and complexity, the main constraint came to be finance. In the
decades before 1630, the cost of putting a soldier in the field increased by
500 percent. Nations spent ever more of their incomes on war. In 1513,
for example, England obligated 90 percent of its budget to military efforts. In 1657, the figure was 92 percent. In 1643, expenditures of the
French government, mainly on war, were twice the annual income .
The major states came to rely on credit to finance their wars. Even
with the flow of precious metals from her New World colonies, Spain's
debts rose from 6 million ducats in 1556 to 180 million a century later,
and bankruptcy often undermined Spanish military operations. The cost
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of war loans grew from 18 percent interest in the 1520s to 49 percent in
the 1550s. Both France and Spain often had to declare banlauptcy, or
force a lowering of the rate of interest. From the sixteenth through the
eighteenth centuries, the Dutch, followed by the English, overcame fiscal
constraints by gaining access to reliable short-term and long-term credit.
They were careful to pay the interest on loans, and so were granted more
favorable terms than other nations. They used this advantage to defeat opponents, France and Spain, that were wealthier but were poor credit risks.
In 1775, Frederick the Great expressed eloquently the futility of stalemated European conflict:
The ambitious should consider above all that armaments and military
discipline being much the same throughout Europe, and alliances as a
rule producing an equality of force between belligerent parties, all that
princes can expect from the greatest advantages at present is to acquire,
by accumulation of successes, either some small city on the frontier, or
some territory which will not pay interest on the expenses of the war, and
whose population does not even approach the number of citizens who
perished in the campaigns. (Parker 1988, 149)

Global Consequences of European Wars

European competition stimulated technological innovation, development
of science, political and financial transformations, and global expansion.
The development of sea power and acquisition of colonies became aspects
of strategy in stalemated European warfare . European war ultimately affected and changed the entire world. By 1914, the nations of Europe, and
their offshoots, controlled fully 84 percent of the earth's surface.
As land warfare in Europe produced no lasting advantages, the expansion of competition to the global arena was a logical consequence. Competition expanded to include trade, the capture of overseas territories, the
establishment of colonies, attacking adversaries' colonies, and intercepting the wealth that flowed from them . Overseas resources were needed to
sustain European competition . These societies were, until the nineteenth
century, powered almost completely by solar energy. Sweden's support
base in the seventeenth century consisted nearly entirely (87 percent) of
renewable resources . Lacking colonies outside her region, almost half of
Sweden's forest-based exports went to finance foreign wars. For societies
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powered by solar energy, and using that energy so heavily within the limits
of their technology, the main way to increase wealth was to control more
of the earth's surface where solar energy falls. It became necessary to secure the produce of foreign lands to subsidize European competition.
New resources were channeled into this small part of the world. This concentration of global resources allowed European conflict to reach heights
of complexity and costliness that could never have been sustained with
only European resources.
Peer-polity competition not only forced Europeans to search for foreign lands and resources, but also virtually guaranteed them success in
doing so. The stalemated conflicts stimulated continual innovation in
technology, organization, strategy, tactics, and logistics. Any power that
did not match its competitors in these areas risked defeat and domination.
A nation that survives this process will be so proficient at making war that,
outside of its group of peers, there may be no other military force that can
withstand it. The inexorable pressure on European states to become ever
better at making war meant that, when they ventured outside Europe,
they usually had a competitive advantage over other peoples. Time and
again over the past 500 years, comparatively tiny European forces have defeated much larger forces in the New World, Africa, and Asia.
European expansion set the stage for a continuing chain of reactive
processes in the rest of the world. Understanding those reactive processes
is the second historical ingredient to comprehending the ethnopolitical
problems we now face.
Reactions to Global European Expansion

An epoch of more than 400 years of colonial expansion, followed by a century of Western economic and cultural penetration of all parts of the
globe, has resulted in a world system in which most people must define
themselves partly in reaction to Europe and North America. It was inevitable that many people would define themselves in opposition to EuroAmerican dominance. This reaction has led to the development of such
movements as Islamic fundamentalism, Sendero Luminoso, and some cases
of reactive ethnonationalism. What is not always so clear, and is typically
misunderstood, is that European expansion has also caused violence
among non-Western peoples.
These reactions began with the earliest phases of European expansion.
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Europeans in many areas commented upon both the frequency with
which indigenous peoples engaged in conflict (against Europeans or
among themselves) and the ferocity with which they did so. The practice
of war by such people led to much social speculation, from Hobbes to the
present day, about the nature of war in nonstate societies, about the role of
conflict in the development of state institutions, and even about the supposedly aggressive nature of our species. This violence has been misunderstood from the beginning.
European expansion transformed indigenous societies from the outset. The immediate consequences were disease, introduction of new plants
and animals, and technological change. Such effects often arrived before
Europeans themselves, so that even the very first descriptions of indigenous societies were sometimes of people who had already been significantly changed. Among these changes were tl1e formation of pan-tribal
confederations and ethnic groups. Both tribes and ethnic groups appear to
have formed in response to expanding states, and may not have existed before the state.
In the era of European expansion, many episodes of conflict among
indigenous peoples, and between them and Europeans, concerned access
to European goods. The circulation of goods beyond state frontiers has
long been an element of state-nonstate relations. With its capacity for mass
production, European expansion magnified this factor. European goods
were valued by indigenous peoples not only for utilitarian reasons, but also
because they became part of social relations. Manufactured goods were
used to validate claims to status and were intimately involved in wars and
alliances. War among indigenous peoples, and between such peoples and
Europeans, often had much to do with access to European technology.
The Yanomami of the Amazon Basin illustrate these points. Long
noted in anthropology for the frequency and severity of their violent behavior, they have come to public attention with labels such as "the fierce
people." The Yanomami are depicted as representing the Hobbesian state
of anarchic war in which all nonstate peoples supposedly once lived. Yet,
analysis by Brian Ferguson ( 199 5) reveals that there is nothing pristine or
intrinsic about their violence. To the contrary, every reported incident of
Yanomami conflict is, directly or indirectly, about access to or control of
manufactured goods. Yanomami with direct access to Western goods try
vigorously to monopolize them. This action creates tension with outlying
villages, and even within villages. The problem of access to goods mani-
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fests itself not only through violence, but also through changes in kin relations, relocation of villages, population aggregation, village alliances,
feasting, economic specialization and exchange, the authority of headmen, and the treatment of the Yanomami as a cultural entity. Manufactured goods so significantly transformed Yanomami society that its recent
configuration cannot be considered to represent accurately the precontact
society. Ironically, some antl1ropologists who have taken manufactured
goods on their visits to tl1e Yanomami may have inadvertently stimulated
episodes of the "pristine" violence that they described.
The Iroquois in colonial North America were a group of independent
"nations" often noted for their fierceness and territorial ambitions. Although Iroquois conflicts may have originated in prehistory, in the historic
era the Iroquois made war well out of proportion to their disease-reduced
numbers. This result was closely linked to their need for European goods.
With the new importance of muskets in warfare, and a reduction in the
local supply of beaver pelts, the Iroquois in the seventeenth century faced
marginalization and ultimate obliteration. Pelts had to be obtained to
trade for muskets. At the same time, losses to European diseases were so
high that the Iroquois nations had constantly to replenish their populations with war captives and refugees. The Iroquois took to ambushing
canoe fleets in Canada for pelts, and concluded that the solution to the
shortage of beaver was to expand their hunting territory. Their wars were
ultimately about obtaining European goods.
As frontier encounters were transformed into colonial administrations, and ultimately into independent states, political and economic
processes in much of the world were modeled on the European nationstate. Yet, the fundamental reactive processes did not change. Many of
today's conflicts can trace their origins to the expansion, domination, and
meddling of the great powers. Political and territorial arrangements in tl1e
areas of former colonies, and in what were the Ottoman, AustroHungarian, and Soviet Empires, have caused people to accentuate their
differences as they compete to control state institutions. Peoples that have
coexisted for centuries now stress the "traditional" nature of their conflicts. New cultural identities are emerging, as among the Maya of
Guatemala and in Tajikistan. Ethnogenesis was apparently a policy of the
former USSR. The role of the state in ethnic formation can be seen in
Bedouin resistance to Israeli attempts to assign them an ethnic classification. A Bedouin school principal once complained, "[I ]f it was not
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enough what they [ the Israeli administration] are doing to us, now they
tell us we are an ethnic group" (Jakubowska 1992, 85).
Colonial policies have in many cases exacerbated cultural antagonisms, or even created them. When the British displaced the Moslems as
rulers oflndia, for example, they used Hindus to run the colonial administration, and emphasized the differences between the religions. Hindus
were sent to English schools and recruited as minor officials. Moslems
largely attended Islamic schools, where the teachings concerned religious
orthodoxy rather than secular advancement. In the postcolonial era, continued poverty, lack of access to power, and disillusionment with Westernderived models of "modernity" have contributed to the rise of Moslem,
Hindu, and Sikh nationalism. Throughout South Asia, politicians are exploiting these intensifying cultural differences for personal advancement,
provoking recent violence. In such a situation, an aura of antagonism can
be rapidly created by unscrupulous leaders, and manipulated to further
political ambitions.
The tragedy in Rwanda has deeply impressed itself on the world's consciousness. The true origins of this conflict are little known to the public.
A century ago, according to Alex de Wall ( 1994 ), European colonialists
found in what is now Rwanda a centralized kingdom consisting of numerous clans, and three groups largely defined by occupations. The European
administrators transformed the occupational hierarchy into an imaginary
racial classification. The minority Tutsi rulers were proclaimed by Belgian
missionaries to have a cultural and racial heritage in Etl1iopia-and thus
closer to Europe. As the Tutsi converted to Catholicism, they adopted this
new "history" to legitimate their continued rule. Hutu cultivators were
consigned to a life of toil.
In 19 59, on the eve of independence, the Belgians reversed botl1 their
policy and the order of Rwandese society. They assisted in eliminating the
Tutsi monarchy and in the installation of a Hutu republic. The Hutu have
since seized upon the myth that the Tutsis originated elsewhere, condemning them now as foreigners . The fact that Tutsi and Hutu "ethnic"
and "racial" identities were recently created by an outside power is now irrelevant. As they persecute each other and fight to control the Rwandan
state, survival now demands that they must be ethnic groups.
In the 1930s, the Belgians issued identity cards, categorizing people
as Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa (low-caste hunter-gatherers who do not emerge in
today's journalism). Unable to implement their racial typology in practice,
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the Belgian administrators classified people by the ownership of cattle.
Those people with ten or more were Tutsi in perpetuity; the ones with
fewer were Hutu. These identity cards still exist, and were used to categorize people in the recent massacres. Upon such a distinction, 500,000
people were killed.

Ways Out
There is no simple way out of problems that have taken so long to develop.
The most important step is understanding. It is most realistic to talk not of
immediate solutions, but of comprehending problems well enough that
intervention does not make them worse. Each conflict is but the tail end of
a long series of prior events and processes. In our historical arrogance, we
fail to see the context of today's dilemmas. The first step toward a way out
is to understand the long history that drives today's events. Once that understanding has been achieved, further steps can be based on the factors
generating conflict, such as reactions to external forces, rather than on the
simplifications of journalists or the illusions created by local leaders. This
obligation to understand the historical context of violence extends not just
to intervenors, but also to the participants. For the participants, understanding brings the opportunity to choose whether to continue to behave
reactively.
There has been a persistent pattern of reaction to European expansion, consisting of tribalization and ethnogenesis, intensification of cultural identity, and violence. The reasons for conflict range from control of
Western manufactured goods to control of Western-style governments .
These patterns are seen historically among the Iroquois, in recent decades
among the Yanomami, and today in both those conflicts that receive public attention and the ones that do not. In such places as the Balkans, Iran,
central Asia, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, violence is shaped by cultural and political reactions to external forces.
Though the forms of tl1ese conflicts differ, the factor that unifies tl1em is
that each is in part a response to former colonial, imperial, or other global
powers. Where violence focused on resisting European or U.S. encroachment, the great powers have found it comprehensible if disagreeable. Yet,
much of today's violence has seemed so incomprehensible because it is directed internally. Europeans and Americans have not understood that
their own expansion has stimulated much of today's culturally defined
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conflict. There is a direct line of cause and effect from warfare in medieval
and Renaissance Europe, to global expansion and colonialism, to today's
events in places such as Rwanda, Peru, and India.
This discussion suggests two implications for understanding today's
and tomorrow's difficulties. Grasping these implications is the first step toward seeing a way out. The first is the importance of knowing where we
are in history. Historical patterns, which may develop over periods of generations or even centuries, are the context of today's violence. In the
Balkans, for example, we see the legacy of the Ottoman Empire more than
a century after the Turks ceased to rule there. In the division between
Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs, we still see the legacy of the division
of the Roman Empire in 395 A.D. Rarely can an individual in the experience of a lifetime come to understand fully the origins of an event or a
process. Yet, to remain ignorant of the origins of today's problems is to
condemn ourselves to manage them ineptly, and to condemn others to the
consequences of that mismanagement. As for the future, it is folly to suppose that we can use present conditions to predict the twenty-first century
if we do not understand how the present came to be. Managing political
and cultural problems requires that we know where we are in history.
Western nations that attempt to ameliorate or manage conflicts need
to understand how their own histories have stimulated many of tl1ese
problems. If today's culturally defined conflicts are a response to European political and economic expansion, then interference carries the risk
of provoking further reactions. On one level, it can be seen clearly. Video
clips released, for example, by Moslem fundamentalists in Lebanon, by the
government of Iraq, and by tl1e Bosnian Serbs are clearly intended for
Western news broadcasts. The Tutsi-dominated Rwandese Patriotic Front
has legitimated its claim to rule Rwanda by asserting that its struggle is
based on social transformation ratl1er than ethnicity, that its troops are
well disciplined, and that it has no wish for revenge against Hutus, only
justice. These messages are meant for European and American ears. Beyond these obvious reactions to Western intervention, there is a likelihood
of more subtle and far-reaching consequences. These repercussions include continuing ethnogenesis, further intensification of existing cultural
identities, and the emergence of new culturally defined conflicts. Those
countries who design interventions in world conflicts must do so witl1 the
realization that involvement by dominant nations always stimulates unanticipated reactions.

Foundations and Context of Conflict

119

A second implication concerns Western perceptions of cultural conflicts. Many in Western nations (including, unfortunately, journalists) assume that cultural differences are innate and immutable, and lead
automatically to violence . Both journalistic and some scholarly reporting
tends to "explain" violence as the irrational but inevitable result of "ancient tribal feuds." It is assumed that contemporary expressions of cultural
difference represent both actual history and the "natural" divisions of our
species.
Cultural differentiation in today's conflicts is, to the contrary, flexible
and shifting, and responds to history, external stimuli, and deliberate manipulation . Conflicts in central Asia are a clear example, where new cultural identities (such as Ozbek) are emerging, stimulated substantially by
the involvement of external powers. In places such as the Balkans, "ethnic
entrepreneurs" ( a term suggested by Airat Aklaev of the Russian Academy
of Sciences) manipulate cultural identity as a means of political mobilization. This manipulation masks the underlying issues, sometimes deliberately. To a casual observer, it is easy to suppose that conflicts between
cultural groups are conflicts about culture. Often the conflicts are actually
about relations to the West, about the relations of local groups to Western-style central governments, or, as in Somalia and Liberia, really about
the control of those governments. In such struggles, appeals to culture
raise the moral authority of the political claim and tap profound emotions.
This strategy is, unfortunately, effective in political assertion. If cultural assertions mask real issues, then to address only the cultural dimension of a
conflict is to miss potential ways out.
The conflicts of the twenty-first century cannot be avoided or managed if we consider only conventional, short-term factors . This analysis
suggests a complex picture, in which reactive historical processes may
combine with scarcity, power, politics, and culture to provoke violence, or
may operate independently of them . The implications for preventing violence in the next century are complex as well: nothing can be more difficult in the management of conflict than to know that intervention itself
may generate further violence (as we see in Sierra Leone) . No doubt,
many who work in the crisis-laden world of international relations will be
reluctant to accept the additional burden of learning historical context.
Yet, if we accept the simple premise that problems can rarely be solved if
their causes are not understood, then historical knowledge is the first step
toward a way out. Diplomats, politicians, and conflict participants cannot
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hope to achieve lasting resolutions unless they first understand the importance of knowing where we are in history.
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Sustainable Development
and Human Security
Can We Learn from Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, and Haiti?

Waltraud Queiser Morales
One possible alternative explanation for the rise in hostilities during past
years is the cumulative effect of decades of unsustainable development, the
consequences and pressures of which have begun to undermine the wellbeing and security of many countries.

-Hal Kane, "The Hour of Departure"

Resource Scarcity and Violence

describe a phenomenon as old as humankind itself. Despite the biblical images of Adam and Eve partaking of unlimited bounty
in the Garden of Eden, through the ages mankind has struggled with both
absolute and relative scarcity. Historically, scarcity has been imposed by
two dominant causes. The first cause relates to geographical, ecological,
and climatic limitations over which humankind has had only partial control. The second cause relates to the social and political conditions of inequality and injustice that humankind has created and perpetuated in its
struggle for power and dominance globally and within states. As the cold
war began in the late 1940s, a noted North American statesman celebrated as the father of anticommunist containment, George Kennan,
warned fellow policy makers of the coming age of scarcity and the fierce
challenge that resource scarcity would pose for the foreign policy of the
RESOURCE WARS
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United States. In a secret policy brief, Kennan bluntly advised: "We have
about 50% of the world's wealth but only 6 .3% of its population . ... Our
real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which
will permit us to maintain tl1is position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security" ( cited in Etzold and Gaddis 1978, 227). In
short, the challenge was to devise a strategy of permanent global inequality whereby the people of the United States could continue to live in prosperity in a world oflimited and shrinking resources.
Scarcity has proved to be the curse of both the cold war and the
post-cold war generations for tl1e majority of the world's developing nations. Indeed, with the beginning of the twenty-first century, intrastate
conflict has supplanted interstate conflict as the pattern of warfare. 1 Much
of this violence within states has been aggravated by economic deprivation
and scarcity. Theories of revolution and instability have long emphasized
the important role of economic scarcity as a prime facilitator of violence .
Economic conditions of deprivation, inequality, and underdevelopment
exacerbated the tribal, ethnic, racial, and nationalist divisions that characterized much of the conflict of the twentieth century.
Nation-states around tl1e world have experienced severe social fragmentation, giving new meaning to the term balkanization. For example,
the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia has led to intrastate conflict in
Bosnia and Kosovo, and fears of a similar outbreak in Macedonia. Tribal
violence and postcolonial power struggles continue to ravage Somalia. In
Haiti, a postrevolutionary society struggles to establish democracy and
economic viability. In the aftermath of intrastate conflicts, these countries
seek to achieve a form of equitable and sustainable development tl1at will
break the brutal cycle of poverty, group rivalry, and violence.
Why are the states of tl1e twenty-first century seemingly more vulnerable to internal disintegration and internal violence? Increased relative
economic scarcity and deprivation clearly have been part of the answer. In
societies from the former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, to the former
colonial regions of Rwanda, Liberia, the Congo, Zimbabwe, Liberia,

1 . Intrastate violence or conflict is understood as violence between or among one or
more advantaged or disadvantaged minority or majority groups, and one or more of these
groups and the political and juridical state, in order to gain either a greater share of limited
resources or to secure control or autonomy or both over the territorial state. Violence may
take o n ethnonationalist, tribal, indigenist, or religious dynamics.
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Ethiopia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, East Timor, El Salvador, and
Guatemala, to name but a few, increased pressure on scarce resources and
the struggle to achieve sustainable development with justice and equity
have contributed to bloody revolutions and civil wars. Scarcity, although
downplayed by some theories of violence, has been a primary and secondary explanation for increased civil unrest. Moreover, whether relative or
absolute, scarcity has activated the process ofinternal "balkanization" and
social disintegration. Both "objective" and "subjective" increases in socioeconomic competition for scarce state resources have been essential
preconditions of intrastate violence. Scarcity, especially when aggravated
by inequality, has intensified the "us" versus "them" polarizations in most
developing societies.
Therefore, this overview suggests that the socioeconomic scarcity that
in large part unsustainable development has created and perpetuated is an
important explanation of global wars, ethnic violence, and civil unrest
within and among states. Recently, the importance of resource scarcity
and socioeconomic deprivation has been obscured by an emphasis on the
cultural, ethnic, and nationality factors as causes of violence . Additionally,
the fixation with the technological and military-hardware dimensions of
national security has ignored the fact that resource deprivation is closely
linked to the global struggle for sustainable development. What is really at
issue is the collective survival of mankind in an era of ever increasing
scarcity and inequality, and it is this global struggle that has been mirrored
in localized, intrastate conflict. A review of four cases of intrastate conflict
in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, and Haiti demonstrates that "no country is an
island." In the final reckoning, resource deprivation and depletion among
the world's poorest nations are integrally linked to global sustainability
and human security.

Why Intrastate Conflict?
Because of rapid global changes, the twenty-first century has seen a proliferation in the causes of conflict and in popular theories that try to explain
that conflict. An important part of the difficulty is that the traditional distinctions between revolution and war, interstate and intrastate violence,
and internal and external conditions of strife have all basically collapsed. At
the same time, theories of war, revolution, and intrastate violence have become closely linked to theories of racial, indigenous, and ethnonationalist
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resurgences and rebellions. Domestic and international dimensions of
conflict have become tightly intertwined, and conflicts, such as the ones in
Bosnia and Kosovo, not only have bridged the conceptual and actual barriers between internal and external war, but also have recombined intrastate and interstate violence in novel ways. Multilateral interventions
around the world, especially the peacekeeping operations in Somalia,
Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, have further demonstrated the significant deterioration in state boundaries, authority, and sovereignty. Indeed, war
and revolution in the twenty-first century have become two sides of a
single coin.
In the search for explanations, "politicized ethnicity" has been isolated as a prime mover in both intrastate and interstate conflict. Among
the competing theorists who attempt to explain intrastate violence, James
Kellas (1991) and Ted Gurr (1993) emphasize the causal importance of
minority-group relations with a dominant majority group and the presence of ethnic conflict. They identify various economic, social, psychological, and cultural mechanisms as key triggers that create or intensify
antagonistic in-group and out-group perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. Both argue that an important indicator of the potential for intrastate
conflict is whether ethnic, racial, or nationality groups aspire to revolutionary political or territorial claims or both.
Another potential explanation of intrastate violence is found in sociobiology. Kellas concludes that although "identity and behavior are partly
genetic," they are also influenced by context and choice (1991, 19). For
example, politicians routinely manipulate group identities for their own
ends. Indeed, such political manipulation by unscrupulous political leaders was an important element in the cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and
Somalia. Human nature may provide the "necessary" conditions for ethnocentric or racist behavior, but politics converts them into the "sufficient
conditions" for ethnic and racial violence. Gurr also emphasizes "politicized communal groups" formed against socioeconomic conditions of
discrimination and deprivation. In his words, "treat a group differently, by
denial or privilege, and its members become more self-conscious about
tl1eir common bonds and interests" (1993, 3). The experiences of discrimination (economic or political) and the politicization of group interests provide the sufficient conditions for intrastate conflict.
Considering human nature and sociobiology, theorists Paul Shaw and
Yuwa Wong propose a connection between violence and the genetic pre-
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disposition to kin selection. Over evolutionary time, kin selection and environmental forces have predisposed "genetically related individuals to
band together in groups, oriented for conflict" (1987, 5 ). In short, intergroup conflict relates to successful reproductive fitness and survival of
close relatives. Although controversial, of interest to an explanation of the
causes ofintrastate conflict and violence are the environmental, structural,
and socioeconomic conditions that trigger violent behavior. According to
their theory, the biological processes underlying human cooperation and
aggression are "exacerbated under conditions of scarce resources or
stress" ( 6 ).
All four theorists concur that socioeconomic mechanisms of scarcity,
deprivation, competition, and economic discrimination are instrumental
in causing in-group versus out-group conflict. Material deprivation (often
extreme impoverishment) and systematic discrimination (by dominant
groups and advantaged minorities) may threaten the group's physical survival. In this sense, resource scarcity activates group conflict and trans forms it into intrastate and ethnonationalist violence. This convergence of
grievances, according to Ernest Gellner, creates the volatile combination
of "nation-classes" that define themselves ethnically, and "class-nations"
that develop class consciousness and activism (quoted in Kellas 1991,
41-44).
This brief review of relevant theories of intrastate conflict indicates
that conditions of regional and global scarcity are potentially devastating
for the future of human cooperation and the delicate calculus between war
and peace . At no time in human history does it seem more vital that both
civil and global society function as a "collective survival enterprise." Certainly, a more supportive context for human behavior would reduce or
eliminate the dehumanizing conditions of resource scarcity and inequality
at all levels of social organization. A necessary step toward a comprehen sive solution to global scarcity and intrastate conflict is the implementation of a global policy of sustainable development within a just
international economic order.
Collective Survival of Humankind
A "new cold war" or North-South resource war directed against the de veloping world has replaced the ideological East-West cold war of old.
The only way to "win" this new war is to resolve the global crises of
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poverty, scarcity, overpopulation, and chronic underdevelopment. Despite the professed policies of democratization, nation building, and sustainable development by northern governments, the goals remain elusive.
Indeed, the rhetoric may mask a process that has been characterized as the
"structural resubordination" of the developing world by the rich and
powerful countries. This neocontainment of the developing nations intends to maintain the global disparity in resource distribution primarily
through orthodox and free-market development policies. Narrow ideologies of economic individualism and growth undergird traditional development models and the inequitable global economic order. Can the egoistic
development of global resources be replaced by a sustainable and communal model?
Sustainable development broadly means meeting present needs without destroying resources that will be needed in the future. However,
agreeing on the what and how of sustainable development has been problematical and controversial from the start. In 1987, the United Nations
World Commission on Environment and Development ( the Brundtland
Commission) interpreted sustainable development as "sustainable industrial development." In 1992, the UN conference on environment and development, the Rio Earth Summit, equated sustainable development with
the "greening" of traditional development. Rio popularized the myopia
that "clean growth" that minimized environmental and ecological damage and "eco-efficiency," or efficient growtl1, could resolve the scarcity
crisis. The Earth Summit also legitimated transnational corporations as
major global actors in sustainable development, rehabilitating them as
part of the solution rather than the problem that they had partly helped
create. At Rio tl1e TNCs and mainstream NGOs recognized that their
brand of environmentalism and sustainable development was profitable.
As long as sustainable development is defined by "unsustainable development models" that fail to question the traditional assumptions of unlimited growth and industrialization, the real global crisis and its solutions
will be overlooked. The popular myth of development as unlimited
growth dies hard. Nevertheless, we can no longer be seduced by the illusory promises of technocratic solutions to scarcity and underdevelopment,
and the comfortable belief that everyone can attain First World lifestyles
without limiting growth and consumption. Such thinking is itself a cause
of global scarcity and conflict.
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Learning from Cases of Intrastate Conflict

The country cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, and Haiti demonstrate that
the environmental and socioeconomic conditions ofintrastate violence already discussed were generally shared. First, these diverse cases reveal uncommonly similar histories of internal economic, social, cultural, and
political oppression and exploitation. Second, all four societies experienced colonialism and dependent ( unbalanced and exploitative) development. Third, the imposition of traditional and unsustainable development
policies aggravated conditions of resource scarcity, poverty, and ecological
and environmental devastation. Fourth, ethnic and religious differences
and nationalist sentiments were egregiously manipulated to intensify socioeconomic discrimination against out-groups. Fifth, radical shifts in the
balance of power within states and among minority-majority group relations fostered instability. Sixth, localized instability and conflict threatened
the continued prosperity of neighboring countries and regions, as well as
global peace.
Above all, an important lesson that we must learn from the intrastate
violence in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, and Haiti is that societies do disintegrate under the strains of life-and-death competition for scarce resources.
When economic deprivation is based upon hateful ethnic and group discrimination as in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, and Haiti, multiethnic states
can easily fragment into "politicized communal groups," and contentious
"nation-classes" or "class-nations." With time, collective insecurities and
fears for the very physical survival of one's group find release in bloody internal conflicts.
Bosnia and Kosovo

The Balkan wars have confused the experts and challenged traditional
assumptions. Were these intrastate or interstate conflicts, civil wars, interethnic wars, religious wars, or international aggression? In a sense, intrastate conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo involved all of these possibilities; it
challenged the sanctity of international borders and threatened proliferation from a Balkan to a wider European war. And with the swell of
refugees fleeing genocide and "ethnic cleansing," both conflicts fed fears
of global ethnic warfare. What were the causes of the Bosnian and Kosovo
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conflicts? And what was the role of unsustainable development and resource scarcity in the outbreak of the devastating intrastate conflicts in the
Balkans?
The first stage of the recent Balkan crisis began in 1991 when the former Communist state of Yugoslavia, comprising six component republics
and regions (Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia), disintegrated. After the death ofTito in 1980 and the demise of communism since 1987, the multiethnic state could not withstand the
resurgence of ethnic divisions and fears. In 1991, Milosevic's attempts to
make Greater Serbia the dominant nationality of the new postCommunist Yugoslavia precipitated the secession of Slovenia and Croatia
and the outbreak of war. Soon ethnic Serbs living in the newly independent Croatia sought to secede, create their own independent republic (Krajina), and reunite with Serbia proper. The new Croatian government
violently repressed the secession, but in the end lost 30 percent of its
territory.
By 1992, Bosnian Moslems also voted to secede from Yugoslavia, but
Bosnian Serbs boycotted the vote and began a resistance war against the
new government. Nevertheless, the United States and European Community recognized the secession of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, and of
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992. Slobodan Milosevic, leader of what was left
of Yugoslavia, armed the local Bosnian Serb resistance and escalated the
conflict into a trilateral Yugoslavian war of Croatia, Serbia and Bosnian
Serbs, and Bosnian Moslems. UN peacekeeping troops were dispatched to
contain the conflict in early 1992. Despite some twenty-five thousand
peacekeepers, largely from Western European countries and the United
States, there were hundreds of thousands of deaths and 3 million refugees
before a precarious status quo was imposed by the Dayton Peace Accords
in December 1995.
A similar violent and disastrous scenario unfolded in Kosovo, a region
heavily populated by ethnic Albanian and Moslem people but dominated
by Serbia. The political and economic crises of the 1980s and renewed
Serbian nationalism led the majority Albanians (90 percent) in Kosovo to
also demand more autonomy and ethnic rights . But Milosevic, unwilling
to lose control of Kosovo, part of the historic heartland of Serbian nationhood, ordered the army to crush Albanian demonstrations. Clearly,
Kosovo was not Bosnia. Despite a similar disintegration of state and society, ethnic rivalry, and fears of a wider war, Kosovo was basically an in-
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trastate conflict between Yugoslavia (mainly Serbia) and its province
(Kosovo). Unlike Bosnia, the international community opposed Kosovar
independence and sent in UN and NATO forces on a limited mission to
prevent humanitarian atrocities and end Serbia's brutal ethnic cleansing.
This time, Milosevic's genocide in Kosovo branded him an indicted war
criminal instead of an equal partner in a peace process as in the Bosnian
war. In the end, the NATO bombings (which lasted seventy-eight days
and included forty thousand missions) and the protracted humanitarian
intervention have meant more suffering and casualties among the
refugees.
In both Balkan conflicts, disadvantaged minorities and majorities were
subject to economic, social, cultural, and political oppression. The realignment of internal and external borders destabilized the relationships
among minority and majority ethnic groups. For example, in an independent Bosnia, the Bosnian Serbs feared becoming a disadvantaged minority ( 31 percent of the population) in a state controlled by Moslems (44
percent of the population). Similarly, in an autonomous or independent
Kosovo, the Serbian population (less than 10 percent) would become a
potentially disadvantaged minority in the 90 percent Albanian-dominated
state rather than retain the advantages of the Serb majority in Yugoslavia.
Also behind the Balkan crises were depressed and discriminatory economic conditions that systematically disadvantaged the weakest and poorest ethnic groups and regions. Uneven economic development and
internal colonialism reinforced scarcity and inequality. Thus, the economic downturn in the 1980s had a greater impact in Kosovo, one of the
poorest regions of Yugoslavia, and in the less-developed Bosnia. Misconceived and unsustainable development models promoted wasteful industrialization and reinforced existing inequalities and resource scarcities. At
the same time, because economic discrimination against Kosovo's Albanians and Bosnian Moslems was popularly rationali zed by hateful racist and
nationalist prejudices, ethnic resentment and mistrust among ethnic
groups festered and ultimately exploded in violence.
Somalia and Haiti

Although in two very different parts of the world, these two black nations have experienced some of the worst conditions ofresource competition and scarcity. In Somalia and Haiti, severe environmental degradation
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contributed to massive social disruption and both class and ethnic conflict.
In Haiti, intrastate violence escalated with the genocidal revolution of
1986 that overthrew the corrupt and brutal dictatorship of the Duvalier
family. In Somalia, a major regional war ( the Somali-Ethiopian war in the
Ogaden in 1977-1978) and a protracted civil war (1988-1991) that deposed the longtime dictator, Siad Barre, devastated the land, created a
massive refugee crisis, and reinforced a cycle of mass famine. In both cases,
intrastate conflict was precipitated and aggravated by conditions of deprivation and unequal and unsustainable development.
The 1992 humanitarian intervention in Somalia was initially precipitated by mass starvation that threatened 2 million people, but the underlying problem was intrastate violence among some fifteen warring tribal
clans and the resource competition and environmental destruction that
chronic civil war caused. In times of extreme scarcity, food and resources
were divided along tribal and class lines with the dominant clans discriminating against the out-groups . Therefore, in Somalia, once tribal identities
were reinforced by socioeconomic and class differences, and aggravated by
scarcity and famine, the key preconditions of instrastate violence were in
place. The overthrow of the Barre dictatorship also destabilized the balance of minority-and majority-group relations and created a political
vacuum that quickly disintegrated into social and political chaos.
Somalia, like Haiti, is one of the world's poorest countries, chronically
dependent on food imports, and with scarce arable land, subject to misuse
by farmers, overgrazing by nomadic herdsmen, and desertification. The
economic development model, again like Haiti's, relied on foreign aid
(largely from the United States), and cash crop-primary exports. Both
countries suffered from extreme trade imbalances with imports greatly exceeding exports, foreign debts, and severe IMF structural adjustments
(imposed economic belt-tightening). Much foreign aid, as in Haiti, was
food aid, which served to undermine local farm prices and impede agricultural sustainability. Northern focus on "growth" areas for development assistance in Somalia and Haiti ignored the importance of sustainable
development and left the poorest of the poor few alternatives than humanitarian assistance or the destruction of their environment in their desperation to survive day to day. In short, Somalia (not unlike Haiti) was a
hapless victim of both cold war and post-cold war politics and shortsighted and exploitative northern models of unsustainable development.
The years since the 1992-1993 humanitarian intervention have seen few
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solutions to the endemic causes of hunger, scarcity, and conflict that continue to wrack Somalia. Somehow it seems that the $3-4 billion that were
expended on the UN humanitarian operation could have been used more
effectively to promote sustainable development.
In Haiti, the conditions after the 1986 revolution and the 1994 humanitarian intervention have not improved significantly either. The peasantry, the dispossessed of Haiti, continue to suffer desperate poverty,
political repression, and systematic violence. Haiti's economic and social
history has been one of internal and external colonialism: exploitation by
dictators and Creole elites from within (Francois "Papa Doc" and Jean
Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier) and by foreign interests ( the United States)
from without. Haiti's unsustainable development model relied on the export of primary commodities and assembly products to U.S. and global
markets, and on foreign assistance from the United States. Haitian peasants have served as a large, cheap, and nonunionized labor pool for U.S.
industries. This development model has not only been unsustainable environmentally but also contributed to an absolute poverty level of $60- 100
per capita yearly income for more than 60 percent of Haitians . Cultivation
of land for food was shifted to export crops, forcing the starving peasants
to denude the island for cheap firewood to sell and exhaust the sparse and
depleted arable land. Haiti's soil and resource depletions portend a major
environmental and ecological disaster.
In the ten years since the 1986 revolution, H aitians experienced terrible violations of human rights and outright genocide by the state's mili tary and security forces. The 1994 U .S.-UN humanitarian intervention
served to moderate some of the worst abuses, but the ultimate result has
been the shift of power to a more conservative minority ruling class- a
new Creole elite- and through them the containment of Haiti's popular
revolution . In the process, sustainable development has yet to be achieved;
until it is, internal conflict and violence are unlikely to end in Haiti.

Ways Out
More global conflicts of the twenty-first century will be rooted in the convergence of resource scarcity and environmental depletion. Scarcity intensifies human degradation and deprivation, and ethnopolitical and religious
hatreds. Unless action is taken, these conditions will provoke more violent
intrastate conflict and ultimately threaten the collective survival of hu-
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mankind. What can and should be done to avoid such catastrophe? As in
all problem solving, the logical and vital first step is to identify the problem
correctly, because a mismatch between problem and solution invites failure. Therefore, this investigation is the first step in systematically identifying and addressing the causes of intrastate conflict.
The challenging second step is the search for solutions and comprehensive policy changes. Among the actions that can be taken to prevent
more intrastate conflict and further social and political disintegration are
changes in our fundamental attitudes and loyalties. It is critical to define
state and national security in more humane terms, so that the peoples
whom governments claim to protect come first and their political and economic human rights are fundamentally respected and preserved. State security must also be understood in more comprehensive and holistic terms.
Survival is inherently indivisible. And in the absence of sustainable development, exhaustive resource competition will promote resource scarcity
and speed environmental collapse. In the end, humankind will no longer
have homes or societies to protect. Thus, human security must be accepted as the only real security.
Global interdependence and globalization in the twenty-first century
mean that distant crises of famine, disease, environmental degradation,
and ethnic strife cannot be ignored, isolated, or confined within national
borders. No longer can any individual, group, nation, or state remain an
island unto itself. Collective interests must replace narrow self-interests.
Each one of us must take to heart and act upon the clear lesson revealed in
this examination of the theories and cases of intrastate violence. Unless the
survival of the few means the survival of all, future intrastate conflict is inevitable. The future portends immense challenge. If it is to be met successfully, then citizens must support national and international policies
that will achieve the goals of sustainable development, equitable and limited resource consumption, and tl1e elimination of poverty and scarcity.
The collective survival of humankind demands radical and immediate
changes in how we think and act today.
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Part Three

CASE STUDIES OF SCARCllY AND

MASS DEATH

Introduction

we have witnessed recently in Bosnia, Somalia,
East Timor, and Rwanda has some common roots. Resource scarcity is a
necessary precondition that apparently activates group conflict and transforms it into the virulent ethnonationalist violence we are seeing with
greater frequency. It may be a precursor of genocidal incidents and tendencies that will be only more pronounced as resource-scarcity problems
and population pressures continue to intensify in the coming decades. If
current ecological and demographic trends continue apace, particularly
population growth combined with resource depletion, this situation will
put added pressure on already fragile social and political systems in the affected parts of the world. These areas, as Roger Smith, David Smith, and
Waltraud Morales point out, are the very places where much of genocide
since 1945 has occurred. To forestall what may be likely, if not inevitable,
as Leon Rappaport argues, we need major paradigm shifts in values, psychology, politics, and economic organization. The authors in this final section begin to address the threat of proliferating genocides and offer some
possible solutions.
THE TRAGIC VIOLENCE
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it is a political choice. But political
choices, including genocide, are effected by many different forces, internal
and external. Scarcity will increasingly be one of those forces in the not-sodistant future.
The question of the relationships between scarcity and genocide is an
important one, both in terms of understanding the causes of genocide and
in anticipating the prospects for genocide in the twenty-first century. If
current trends continue, a combination of environmental degradation,
loss of agricultural land, depletion of fish stocks, dwindling of fuel resources, and a doubling of population to around 11 billion persons in the
latter part of the century will lead to conditions of extreme hardship, even
disaster, in many parts of the world. These areas, mainly in the Third
World, are the very places where much of the genocide since 1945 has
taken place.
The genocides that have occurred in Bangladesh, Burundi, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Rwanda, however, have not been brought about by
material scarcity. In fact, genocide, with some exceptions to be noted later,
has seldom been the result of material scarcity; on the contrary, material
scarcity has often been a direct result of genocide. Nevertheless, in a world
that in the twentieth century displayed an unparalleled capacity for mass
slaughter, it would be surprising if severe shortages would not exacerbate
existing tendencies toward resolving social and political problems through
elimination of the groups thought to constitute the problem.
"Scarcity" is a concept that includes both the relative and the absolute. For those people used to affluence and abundance, a mild reducGENOCIDE IS NOT INEVITABLE;
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tion in goods available to them will be perceived as a matter of scarcity;
similarly, they may feel worse off if other persons improve their material
condition while they remain at their previous level. Scarcity, in these instances, is not only relative, but also psychological: desire is confused with
need. Psychological scarcity is an important facet of the "developmental"
genocide that indigenous peoples have faced, and, most likely, will face.
Although many philosophers have seen "desire" and its control as a crucial
problem, the modern view, one that underlies ideas of progress and development, is that the expansion of desire and continual efforts to satisfy its
expectations thereby created are the principal reasons for social existence.
It is this artificial scarcity, a scarcity created by desire rather than need, that
in large part drives the development projects that have destroyed the lives
of indigenous peoples in the name of "progress." Scarcity may also be
both absolute and material: without food and water for a certain period,
we, of course, die.
Considered in material terms, scarcity can take at least two different
forms. First, there may be a scarcity of resources-little usable land, forests
that have been depleted, minerals long ago extracted from the soil. Some
of these resources can be renewed, whereas others are simply no longer
there. Whetl1er resources are renewable or not is itself an important dimension of overcoming scarcity and any role it may have in prompting
murderous conflict. Second, resources may be scarce because of the size of
the population: even if all goods were distributed equally, there would still
be generalized poverty. In order to overcome this kind of scarcity, either
the material resources would have to be increased ( the green revolution in
agriculture, for instance) or the population would have to be decreased.
In addition to psychological scarcity and the material scarcities described, there is a kind of scarcity-political scarcity-that includes both
material and political deprivation. Where political scarcity exists, there
may be sufficient resources to meet everyone's needs, but the allocation of
resources favors certain groups and discriminates against other groups. In
practice, there will often be a scarcity of resources and an expanding population, both of which may contribute further to policies of unequal distribution of goods. Such situations frequently exist in ethnically divided
("plural") societies and help to drive demands for equal treatment, demands that may be met with repression and, if the conflict persists, with an
attempt at partial or total genocide. Power sharing, protection of basic
rights, and equality of treatment could go a long way in overcoming the
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difficulties otherwise exacerbated by deteriorating resources and expansion of population.
The relationships between genocide and scarcity fall into four broad
patterns. First of all, genocide typically produces scarcity: it creates social
chaos; disrupts the economy; destroys the lives of hundreds of thousands,
even millions, of persons who possess skills and productive capacities; and
diverts the perpetrators themselves from their role in economic life, turning them into persons who destroy rather than produce and create. In extreme cases, such as that of Rwanda, economic production may cease
altogether. Moreover, in many instances, disease may sweep through the
society, facilitated in part by famine, water sources contaminated by the
dead, and lack of sanitation. Where the genocide occurs in the context of
war, as in Bosnia, human habitations, production facilities, and the environment itself may all suffer significant damage, creating additional material scarcities.
If genocide falls most heavily upon the intended victims, the perpetrators are not immune to the scarcities it induces. In Cambodia, for example, hundreds of thousands of people whom the Khmer Rouge tried to
turn into the foundation of a peasant society died from malnutrition
brought about by its agricultural policies. Although humanitarian aid in
the form of both food and medicine was available, the Khmer Rouge
would not accept it for ideological reasons: its vision was of a self-sufficient
peasant society; moreover, if food was scarce, the regime maintained it was
due to sabotage by "enemies of the revolution," not any failure of the revolutionary design itself.
Perpetrators may be so intent upon destroying a group that they fail to
calculate the effects that their actions will have on themselves. Or there
may be a recognition of this consequence, but the calculus used to assess
costs and benefits is one that stresses ideology, revenge, or power rather
than the material well-being of the perpetrator group.
There is one type of genocide in which scarcity falls almost entirely
upon the victims . In developmental genocide, it is the indigenous peoples'
land that is taken and their sources of food eliminated. The perpetrators,
on the other hand, gain land, gold, timber, or cheap electricity from the
hydroelectric projects erected on the indigenous peoples' territory.
Scarcities that stem from genocide may be either short-term (a tem porary shortage of food, for example) or long-lasting (where much of the
existing housing is damaged or destroyed, as in Bosnia). In some cases, the
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damage to the economy will continue for generations: eighty-six years
after the 1915 genocide of the Armenians, lands that were once highly
productive lie barren in eastern Turkey.
Direct conflict over scarce resources is another recurrent theme. It is
likely to occur in three situations, each of which is compatible with genocidal actions. The first is the result of migration into areas occupied by
other groups. A well-known example of this occurrence is the Israelite exodus from Egypt, their migration into Canaan, and the ensuing wars over
resources that the early books of the Bible invariably depict as wars of extermination. Migration may itself result from lack of adequate resources,
but more commonly in the modern world from persecution, war, and
genocide.
Direct conflict over material resources is also likely where resources
held by indigenous peoples are slated for "development." Much of the
scarcity perceived by the ones who set development into motion involves a
lack of abundance rather than economic hardship . The other form of
scarcity involved here is the maldistribution of resources, particularly land,
within the perpetrators' territory, rather than a lack of resources. One of
the reasons that development appeals to political and economic elites
("progress" is another) is that it offers a kind of safety valve to release the
frustrations of the landless and the impoverished without requiring any redistribution of resources held by the elites. The costs of development will
be borne instead by those people whose lands are taken . There are currently some 200 million indigenous peoples around the world, most of
whom are already vulnerable to existing pressures for greater and more
productive utilization of resources. Given an age of scarcity in the twentyfirst century, the future of indigenous peoples would appear to be bleak.
The third basis for direct conflict over resources occurs when a state
collapses, followed by fragmentation , with no group capable of gaining
overall power or control. When a state fails, with the consequent breakdown of security for life and property, scarcity can be expected to increase,
leading to a struggle over basic resources .
In principle, a dominant group may arise out of the "state of nature"
and impose a repressive order. But it is possible that a variety of groups will
sustain tl1e low-level conflict for many years, with repeated genocidal attacks being made by all sides . Genocide, rather than being exceptional,
would become part of an equilibrium of destruction. Under these conditions, life would almost certainly be "poor, nasty, brutish, and short." In
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this situation, any distinction between war and crime, and war and genocide, would blur or disappear.
The history of genocide also provides many examples of the act being
carried out primarily through depriving the victims of food . Ancient warfare was synonymous with genocide; when a walled city offered resistance,
the perpetrators would resort to siege warfare, cutting the inhabitants off
from fresh supplies of food and drink. Eventually, the people within the
city would starve or would capitulate and then be killed or enslaved. During the Spanish "conquest" of Mexico, Indians were forced into submission or died by starvation when their supplies of food were confiscated and
their crops burned. A modern example is the Stalinist man-made famine of
1932-1933 in Soviet Ukraine that led to the death by starvation of some
5 million Ukrainians, most of them the very peasants who had produced
the grain that was confiscated. A calculated policy to force peasants into
collective agriculture and to crush a rising Ukrainian nationalism led, in
two years, to the death of almost 20 percent of the population.
Scarcity, particularly in its psychological and political forms, has
played a role in genocide for centuries; material scarcity has less rarely been
a source for mass killing. Other motives have included conquest, retribu tion, dominance, and, where certain ideologies were involved, the total remaking of society to achieve salvation and purification. Although many of
the motives and pressures for genocide that have existed from ancient
times to the present will likely continue, it may be that we are entering an
age in which scarcity in its various forms will increasingly contribute to the
decision to resort to genocide. In this context, "scarcity" includes degradation and depletion of natural resources, fewer goods per capita due to
population growth, and unequal resource distribution. It also includes the
psychological and political scarcities that play a role in the genocide of indigenous peoples and minorities in plural societies. Each form of scarcity
can contribute to the conditions that make genocide more likely: they include conflict over resources; population displacement and ensuing conflict between groups; allocation of resources along racial, religious, or
ethnic lines, resulting in demands for autonomy or independence; and
weakening of the legitimacy of the state, followed by either revolution, an
attempt at secession, or a growing authoritarianism that seeks to solve social and political problems by force. New ideologies may also arise, and are
likely to be formulated along lines of ethnicity or religion. In some instances, states may fragment into warring groups, with no group able to
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achieve dominance, but able to decimate other groups in intermittent
combat. Finally, genocide itself begets new, especially material, scarcities,
laying the basis for further violence in the future.
To spell out one example of the possible effects of scarcity contributing to genocide: where the legitimacy of the state or the ruling group in a
plural society is challenged, it is likely that the old regime will resort to authoritarian solutions to hold onto power. But in so doing, it will further
alienate the minority groups that it has previously excluded from power.
This alienation will provoke further challenge to the elite's authority,
which will be met with greater force, including massacres. This example is,
in fact, the classic case of what leads to genocide in ethnically divided, plural societies. If there is also the problem of material scarcity, which is likely
to be accentuated in the future, then increasing demands will be made on
those people in power. These demands, due to lack of resources, competence, or fairness, will not be met, resulting in further erosion in the legitimacy of rule by the dominant elite. In such a situation, the tendency is to
crack down on the ones making the demands, but also to allocate scarce
resources even more decidedly along ethnic lines, favoring members of the
dominant group. This result is in part a matter of what might be called a
politics ofidentity, in which one favors one's own group, but also in part a
strategy to reward those citizens thought to be loyal to the people in
power. The end result will be that in times of scarcity, the regime will move
from its usual pattern of discrimination to a policy that increases hardship
and, at the extreme, leads to destitution. If the destitute have the means to
resist, then this violence will in turn generate a new spiral of repression,
beginning with massacres, which are a way of keeping a group in its place,
and possibly ending with genocide, which attempts to eliminate the group
itself.
In this scenario, a type of society (plural), a type ofregime ( authoritarian), a type of policy (unequal allocation ofresources), a challenge to that
policy (by the group that is viewed as inferior and excluded from power),
and material scarcity (whatever its sources) come together in a mix that
is fatal.
Preventing Genocide

Those people who study genocide do so in order to understand why such
extreme violence takes place and why it is directed at particular groups.

144

ROGER W. SMl T H

The quest to understand, however, is a desire not only to know, but also to
find ways in which that understanding can be used to prevent future acts of
genocide. As previously mentioned, there is nothing inevitable about
genocide; nevertheless, there are certain predisposing elements, and the
likelihood of preventing genocide is enhanced if they can be overcome.
The chapter will conclude with some reflections upon possible means of
removing the links between genocide and scarcity.
The means fall into two broad patterns . First, there is the question of
how "scarcity" can be dealt with so that it does not put pressure on
regimes to commit genocide. Second, there is the more general question
of how genocide can be prevented, even if such pressures cannot be wholly
removed.
Reducing Scarcities

As we have seen, "scarcity" takes a number of different forms: psychological, political, and material. Let us consider each in turn.
The psychological expectation of ever increasing material satisfaction
is deeply embedded in the modern worldview, but instead of attempting
to dominate nature, we could respect and work with it, seeing ourselves as
part of nature, and dependent upon it for our very existence. Another approach would call attention to the fact that cutting down rain forests, for
example, is not the best use to which they can be put, and that many largescale development projects in indigenous areas have been failures at great
cost in terms oflives, money, and damage to the environment.
Deprivation, on the other hand, is the hallmark of political scarcity. It
contains three elements: deprivation in terms of power, material wellbeing, and respect. Plural societies often display these forms of deprivation, prompting challenges to the structure of authority, and leading in
turn to repression, renewed demands for equality or autonomy, and, without outside intervention, genocide. In fact, the most frequent source of
genocide in the twentieth century was that which sprang from the political
scarcity imposed by domination and exclusion. The question, then, is not
only of divided societies, but also of authoritarian government.
The conditions for averting genocide that arises in part from political
scarcity are reasonably clear. Some form of power sharing would be neces sary. The precise form it would take could vary from society to society, but
it might involve, for example, federalism, a degree of autonomy, or certain
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offices, or a percentage of offices in the military, bureaucracy, or parliament, being reserved for members of the previously subordinate group. It
would require justice in the allocation of goods. And finally, it would require some degree ofacceptance of the minority group as persons, and the
repudiation of stereotypes and prejudices that had served as justifications
for exclusion from equal treatment.
The conditions are easily stated, but societies have their own histories,
and their social arrangements are not accidental. The alternative to changing the existing arrangements is outside intervention.
The third form of scarcity is the most obvious and the most difficult to
overcome. Material scarcity has two possible sources: resources either are
not available or have been degraded in ways that make them less productive, and there may be fewer goods per capita due to population expansion. The solutions to resource scarcity and population explosion are both
technical and political. Further, these two sources of scarcity are so entangled that it is not possible to solve one without the other.
High growth rates in population tend to occur precisely in societies
that can least afford them, those places that are already resource scarce or
whose government allocates resources in ways that favor some groups and
deprive others. Given the existing strains in such societies, rapid population growth will lead to increased scarcity, violence, and possible genocide. The spiral of scarcity will increase both because goods now have to be
divided among more people and because attempts to increase production
(especially of food and shelter) often produce severe ecological damage,
undermining further the capacity to meet material needs.
Populations in the past have been reduced within a specific territory
by migration, disease, famine, war, and genocide. These factors may operate in the future; less apocalyptic visions, however, are possible, though
they are not without their own difficulties in terms of implementation.
High birthrates will tend to fall where four conditions are present: a low
mortality rate, a relative improvement in earnings, the availability of family planning and birth control, and an equal status for women. Where
these conditions are not met, the surge in population will most likely continue, leading both to increasing impoverishment and to long-term environmental damage.
Solutions to the problems of resource scarcity are likewise difficult to
implement, but some progress can be made if the size of the population
can be stabilized. Too often, however, the response to growing population
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has been to adopt means that may offer some temporary relief, but lead to
even more resource scarcity in the future.
Institutional and Political Means

Scarcities exacerbate the conditions that favor genocidal choices, but
they do so within societies already divided along racial, religious, or ethnic
lines and governed by authoritarian regimes. This realization brings us,
then, to the more general question of how genocide can be prevented,
even if not all of the pressures exerted by scarcities can be removed.
There are numerous steps that can be taken to prevent genocide. A
carrot-and-stick approach might be adopted by states and international
organizations to support social and political transformation in divided and
repressive societies. Societies that are likely to resort to genocide can be
identified and closely monitored. Early warning systems can be devised to
forecast the likelihood of genocide, allowing governments and international bodies time to decide upon appropriate responses. Publicity and the
mobilization by nongovernmental organizations of a human-rights constituency to pressure governments to act are also important in this context. International law can be strengthened through the creation of a
standing, permanent tribunal to sit in judgment of those people who commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Also, the right of
humanitarian intervention must be both recognized and made effective.
At present, individual states have the capacity to intervene, and the United
Nations is capable of putting together a coalition of forces, as in Bosnia
and Somalia. But far more effective, and most likely a precondition for
preventing genocide, is a permanent, standing international force that can
be rapidly deployed. What is also crucial, for it is unlikely that the other
steps will be undertaken to any extent without it, is for states to enlarge
their definition of national interest to include the prevention of genocide.
Here morality and realpolitik largely coincide .
Conclusion
Many, if not all, of the strategies for preventing genocide and reducing the
scarcities-psychological, political, and material-that can contribute to it
could be effective, if implemented. The prevention of genocide, however,
is less a matter of knowledge than of political will. Two related questions
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thus hang over the future: Will the states and international organizations
of the world continue to be bystanders to genocide, looking on and doing
little? Or will a human capacity to resolve political and social problems in a
manner befitting humankind finally assert itself in this century?

Ways Out
There are neither simple nor guaranteed solutions to the problems of
scarcity, genocide, or the increasing likelihood that the material scarcities
of the twenty-first century will exacerbate the pressures toward genocide
already exerted by scarcities rooted in politics and modern expectations.
But there are possible solutions, and even if not completely effective, they
could mitigate or even reduce the incidence of genocide.
If scarcity contributes to the decision to commit genocide, then it is
plausible to attempt to reduce scarcity. But as we have seen, there are several forms of scarcity. A reduction in material scarcity will require above all
a decrease in population growth. Raising the status of women and providing family planning are crucial here. To prevent the continued assault on
the lives of indigenous peoples will require a change in attitudes toward
the environment, greater concern by international lending agencies for
the environmental and human effects of "development," and restraint by
global capitalism. Political scarcity could be reduced by power sharing and
the replacement of authoritarianism by democracy. An economy adequate
to meet needs is also crucial.
On the international plane, many steps could help to prevent genocide. But the most important of these methods is for governments to redefine "national interest" to include the prevention of genocide. Until
there is political will to take effective steps to prevent this crime against humankind, genocide will remain a distinct possibility.
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Globalization and Genocide
Inequality and Mass Death in Rwanda

David Norman Smith

and intensity of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 took the
world by surprise. More than eight hundred thousand people were killed
in just one hundred days, capturing the attention of a global audience
that, until then, had barely heard of Rwanda. Soon, however, surprise
yielded to cliches. The problem was said to lie with the Rwandan people,
whose hatreds could not be contained. The genocide, we were told, was
the result of incorrigible "tribal" and "ethnic" tensions that had existed
since antiquity.
Ultimately, this way of thinking led many pundits to conclude that the
only hope for Rwanda lies with external forces: the international lending
agencies, once they learn the "policy lessons" of the genocide; the Rwandan state, duly reformed; global free trade; and perhaps even a "return to
colonialism," if all else fails.
This perspective, I will argue , rests on a misreading of history-and
finds hope in the very forces that spurred the genocide in the first place.
Far from being an engine of genocide, the Rwandan people are in fact the
only force with a realistic chance of preventing future genocides.
Rwanda's many ailments-political, ethnic, military, cultural, economic,
and environmental-require popular solutions that existing states and
global agencies are likely to oppose.
THE SCALE

♦

♦
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Before 1990, many observers regarded Rwanda as an oasis of progress in
east-central Africa, in striking contrast to nearby Zaire, Uganda, and Burundi. The ruling party had been in power since 1973, and the humanrights situation, though classified as "poor" by outside monitors, was
demonstrably better than in many neighboring countries. Indeed, fleeing
terror elsewhere, many schools, missions, and NGOs had relocated to
Rwanda. Rwanda also appeared to be economically sound. Since 1965,
Rwanda had reduced its reliance on agriculture more than any other subSaharan country except Lesotho. In the 1970s, when population growth
outstripped food production elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, Rwanda enjoyed better luck. In the mid-1980s, only one other sub-Saharan nation
boasted a faster growth rate in agricultural exports (which, in the Rwandan case, consist mainly of coffee) .1
Although still very poor, Rwanda was evidently on an ascending
curve. In the 1980s, tl1e European Community acknowledged this
progress by inviting Rwanda to participate in its Food Strategies program,
along with just three other African countries. The World Bank, reviewing
nearly a decade of African development, gave Rwanda its highest accolade.
Few observers in 1962, when Rwanda won its independence, would
have predicted such a promising future. Rwanda was tiny (about the size
of Vermont), landlocked, crowded, and almost entirely rural. Of modest
geopolitical significance, Rwanda had been an afterthought even for its
conquerors. Germany, which ruled Rwanda from 1899 to 1916, valued
the country mainly as a path for a railway (which was never built). Even
Belgium, which seized Rwanda and Burundi during World War I, initially
hoped to trade "Ruanda-Urundi" for territory elsewhere in Africa. When
this action failed to materialize, the Belgians forced Rwanda to supply
food to the copper miners in tl1e Belgian Congo. In 1929, when the copper market collapsed, the Belgians forced the peasants to grow coffee for
the export market. During World War II, as forced coffee production rose
to new heights, a famine of epic proportions killed three hundred thousand people-one-tenth of the entire population.
Other problems sprang from the growing polarization of Rwandan
society. Precolonial Rwanda had been divided into two major social
1. Coffee is the most widely produced agricultural export commodity in sub-Saharan
Africa. Almost half of the forty nations analyzed in a 1992 study specialize in coffee production, whereas more than 25 percent specialize in cotton production.
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classes, the Tutsis ( a warrior nobility) and a "Hutu" peasantry. The key to
Rwandan history is the fact that the term Hutu refers not to a pristine ethnic group, as many assume, but rather to a modern peasant class, drawn
from a variety of conquered peoples whose shared identity as "Hutus" (literally, "subjects") reflects their common subjection to Tutsi nobles . The
Rwandan empire, which grew rapidly in the late precolonial era, was the
joint product of both classes. When this empire fell to Europeans, the delicate balance of Rwandan class relations was upset. The Tutsi lords became
hated labor bosses, who were driven by the Belgians to "whip" the peasants to grow coffee for the world market.
In 1962, upon the departure of the Belgians, a "Hutu" regime surged
into power on a wave of anti-Tutsi emotion, leaving thousands of Tutsis
dead or in exile, the victims of a movement that showed many signs of
racism (because many Hutus accepted the Belgian myth that Tutsis, as
"Bronze Caucasians," were their racial enemies). The cycle of violence
that climaxed in 1994 had begun.
Act Two in this tragedy unfolded in Burundi, where another "Tutsi"
nobility retained power even after Belgium withdrew. In 1972, a flicker of
revolt served as a pretext for one hundred thousand murders. Similar massacres ensued in 1988 and 1993. Act Three took place in Uganda, where
more than a million Rwandans had migrated since the 1920s, fleeing
famine or persecution. In 1982, the Obote regime responded to a revolt
with vicious repression in the Luwero District, in which Rwandans were
singled out for attack. About three hundred thousand people were killed,
including about sixty thousand Rwandans.
After Obote fell in 1986, several Rwandans assumed leading roles in
the new Museveni regime-but even so, anti-Rwandan bias remained
rife. Many Rwandan exiles sought to return home, but they were consistently rebuffed by the Rwandan government. In October 1990, Rwandan soldiers from Museveni's military, organized into the "Rwandan
Patriotic Front" (RPF), entered Rwanda to replace the one-party "Hutu
Power" state with a multiparty, multiethnic regime. In April 1994,
shortly after signing a peace treaty, the Hutu Power regime made a final
effort to cling to power by massacring domestic Tutsis (most of whom
were peasants) and dissidents. The RPF resumed fighting, won the war,
and halted the slaughter. The former government and its supporters fled
into exile.
Rwanda's oasis of progress, in other words, had become a vast killing
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field. Why? What forces plunged Rwanda into this vortex of murder and
mass death?
♦

♦

♦

Africa has long been plagued by exceptionally high levels of civic violence.
From 1960 to 1987, 4.5 million sub-Saharan Africans were killed in civil
wars, revolts, and other internal conflicts-far more than in Asia or in
Latin America. 2 Since 1987, the death toll has continued to spiral, as fighting has engulfed Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Congo. The ultimate reason, most observers
agree, lies in the internal contradictions of the postcolonial regimes. These
contradictions are, at times, "ethnic" in nature. But ethnicity is not the
whole story. Nor are the divisions in Africa as simple as many outsiders
imagine . In Rwanda, for example, what appears to be "ethnic" conflict is,
in many respects, class based, with only a partly or residually ethnic character. And there are also powerful global forces that have wreaked havoc
with African societies.
To grasp these points, we must look briefly at Rwandan history. What,
to start with, is the reality of Rwandan ethnicity?
In the earliest phase, the Tutsi-Hutu nexus was far more "ethnic" in
nature than in any later period. The first "Tutsis" (literally, "newcomers")
were probably Luo-speakers from the North. After arriving in Great Lakes
Africa, they coalesced into a stratum of cattle-herding warriors with, it
seems, a distinctive ethnic profile . Before long, some of these newcomers
had conquered local farming peoples, who thus became "Hutus" for the
first time.
In the next phase, the terms Tutsi and Hutu acquired a primary class
connotation. Whereas nobles were still called Tutsis, this designation was
no longer ethnic. Wealthy Hutus could acquire Tutsi status by an act of ritual, and poor Tutsis could sink to the level of ordinary Hutus. At this
stage, however, colonialism intervened, and a third phase began. Convinced that the Tutsis were racial aristocrats, the colonialists granted them
many privileges on expressly racist grounds. This action not only hardened
the Rwandan class division but also gave tl1is polarization a quasi-ethnic
2. Note, by the way, that this figure omits South Africa- which has been the site of
much additional conflict.
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flavor. Accordingly, the Tutsis became the objects of a passionate hatred
among the Hutu peasantry. A class division thus became a quasi -ethnic division as well.
"Racial" hostilities burst into flame during the anti-Tutsi pogroms
that marked the birth of Rwandan independence in the years from 1959 to
1964. In the next generation, animosities continued to smolder, even
though most of the remaining Tutsis in Rwanda were now ordinary peasants. The actual "ethnic" and even class significance of the Tutsi-Hutu
gulf was declining rapidly, but it remained very real, ideologically, to many
Rwandans. Ethnicity, once invented, often leads to lasting ethnocentrism,
which is clearly what happened in Rwanda. And this ethnocentrism, in
turn, gave the predatory Rwandan state an opportunity. Pressured, in the
early 1990s, by a guerrilla army ( the RPF), by global banking agencies (for
example, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank), and, perhaps most menacingly, by peasant dissent, the Rwandan rulers hoped to
divide their enemies by exploiting residual ethnic hostility. The genocide
proved that ethnocentrism is, indeed, a force to be reckoned with in latterday Rwanda.
Besides local factors, there are, as well, powerful international forces
that have undermined Rwandan stability. Historically, the most destructive of these forces have all been linked to the global market. It is worth
noting, for example, that even Belgian colonialism was, for Rwanda, essentially market driven. Until 1929, Belgium treated Rwanda as an appendage to the world copper market, and thereafter, Belgium placed
Rwandan peasants in thrall to the coffee market. This action was the crux
of the colonial experience, and it has remained the basic postcolonial reality as well. Coffee, and again coffee, has spurred polarization in Rwanda.
At every stage, Rwandans have been forced to labor for "the free market"-first by Belgians and their Tutsi adjutants, and then by a pair of antiTutsi regimes. The consequence has been mass death in several forms,
from famine to genocide.
Never was this link between mass death and the market clearer, I
would argue, than in the experience of the second postcolonial regime .
Originating in a 1973 military coup led by Juvenal Habyarimana, and
overthrown after the 1994 genocide, Habyarimana's "Second Republic"
was a paragon of coercive violence and, at the same time, an icon of the
market-driven "development" strategies so dear to free-trade ideologues.
This blend of qualities is not strange or unusual, as fans of globalization
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might think. On the contrary, the vaunted "progress" of the Rwandan
economy, which made Rwanda so appealing to the IMF and the World
Bank, rested securely on a foundation of forced labor and top -down bureaucracy. Rwanda was an apparent success story for globalization precisely because it used force to guarantee "development." Here, as
elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, forced labor was the guilty secret of "free
trade."
When trade faltered-when the coffee market collapsed in 1987,
yielding famine and dissent-the IMF and World Bank seized the opportunity to impose an even more stringent free-trade policy on the Habyarimana regime. This new policy, however, only worsened the underlying
social and economic problems, and gave a fresh impetus to the forces leading to genocide. Unable to count on the global market for salvation, the
Habyarimana clique turned to force.
Fans of globalization say that it benefits rich and poor alike-the postcolonial "new nations" as well as the ex-colonial powers that fund the IMF
and World Bank. Rwanda, once cited to support this claim, now seems to
tell a very different story.
♦

♦

♦

Chroniclers of the genocide have shown definitively that the genocide itself was not the "elemental outburst" depicted by the media, but was,
rather, a quasi-military campaign meticulously planned by the predatory
Rwandan ruling party, which sought to exploit residual Hutu racism in a
vain effort to remain in power. Here, I emphasize two further points,
namely, ( 1) that the Habyarimana regime turned to coercion because it
could no longer count on consent to stay in power, and (2) that the global
banking community played a shadowy but central role in driving Rwanda
to the edge of the abyss-and over.
These two claims are intertwined, in the following sense : On the one
hand, the legitimacy of the Rwandan state, which was gravely compromised by colonialism, declined still further as a result of the cupidity of the
postcolonial rulers. This cupidity, in turn, was fired and fed by the IMF
and World Bank, which thereby helped set the stage for the genocide itself.
In precolonial days, the Rwandan state had basked in the glory of its
sacred kings. But kingship gave way to a venal colonial bureaucracy, which
relied less on consent than on coercion. In the first flush of independence,
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the new rulers made minor concessions to the peasants . But in the 1970s
and 1980s, when an influx of international loans reduced the state's dependence on the coffee market (and thus, on the peasantry), the rulers became even more predatory than before. Inequality rose to new levels, and
the peasants grew even poorer. When, in 1987, coffee prices fell sharply,
the rulers were forced to rely even more heavily on the global banks.
Forced by the banks to embrace rigorous austerity as "shock therapy" for
their ailing economy, the Rwandan rulers tried to recoup their losses by
turning the screws on the peasantry. The peasants resisted, and when the
RPF stepped up the pressure as well, the rulers felt trapped. Rather than
accepting defeat, they opted for the most violent path open to themtotal war against much of their own public.
Thinly veiled as an eruption of ethnic violence, the genocide was actually a desperate gamble. The aim was to retain power at all costs by murdering actual and potential enemies. Tutsi peasants bore the brunt of this
genocide for several reasons: (1) the regime's wish to exploit lingering
ethnic hatred, in a final bid for "Hutu" legitimacy; (2) the conviction that
all Tutsis were born dissidents; and ( 3) a measure of real ethnocentrism on
the part of the regime and its accomplices. But thousands of Hutus were
also killed, for political reasons. They opposed the regime. They exposed- and could exploit-the rulers' fatal lack oflegitimacy.
Ultimately, it was the rulers' loss oflegitimacy that proved most decisive. Although aggravated by recent IMF- World Bank policy-as we will
see below-this legitimacy crisis also has deep historic roots.
♦

♦

♦

When the Tutsis first arrived in Great Lakes Africa roughly five hundred
years ago, they found sacred kingship well established among the Zigaaba,
Sindi, and other peoples of the region. Until then, the Tutsis had been
egalitarian, but they adapted to local norms . Under various names, including "Tutsi" and "Hima," they built sacred kingdoms of their own.
Rwanda, which means "empire," was one such kingdom, in which power
was entrusted to a sacred king, the Mwami, who was thought to preeminently personify imana, the mystic power oflife and fertility.
Among the Barundi, whose outlook is similar, the verb to rule also
means to give. In Rwanda the same word unites tl1e ideas of man, husband,
virility, courage, and generosity. The king, in this worldview, is the fount of
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wealth and well-being, the embodiment of the empire, the living, giving
divinity who ensures the fertility of the land, cattle, and people by royal
ritual.
In reality, of course, the Mwami was enriched and exalted by peasant
labor. His court, granary, and herds were sustained by services and surpluses from his subjects-the now famous "Hutus." Supposedly above
class divisions, the king was actually the emblem of Rwandan class relations. As the greatest Tutsi lord and bearer of the royal drum ( akin to the
European crown), the Mwami was the most voracious consumer of surplus Hutu labor. Yet, his reign was not simply exploitative. In reciprocal
relations of the Rwandan type, the king seeks legitimacy, not merely domination. And for this authenticity, he must give as well as take.
Still, even in precolonial days, the ties between the state and public
had begun to weaken as the kings claimed ever grander powers. This
change was reflected in a late imperial saying, "The drum is greater than
the shout," which meant, in effect, that the crown eclipses the vox populi.
This sense of distance from power deepened when the final precolonial
king, Rwabugiri, centralized many state functions in a period of growing
disparity between rich and poor. Finally, with the advent of colonialism,
tl1e gulf between the state and people widened still further.
Germany, which annexed Rwanda in 1899, found the small empire in
turmoil. Rwabugiri's death in 1895 had sparked a succession conflict,
which resulted in coup d'etat by the "matridynastic" Kagara lineage of the
Tutsi nobility, the source of many Rwandan queens. In 1896, Kagara plotters (led by the queen mother, Kanjogera) overthrew the heir to the royal
drum, declaring Kanjogera's son Musinga the new Mwami. This usurpation of power spurred a pair of rebellions, which were crushed in campaigns so rapacious that famine ensued. Soon the new regime was cynically
known as Cyiimyamaboko, "It is force that rules." Even Kanjogera sensed
that the sacredness of the kingship had been violated. She and her kinsmen
had seized power, but could they claim to embody imana? It seemed
dubious to many.
Equally fateful was Musinga's wish to conquer the Kigan peoples to
the north. The Kigans, made up of many ethnic groups, were almost the
only Great Lakes population without a history of sacred kingship, and
they had long resisted conquest. Musinga realized, however, that the Europeans could help him overrun Kiga. The consequence, by the end of tl1e
1920s, was that "Rwanda" had grown to encompass not only Tutsis and

Globalization and Genocide

157

Hutus in the South, but also Kigans, who were new to Tutsi-Hutu society-and who remained implacably hostile to the haughty Tutsi conquerors. The full menace of this hostility became apparent in 1994.
A new phase began when Belgium seized Rwanda in 1916. Significantly, the Belgians chose to rule the country through the nobility, thus
marginalizing the king. By 1931, Musinga's anger over his reduced status
had grown so disruptive that the Belgians decided to oust him in favor of
his more pliant son, Rudahigwa. This move had a profoundly desacralizing effect, which was augmented in 1935 when a sacred royal dwelling became the site of a Catl1olic church.
In 1926, the Belgians reinvented the nobility as well. The precolonial
system, which had balanced the claims of several different kinds of aristocrats, was abolished in favor of a centralized system of "chiefs." By 1935,
there were fewer than seventy chiefs in all Rwanda, aided by nine hundred
"subchiefs." These Tutsi chiefs, moreover, were treated as a "racially
pure" ruling caste, witl1 exclusive access to office, education, and luxury.
Though there were a few holes in the Belgians' racist logic-for lack of a
clear racial criterion, they defined Tutsis as anyone who owned at least ten
cows-tl1ey were unbending in their effort to divide Rwanda into racial
camps . The result, as many critics have observed, was a kind of apartheid.
The subtleties ofidentity were flattened into a binary Tutsi-Hutu polarity.
Instead of generosity and reciprocity, the Belgians imposed inequity. The
result was that the class division between nobles and peasants turned into
a yawning chasm-and assumed a "racial" profile as well.
The Belgians profited from this polarization. "We harass the chiefs
without respite," an administrator wrote in 1932, and the chiefs bullied
the peasants in turn. That same year-a decade after forced labor was introduced and a year after forced coffee cultivation began-a priest
protested that the peasants were being driven so hard that tl1ey were in
danger of famine . Forced road clearing, tree planting, farm labor, and construction consumed the labor of fully two-thirds of the 2,024 grown men
in his parish every day. Indeed, so extreme were the Belgian exactions in
this period that the very word for work, akazi, became synonymous with
forced labor. Meanwhile, along with akazi, each taxpayer was forced to
grow one hundred coffee trees, for sale on the export market (at prices set
by tl1e Belgians). By 1937, 20 million coffee trees had been planted in
"Ruanda-Urundi," and many more were planted later.
By 1944, forced labor consumed 120 workdays per adult. Ultimately,
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even one of the governor-generals was appalled, writing, in 1955, that the
chiefs extorted everything from the peasants save "the strict minimum
needed to survive."
Suffice it to say that, under Belgian rule, the Rwandan state became a
virtual suction pump for the extraction of peasant labor. This state of affairs remained true after independence was achieved, as well (a process
that occurred in stages from 1959 to 1962. At this juncture, the king and
thousands ofTutsis were forced into exile, the victims of a "Hutu revolution" led by a new party, PARMEHUTU, that drew its strength from Gitarama, in south-central Rwanda, and from the northern, largely Kigan
provinces of Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, and Byumba. Though posing as an
iconic bearer of republican virtue, PARMEH U TU soon proved to be a worthy heir to the Tutsi bureaucracy. By 1965, PARMEHUTU had established a
one-party state, and soon afterward "Gitaramistes" controlled the party,
elbowing northerners aside . Politicians from Gitarama (led by Gregoire
Kayibanda) soon emerged as a "state nobility," bent on self-enrichment
through control of the coffee trade. Their main instrument was the staterun marketing system, which monopolized export profits .
Northerners were incensed, not only because they were left out in the
cold, but also because they saw Kayibanda as an enemy of traditional
Kigan social relations. Unlike the Gitaramistes, for whom the state itself
was the source of enrichment, the northerners wanted the state to serve
the traditional Kigan landlord class. In 1973, Kayibanda crossed a fatal
line when he vested a new bureau, ONACO, with exalted power over the
private sector. In July 1973, a Kigan general, Habyarimana, seized power
and "suspended" ONAC O, which he vilified as "communist."
No populist, Habyarimana soon revived forced labor, requiring all
adults to join labor teams every Saturday under state direction. The
penalty for refusal was imprisonment.3 In other respects, too, Habyarimana imposed an ever more elitist and predatory state. Standing at the
very heart of the regime was an inner circle known as the Akazu, or "little
hut," which consisted of Habyarimana's intimates, most of whom were
from Gisenyi. Many other Kigans (politicians, traders, and the like) or-

3. The reactionary daring of this step can be gauged by the fact that forced labor had
been expressly singled out in the revolutionary 1957 "Manifesto of the Bahutu" as a practice " no longer adapted to the situation and psychology of today." No other feature of
Belgo-Tutsi rule had been more hated.
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bited the Akazu. So wealthy did this group grow that Claudine Vidal
spoke ironically of a "fourth ethnicity" in Rwanda-the ruling rich.
Although Habyarimana claimed to speak for all Rwandans, it was
plain, a former ambassador reports, that "in reality he was only interested
in the Bakiga people, ... especially those from Gisenyi." 4 Gitarama and
Kibuye, with 20 percent of the population, received just 1 percent of rural
investments (excluding donor funds), whereas Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Kigali
(the capital), and Cyangugu shared almost 90 percent of the total. Analogous disparities were plain elsewhere .
Writing just months before the genocide, a Belgian specialist reported
that the Tutsi-Hutu division had given way to a regional conflict. The
North, prospering at the expense of the South, had made a mockery of the
old rhetoric of "Hutu" unity. Yet even the North was not conflict free.
When an anthropologist visited the North in 1977, he found that the old
landlord-peasant relationship had grown even more unequal. For the
Kigan poor, he reported, the "devil word is amataranga"-money. Kigan
landowners had capitalized on the new money economy to seize land from
indebted peasants, thereby opening an abyss between rich and poor.
Elsewhere conditions were equally desperate. Average landholdings
shrank dramatically, landlessness became common, and peasant incomes
fell sharply. This savage inequality inspired profound dissatisfaction. By
the early 1990s, an open revolt was brewing. The genocide was a last-ditch
effort to quash this revolt.
♦

♦

♦

The Rwandan state lost popular support, briefly, as it became the engine of
an ever widening gulf between rich and poor. Class inequality, no less than
ethnic hostility, played a leading role in unhinging Rwandan society-and
the Rwandan state fanned both class and ethnic tensions. The state, in
turn, was deeply affected by emergent globalism . Old-fashioned imperialism, represented mainly by France (which had displaced Belgium as
Rwanda's principal ally), was still a powerful force, but the global lending
community was, if anything, even more directly influential. This influence
was, for the most part, destructive.
4 . " Bakiga" is the Bantu way of saying "Kigan people," just as "Bahutu" means
"Hutus. "
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The IMF and World Bank seldom deign to notice the political tumult
they cause or aggravate. In 1988, for example, when the government of
Burundi killed tens of thousands of its citizens, the World Bank was
praised for showing interest! And they had good reason to show interest,
because, not long before, they had made Burundi the world's largest per
capita recipient oflow-interest loans. These loans, accompanied by austerity policies demanded by the bank, contributed directly to Burundian
destabilization and polarization. Yet, the bank soon concluded that the
massacres were not "deliberate policy" and resumed their prior lending
policy.
Elsewhere, the IMF and the World Bank have been equally inattentive
to the social and political effects of their lending policies. But so much violence has accompanied bank and IMF programs that even IMF economists
have begun to take note. The key figure in this respect is Jean-Dominique
Lafay, who, with his associates Dessus and Morrisson, analyzed data on
twenty-three African nations (including Rwanda) to learn whether IMF
policies spur conflict and violence. Their conclusions are sobering.
Focusing on a trio of "decision-making forces"-the IMF and World
Bank, tl1e state, and civil society-Lafay tracks an arrow of causality that begins with the IMF-World Bank and runs, through the state, to the public.
The public, injured by IMF-World Back austerity policies, resists until re pressed. 5 State repression is thus a direct outgrowth of the familiar
IMF-World Bank objectives: cuts in public spending, increased consumer
prices, tax increases, cuts in public employment, and currency devaluations.
Empirically, IMF-World Bank interventions of this type have been almost universally unpopular. 6 Spending cuts, price hikes, tax increases, and
job cuts normally prompt strikes and demonstrations, which almost always
provoke state violence-arrests, measures to ban unions and parties, and
efforts to censor the media and close the schools. This outcome, Lafay
says, is because just about every African conflict quickly "turns into a dispute over the legitimacy of the regime." Yet, the IMF and World Bank
continue to fuel these conflicts, seemingly heedless of the consequences.
Rwanda and Burundi are living proof of this point. When, in 1993,

5. From this point on, for ease of reading, I will refer to Lafay as the author of the study
cited below. It should be kept in mind, though, that Morrisson and Dessus are his coauthors.
6. Fifteen of sixteen carefully coded cases.
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the Burundian state massacred another hundred thousand people, two
World Bank economists voiced belated regret about the effects of bank
policies. The "lesson," they wrote, "is that in attempting to restructure an
economy-which implies a redistribution of income and, along with it,
power-a government must recognize not only the economic but also the
social and political bonds that hold a society together" (Engelbert and
Hoffmann 1994, 18).
In Rwanda, plainly, the very opposite occurred. The state, backed into
a corner by forces both local and global, preferred genocide to solidarity.
Forced to tailor the economy to World Bank specifications, Rwanda's rulers
drew the line at the "redistribution of income and, along with it, power."
♦

♦

♦

Rwanda became a favorite of global donors in the wake of the 1973 coup,
largely because the new regime-which declared 1974 the "year of agriculture and manual labor" and revived forced labor in 1975-was a model of
exploitative efficiency. "In the eyes of the U.S. government and other
donors," Lindsay Hilsum wrote, "Rwanda ... was a model of development efficiency. Every Rwandan citizen had to participate in collective labor
on Saturdays. The system was harsh but effective-roads were built, trees
planted ... " (1994, 14). And, even more profitably, coffee was grown.
From 1965 to 1989, the GDP grew steadily in Rwanda--4.9 percent per
annum-and coffee accounted for more than 80 percent of total export revenues. Coffee production was the sector of the economy "where force and
pressure were most [widely] used," Peter Uvin reports, and it consumed the
"overwhelming" majority of peasant energy even in the donor-supported
agricultural extension system. In 1988, for example, peasant families were
forced to devote nearly fifty-four thousand hectares to coffee cultivation,
tending an average ofl57 trees (more than in colonial times). In 1986, this
increase resulted in export earnings of $150 million-of which, unsurprisingly, little trickled down to the cultivators (indeed, retail prices were
twenty times what the peasants received). "The Rwandan peasant, silent
and hardworking," Uvin concludes, "often resembled more an unpaid employee of a public enterprise than an independent farmer" (1998, 130).
Western banks and governments, impressed by the exploitative efficiency of the regime, made Rwanda one of the leading recipients of foreign aid. From 1980 to 1986, Rwanda received at least $200 million in
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new aid every year except one. In 1987, total aid soared to $340 million.
From 1982 to 1987, foreign aid financed more than two-thirds of all public investment. Overall, more than 200 donors were active in Rwanda, and
several gave Rwanda privileged treatment. Canada, for example, contributed $150 million to more than 150 development projects in Rwanda.
Rwanda was also the largest beneficiary of Swiss and Belgian assistance.
And the World Bank, in particular, was smitten by Rwanda's charms. In re ports written as late as 1989-1991-when the coffee market and the
economy were in crisis, war and famine had broken out, and ethnic tension
and repression had worsened-the World Bank praised the Habyarimana
regime for its humane spirit and prudence . As Peter Uvin writes, "the
World Bank seemed to be the one with the strongest love affair with
Rwanda. The reason for the intensity of this relation was in all likelihood
that Rwanda's economic policies overall were quite liberal [in other
words, market oriented] and thus very much in line with the Bank's ideology, which was a rarity in Africa before the second half of the 1980s" (46 ).7
The result, as Catharine Newbury once observed, is that "Rwanda depends, to an extraordinary degree, on foreign assistance" (1992, 199). In
1989- 1990, Rwanda relied on foreign aid for 11.4 percent of its total
GNP. This reliance made the regime all the more vulnerable when the coffee market collapsed in 1987 and exports fell sharply.
Two sad ironies call for attention at this point. First, Rwanda's long
honeymoon with Western lending agencies was also a period of soaring
poverty and inequality, despite rising productivity. And the coffee crisis
that abruptly ended this honeymoon-a crisis that was, plainly, entirely
the result of market vicissitudes-was exploited by the IMF to "marketize" Rwanda still further. And this exploitation, predictably, deepened
poverty and conflict even further.
Thus did the market work its magic in Rwanda.
♦

♦

♦

If lending and "market reforms" actually reduced poverty and repression-as officially advertised-then Rwanda should be comparatively af7. As Andy Storey writes, "Rwanda's economy had already been extensively liberalised- for good or ill- before the formal adoption of a structural adjustment programme"
(1991 , 54).

Globalization and Genocide

163

fluent and untroubled by now. But, in fact, market-oriented lending often
makes the poor even poorer, the rich even richer, and the privileged even
harsher in defense of their privilege. This consequence plainly is what happened in Rwanda. In northern Rwanda, wealth had long been concentrated in the hands of the old Kigan landlord class, the so-called abakonde.
In the 1960s, PARMEHUTU had enriched a parallel elite of southern businessmen and politicians. But after 1973, during the Habyarimana years,
the concentration of wealth grew even more extreme, in both the North
and the South. This fact was perhaps most visible, and most consequential,
in the crucial realm oflandownership.
Recall, first, that in 1949, after decades of colonial rule, the average
peasant family still owned three hectares ofland. By the 1960s, however,
this average had fallen to two hectares, and by the early 1980s, it had
plummeted to just 1.2 hectares. In 1984, in fact, more than half of all peasant families (57 percent) worked a single hectare or less, whereas just over
a quarter (27 percent) owned more than 1.5 hectares. Overall, nearly half
of all farms were rented by otherwise landless tenants, the poorest quartile
of the population owned less than 7 percent of all cultivated land, and a
wealthy minority (16 percent) owned nearly half the land (42.9 percent).
The state, moreover, was legally entitled to expropriate peasants at willand regularly did so. Asked, in 1982, whether they wanted their children
to become farmers, nearly four out of five Rwandan peasants said no.
The wage sphere, however, was no more equitable. In 1986, the
upper 1.1 percent of salary recipients received more than a quarter of
total salaries (27.8 percent), whereas the bottom half (49 percent)
earned just 7.6 percent. And so fast was Rwanda stratifying that just two
years later, in 1988, the share of total salaries received by the top 1 percent had soared to nearly half (45.8 percent), whereas the bottom twothirds ( 65 percent) now earned less than 4 percent of the total. All this, it
should be noted, was true before Rwanda agreed to the IMF-dictated
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1990. Afterward, matters grew
even worse.
The root problem, once again, was market related-namely, tl1e free
fall of coffee prices that began in 1987 when the system of production
quotas established under the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) came
unglued. Two years later, at a "historic" meeting in Florida, the ICA
reached a final impasse, Michel Chossudovsky reports, "as a result of political pressures from Washington on behalf of the large U.S. coffee
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traders" ( 1997, 111 ). In the next few months, coffee prices fell another 50
percent.
In Rwanda, the net effect was catastrophic. Overall, from 1985 to
1992, the world price of coffee fell by 72 percent, whereas the prices of
Rwanda's other major exports (tea and tin) fell 66 percent and 35 percent,
respectively. On balance, the real purchasing power of Rwandan exports
fell by 59 percent in this period. In response, the government forced the
peasants to increase the volume of coffee production by 40 percent in
1989 and 1990-though peasant coffee earnings fell 20 percent. At the
same time, the production of each of the five major food crops fell at least
20 percent. 8
The World Bank, sensing an opportunity, sent a mission to Rwanda in
November 1988 to review government options. The outcome was a document, "With Strategy Change," proposing a deepening of Rwanda's
"transition to the free market." Arguing, on the basis of computer simulations, that further marketization of the economy would yield a bevy of
benefits by 1993-rising levels ofinvestment and consumption, improved
trade balances, and declining debt-the World Bank successfully pressured the Habyarimana regime to accept economic shock therapy in the
form of a Structural Adjustment Program negotiated with the IMF, the
World Bank, and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID). 9 The agreement to proceed with the SAP was reached at a
meeting in Washington on September 17, 1990-just two weeks before
the RPF, also seeking to exploit Habyarimana's vulnerability, invaded
from U ganda. 10

8. Maize production, for example, fell from 110,000 tons in 1983 to 90,000 tons in
1996, whereas sorghum, another staple, fell from 213,000 tons in 1982 to roughly
140,000 tons in 1988. The production of beans, the single most important source of peasant nutrients, fell 50 percent.
9. As the Organization of African Unity concluded in a recent report, "the Habyarimana government reluctantly concluded that it had little choice but to accept a Structural
Adjustment Programme ... in return for a loan conditional on the rigid and harsh policies
that characterized western economic orthodoxy of the time. The premise was that Rwanda
needed economic shock therapy" (Caplan and Sangare 2000, 5.5).
10. This period was an inauspicious time to begin an SAP, since the IMF had just decided to demand more rigorous compliance with stricter requirements. And the collapse of
the USSR gave the IMF a freer hand to push for the decentralization of states that were
blocking the free action of the market.
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The new SAP was inaugurated in November 1990 with a 40 percent devaluation of the Rwandan franc, followed, a few days later, by steep price
hikes for fuel and other consumer necessities. Ultimately, the World Bank
reminisced in 1997, the Rwandan "authorities implemented, in 1991-92,
most of the agreed reform measures" (quoted in Storey 1999, 49). Interest rates, taxes, and school fees were raised, whereas producer prices for
coffee, paid to farmers, were frozen at 1989 levels and then, in 1990,
slashed 20 percent. Other notable features of the SAP included the privatization or liquidation of state enterprises; policies designed to commercialize and intensify peasant production, especially in the export sector;
the abolition ofimport barriers; strict hiring and wage controls in the state
sector; the removal of price and profit controls; the elimination of more
than half of Rwanda's public investment projects; the abandonment of a
program to reclaim swampland for farming, which the World Bank
deemed "unprofitable"; and the introduction of user fees for state services, including health and education.
In June 1992, the government implemented a further 15 percent devaluation of the Rwandan franc, resulting in "a further escalation of the
prices of fuel and consumer essentials." In 1993, prodded by the World
Bank, the government announced plans to privatize the Electrogaz energy
monopoly; shortly afterward, two thousand Electrogaz employees were
fired. In September 1993, the government privatized the state telecommunications company, Rwandatel. These changes were, indeed, shock
therapy with a vengeance.
The global lending community was appreciative. At a time when overall aid to Africa was declining, assistance to Rwanda greatly increased in
1991. By June, the IMF and World Bank had approved more than $100
million in unrestricted new Structural Adjustment loans. 11 That same year,
the European Community gave Rwanda $15-$40 million, tl1e United
States gave $10-$25 million, France gave $12-$14 million, Austria gave
$6-$10 million, Belgium BF 200 million, and Switzerland dedicated SwF
11. In April 1991, the IMF granted the regime an $11.91 million "Extended Structural Adjustment" loan, and two months later the World Bank approved a $90 million
"Structural Adjustment Credit."
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10.9 million-all to what the Swiss called "a friendly country in need." In
1992, Germany chipped in $16 million, Japan $6 million, and Belgium
BF 720 million. France, from the start of the war, provided military support as well. And as late as January 1994, just months before the genocide,
Japan contributed yet another $7 million.
For ordinary Rwandans, the effects of these policies were acutely
painful. Inflation, in the capital city of Kigali, elevated the prices of basic
consumer goods an average of 50 percent during the first seven months of
the program. Overall, from 1989 to 1991, inflation rose from 1 percent to
more than 19 percent. In 1992 and again in 1993, inflation rose 10 percent. As the Catholic relief agency Caritas reported, prices rose so high
that people went hungry, homelessness soared, and (in a period of ongoing famine) children and the sick were in grave jeopardy. State enterprises
went bankrupt, school enrollments declined, public services (including
health and education) were sharply reduced, cases of severe childhood
malnutrition rose steeply, and (in the first year of the program) the incidence of malaria rose 21 percent-mainly due to shortages of antimalarial
medicines at public-health facilities.
As starry-eyed as ever, the World Bank reported in 1994 that, in
Rwanda, "land is less unequally divided than elsewhere" (quoted in Uvin
1998, lll) . This startling claim is belied by a host of facts. By the early
1990s, the average family landholding had fallen to a new low to 0.7
hectares-which, in fact, is precisely what tl1e United Nations defines as
the bare minimum for a family of five . Applying that criterion to Rwanda
in 1991, the UN concluded that 43 percent of all Rwandan farm households had fallen below the absolute survival threshold and suffered
chronic malnutrition as a result. Even the World Bank reported, in 1991,
that the average daily intal<.e of the poorer half of Rwandan society had
fallen below 2,000 calories per person. Peasants who, in 1984, had produced an average of2,055 kilocalories per day were reduced to just 1,509
per day by 1991-a decline of nearly 2 7 percent. 12 About half of all children were stunted.
In 1991, 26 percent of the rural populace was entirely landless. In
1993, a USAID report revealed that Rwanda now had the highest poverty
rate in the entire world.
12. Calorie intake, in turn, was "perfectly correlated" witl1 income and "almost perfectly correlated" with farm size (Uvin 1998, 112).

Globalization and Genocide

♦

♦

167

♦

On many levels, the Habyarimana regime now found itself in great difficulty. The economy, plainly, had been severely compromised. By 1992, external debt had increased 34 percent. By 1993, coffee revenues had fallen
to just 20 percent of the precrisis 1986 figure ($150 million). By 1994, the
state-run coffee marketing system had effectively ground to a halt. In all,
from 1990 to 1993, the ratio of imports to exports doubled, with imports
exceeding $300 million, whereas exports tumbled to about $50 million.
Meanwhile, domestically, after bowing to Western pressure to allow
rival parties, Habyarimana witnessed a flowering of dissent. Old PARMEHUTU forces sprang to life, now joined by a plethora of new parties across
the political spectrum. The peasantry, meanwhile, was growing dangerously restive . Many joined peasant associations, which were centers of dissent. In 1992, suffering the aftershocks of the coffee crisis doubly as the
state intensified its exactions, peasants uprooted at least three hundred
thousand coffee trees. 13 They refused to perform Saturday labor, stopped
attending state rallies, occupied Western-sponsored demonstration and
reforestation projects, and destroyed antierosion structures on their farms.
These moves were all acts of defiance and desperation, and strictly illegal.
They also terrified the embattled rulers, who saw both their political
prospects and their coffee profits plunge still further.
All this occurred, meanwhile, as the state quadrupled military spending and (with French help) expanded its army eightfold. The object of this
military buildup was to repel the RPF- but this plan, too, was a failure,
since it soon became clear that the RPF had fought the army to a standstill.
Even worse, from the IMF-World Bank standpoint, was the fear that military spending would undercut Rwanda's SAP-mandated fiscal austerity. In
1993, the World Bank president wrote Habyarimana a scolding letter that
was widely circulated in the diplomatic corps, insisting that Habyarimana
cut military spending and negotiate a peace pact with the RPF. Grudgingly
bowing to pressure, the government joined the RPF in peace talks held in
Arusha, Tanzania. Before long, though, it became clear that Habyarimana
was dragging his feet . By July 1993, Alison Des Forges reports that "the
donor nations-including France-had lost patience [with Habyarimana's
13. Chossudovsky calls this appraisal "a conservative estimate ."
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stalling tactics] and used the ultimate threat. In combination with the
World Bank, they informed Habyarimana that international funds for his
government would be halted if he did not sign the treaty by August 9.
With no other source of funds available, Habyarimana was obliged to sign
along with the other parties on August 4, 1993" (1999, 124).
This move was evidently the last straw for ruling-party extremists,
who decided to continue fighting without Habyarimana's support. Upon
leaving the Arusha talks, Col. Theoneste Bagosora, who was later a central
figure in the genocide, told colleagues that he was returning to Rwanda
"to prepare the Apocalypse" (Omaar and de Waal 1994, 79).
Death squads, thousands strong, had been in training since the early
1990s. Open threats of genocide became common, and it was well known
that Tutsis and dissidents were in danger. Many were assassinated. The signal for the start of the genocide came on April 6, 1994, when the jet returning Habyarimana from abroad crashed upon arriving in Rwanda. In
the ensuing days, death squads, aided by the military, fanned across
Rwanda, killing as many actual and potential dissidents as possible. Peasants in many communities were bribed, coerced, and cajoled to participate
in the slaughter; many did, and many did not.
In barely fourteen weeks, roughly 850,000 were killed. The genocide
was halted, without foreign help, in mid-July, when the RPF captured Kigali and forced the remnants of Habyarimana's army and death squads
into exile.
♦

♦

♦

From the start, the IMF and the World Bank showed remarkably little interest in the possible negative effects of structural adjustment in Rwanda.
The danger of crisis as a result of shock therapy in a country on the edge of
war might seem acute, but the World Bank was, in fact, so blase about this
risk that it blithely excluded all "noneconomic variables" when computing
likely SAP outcomes. And, indeed, the World Bank was so adept at seeing
no evil that, in a 1991 report, Rwanda was praised for its etlmic and socioeconomic homogeneity! That same year, outside monitors found
"major donors .. . unwilling to admit that ethnic conflict posed serious
risks," Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch reports. "When they
advised donors to insist on the removal of ethnic classification on identity
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cards as a condition for continued aid, none of them took the advice"
(1999, 92). 14
This incident was not an isolated episode. In April 1993, the UN special rapporteur on summary, arbitrary, and extrajudicial executions went
to Rwanda to investigate charges of widespread human-rights violations,
including the violent repression of dissidents and the massacre of fifteen
hundred Tutsi nomads, the so-called Bagogwe, in 1992. In August, the
rapporteur released a report indicting the Habyarimana regime for a host
of crimes, including acts of genocide as defined by the 1948 UN Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of Genocide. Once again,
donors showed scant interest. As Uvin writes, "The fact that the development business continued as usual while government-sponsored human
rights violations were on the rise sent a clear signal that the international
community did not care too much about the racially motivated and publicly organized slaughter of citizens" ( 1998, 229).
Since the genocide, most critics have blamed the state and its death
squads; France, for sending Habyarimana money, weapons, and military
advisers; the UN, for pulling its troops out of Rwanda at the start of the
genocide, and thus failing to prevent what Gen. Romeo Dallaire, the
leader of the UN military mission, called a preventable genocide; the RPF,
for putting domestic Tutsis and dissidents at risk; and, above all, the
Rwandan people, who are accused of racism and authoritarian compliance
with evil. Except for the latter charge-which understates the role of popular resistance to authority and exaggerates the level of public participation in the genocide-these criticisms are amply deserved. But it would be
a mistake to minimize the role played by the avatars of globalization as
well. As important as internal factors may have been, it seems highly unlikely that these factors, alone, would have generated a genocide. 15 And
14. Des Forges (1999) adds that the same consultants approached ambassadors and
others from the U.S., French, Canadian, German, and Belgian embassies, with equally little
effect.
15. The internal factor most often assigned a causal role vis-a-vis the genocide is overpopulation. This statement, in my opinion, is only modestly credible. Although population
pressure is certainly a problem in Rwanda, it is wrong to think that violence is a simple reflex
of crowding. As Peter Uvin ( 1998) notes, both earlier periods of civil violence in Rwanda
(1959-1964 and 1973) took place during extended phases of high growth in per capita
food production. And despite the well-advertised fact that Rwanda has the highest fertility
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among the global forces implicated in the genocide, none (save perhaps
French foreign policy) played a more consequential role than the IMF and
World Bank.
David Woodward, otherwise a cautious critic of globalism in Rwanda,
calls shock therapy "irresponsible in the extreme. Even if the adjustment
programme did not contribute directly to the tragic events of 1994, such
a reckless disregard for social and political sensitivities in such a conspicuously sensitive situation would unquestionably have increased the risk of
creating or compounding a potentially explosive situation" (1996, 25).
Gerald Caplan and Anatole Sangare, writing for the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), have vigorously endorsed this criticism: "The
World Bank, we should acknowledge, disagrees that it was responsible for
exacerbating Rwanda's economic woes, though not," the OAU ironizes,
"with its usual confidence" (2000, 5.7). Indeed, on May 16, 1994, at the
height of the genocide, the World Bank argued, in halfhearted selfdefense, that "it is difficult to analyze the effects of the adjustment program on the incomes of the poor because overall economic conditions
worsened and everybody was worse off' (italics mine; quoted in ibid.). Fair
enough.
More recently, in a classic case of twenty-twenty hindsight, the World
Bank has suggested "social assessments, including explicit recognition of
sources of social conflict and social tension, as a core aspect of development" (quoted in Storey 1999, 58). Yet, IMF and World Bank enthusiasm
for structural adjustment remains undiminished. Even Lafay and Lecaillon, who understand well that ill-considered interventions may prompt
"the triggering or acceleration of a revolutionary process or civil war, [or]
the emergence or proliferation of acts of terrorism or ... repressive action
by tl1e state," nevertheless continue to feel that the risk is worth taking
(1993, 91).
Ways Out

"The old is dying and the new cannot be born," Antonio Gramsci once
wrote, musing over tl1e miscarriage of capitalism in southern Italy. "In this
interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear." For Rwanda
rate in sub-Saharan Africa (8.3 children per woman), Rwanda is actually only the sixthranked African country in terms of population density per square kilometer.
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and much of Africa, the twentieth century was an epoch of arrested transition. Old ways died, yet the market millennium never arrived. Forced
labor and coffee exports broke empires, but did not offer emancipation. Is
there a solution? Is there a way forward?
Pundits say that Rwanda has been sabotaged by its own irrepressible
past. Primitive hatreds, pulsing beneath the veneer of civilization, have
been reawakened. The solution, hence, can lie only outside Rwanda. This
thinking is the apparent rationale for William Pfaff's proposal, in Foreign
Affairs, to revive colonialism: "If anybody is competent to deal sympathetically with these countries, the Europeans are" ( 1995, 4 ).
By now, the bald, comic effrontery of this claim should be plain. As
long as Rwanda remains a pawn of the West and the market, it seems to
have little chance of ceasing to be a forced-labor state. It is thus highly revealing, culturally, that the genocidal death squads were called interahamwe-a name once reserved for forced -labor teams. And the colloquial
term for murder during the genocide was work. Evidently, the path from
forced labor to forced murder is not as long as it might seem. To the extent, hence, that global forces continue to favor a forced-labor, coffeebased regime in Rwanda, there is likely to be continued strife.
Hope for Rwanda lies, in my opinion, in two realms: regionally, in the
potential unity of the oppressed peoples of Great Lakes Africa, and in
Rwanda, in the same forces of public dissent that sprang to life in the early
1990s.
In late 1994, the human-rights activist Monique Mujawamariya was
asked, "What happened in your country?" Her reply is instructive:

The people revolted against a well-armed dictatorial regime, and they are
paying a high price for their attempt to install democracy. The dictator's
clan knew that, as a result of international pressure and the mobilization
of the people, it would have to share power. People had massively joined
opposition parties; this threw the regime into a fever. So it decided to
crush the moderate opposition, to eliminate the intellectuals, to kill
everybody who could have laid claim to power. It is a revolution, within
which a genocide has taken place. (Saint-Jean 1994, 13)

Only the Rwandan people, strengthened by unity with neighboring
peoples, can take the steps needed to avert mass death in the future. The
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shining example of mass resistance in the early 1990s gives us reason to
hope.
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The Feminization of Global
Scarcity and Violence
Waltraud Queiser Morales
Structural violence especially affects the lives of women and other subordinated groups. When 1ve ignore this fact we ignore the security of the majority of the planet's occupants.

- V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, Global Gender Issues

GLOBAL SCARCITY and violence are part of a seamless web of relative
deprivation and inequality that impacts the weakest members of human
society disproportionately. Among the millions of the world's poor who
suffer injustice and desperation today, women and children are systematically victimized. Their struggle to survive ever worsening resource scarcity
and their social, political, and economic marginalization has had disproportionately negative consequences for global sustainability. If the dangers
of global scarcity are to be avoided, the plight of the weakest members of
human society must be addressed because the coming age of scarcity will
not be gender free. As in the past, the underlying causes of economic and
social disintegration in the twenty-first century include gendered scarcity
and structural violence against women.

Feminization of Scarcity
For some, the emphasis on gender concerns within underdevelopment detracts from the important work at hand. However, the feminization of
poverty, scarcity, and violence is a reality that cannot be ignored. The fact
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that poor women in the Third World represent a new global underclass
that the current economic order and traditional development models perpetuate is central to the crisis of scarcity in the twenty-first century. Peterson and Runyan ( 199 3) have defined structural violence as the reduced
life expectancy of women and children as a result of oppressive political
and economic structures. The statistics are revealing. More than twothirds of women's work is unpaid labor in the home, invisible to a
country's official gross domestic product and the gross global output.
However, women earn only one-tenth of the global income, and own less
than 1 percent of the world's property. Women work one-third more
hours daily than do men yet earn only 70 percent of a man's nonagricultural wage in the Third World. Nearly 50 percent of women in the developing world are below the poverty line compared to only 30 percent of
men, and in many Third World countries women constitute some 60 percent of the rural poor. And despite their systematic exclusion from the
economic systems of the Third World and their depressed earning abilities,
women who head households spend more on food for the family than
male-headed households.
Moreover, the deprivation of women also has a much greater negative
multiplier effect on overall conditions of global scarcity. Conversely, employment opportunities, economic independence, and guaranteed education for women have proved to have positive multiplier effects on
sustainable development. For this reason, Mieka Nishimizu, vice president
of the World Bank, argued: "If you educate a boy you educate a human
being. If you educate a girl, you educate generations" ( quoted in Buvinic
1997, 234). Therefore, the problems of underdevelopment and scarcity
are NOT gender neutral. The mistaken assumptions of traditional, unsustainable, and gender-biased development models have resulted in unintended consequences that have imposed greater hardships and obstacles
for women in the developing world. Probably in no other area have unin tended consequences of unsustainable development had more negative
multiplier effects than in global population policy.

Women and the Population Crisis
Overpopulation is an integral component of the feminization of poverty,
that vicious cycle of deprivation inherited by generations of women in the
Third World. Approaches to population reduction have generally relied on
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birth-control policies almost exclusively. However, in the Third World, the
relative disempowerment of women politically and economically has
meant that birth-control programs have often been ineffective . Population
programs have often ignored the fact that women's rights are also human
rights and that cultural and traditional restrictions cannot deprive women
of the same rights that men have under international, as well as national,
laws. Typically, population policies have tended to focus on controlling
women's choices without recognizing that women must have a voice in reproductive decisions. The tensions between an individual woman's right to
reproductive choice and voluntary limitations in family size are resolvable.
Recently, international conferences and movements-for example, the
Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women in 1996- affirmed the rights
ofwomen over their own sexuality and their reproductive rights, and urged
that national abortion laws achieve the goal of decriminalization.
Empowerment of women and the improvement in their social and
economic positions in the Third World are critical components of population policy. Given a choice, experts argue, women will have only the number of children for whom they can adequately provide life opportunities.
Studies have shown that educated women tend to have fewer children,
that women with greater economic security tend to have fewer children,
and that women whose social status is not based solely or primarily on
their reproductive role tend to have fewer children. The conclusion seems
to be that a global decrease in the birthrate becomes more possible with
conscious gender analysis in development policies and witl1 the improvement of the economic, political, and social status of women in the Third
World (indeed, among the deprived women of the First World as well) . A
key caveat is that economic growth alone may not automatically translate
into population reduction. The type of economic growth and its impact
on gender roles and women will be critical.
Modernization and some free-market economic programs may actually leave women worse off, especially since joblessness, abuse, and deteriorating social services disproportionately impact women and children
around the world. On October 12, 1999, the "Day of Six Billion," the
United Nations issued tl1e chill reminder that despite the greatest wealth
the world has ever seen, 1 billion people lacked the fundamental elements
of human dignity-clean water, food, secure housing, basic education,
and basic health care. In the developing world, the majority were women
denied access to decent health and whose reproduction constituted the
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single greatest threat to their lives. Indeed, one conclusion must be that if
we take care of the world's women, then we will significantly reduce the
global population crisis.
Women and Development

In the process of national development and economic growtl1, tl1e women
of the Third World have generally been ignored and victimized. Among
the most powerless members of developing societies in Africa, Asia, the
Middle East, and Latin America, women, especially women who belong to
oppressed minority groups distinguished by color, class, or religion, have
been impacted negatively and disproportionately. Nevertheless, in the past
decades, these disadvantaged women have thrown off their oppression
and have come to play decisive roles in the creation of independent grassroots political organizations and social movements. Through these new
social movements and the revolutionary new development models of
Women in Development (WID) and Women and Development (WAD),
women have chartered new avenues for social change . Their collective
success has proved decisive in the struggle to overcome global inequality,
overpopulation, and resource scarcity.
Several decades of failed development led to the recognition that
women are critical to the development process. In Africa, agricultural improvements floundered because traditional development programs excluded women and erroneously trained only men when women were the
primary farmers and bore responsibility for food production. Although
Third World women were also tl1e key economic actors in the marketing
of food, they had no access to new agricultural technology, training, and
credits. UN statistics indicated that more rural women lived below the
poverty line tl1an men, but that agricultural assistance was almost exclusively directed to rural men despite the fact that these resources generally
never found their way into family coffers or into agricultural improvements. As a result, tl1ese inefficient and wrongheaded development programs failed to alleviate tl1e chronic problems of overpopulation, poverty,
and starvation in the developing world. Failure led to critical reexamination of the most basic assumptions concerning women, underdevelopment, and global scarcity.
One revolutionary conclusion was the realization that women are key
to development and reproduction. Nevertheless, development experts
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(most of whom were men) had routinely focused on men in dealing with
population and family-planning programs. However, successful family
planning has never been as simple as providing birth-control methods to
women, because modernization unequally and unfairly impacted the
women of the Third World. Unsustainable economic growth and technical advances actually eroded the precarious status and reduced the life opportunities of poor women. For example, mechanization improved
agricultural productivity, but it also eliminated critical jobs for both men
and women. And because women found themselves on the bottom of the
economic ladder to begin with, they were impacted more extensively.
Globalization and industrialization have radically restructured the
roles that women played in many developing economies. Routinely,
women have been displaced into low-tech and low-wage assembly jobs,
which involve the least labor costs. The significant wage differentials between men and women in the modernized sectors of the economy have
also disadvantaged women most. In general, not only are women relegated
to the less-valuable work, but also women's work tends to be ignored or
undervalued in many developing (as well as developed) societies. Economic austerity measures, such as the economic Structural Adjustment
Programs imposed by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank
have also impacted Third World women disproportionately. Unemployment has increased in the short term as a result of structural adjustments,
because governments and private employers are forced to reduce labor
costs-that is, hire less workers, reduce the numbers currently on the rolls,
as well as reduce salaries. Women lose jobs not only in the formal sector but
also in the mainstay informal economy, where women are forced to compete with men for scarce resources and employment opportunities. And
when women suffer, entire families, especially children, suffer. The informal economy represents the unregulated and rapacious markets of the
streets and underground and illegal economies of the Third World, peopled with the desperately poor street peddlers and street children who
are forced to make work and struggle with long hours in order barely to
survive .
New development movements, such as Women in Development and
Women and Development, recognized not only the central role of women
in the development process, but also the critical relationship among economics, empowerment, and developmental change. Women represented
more than SO percent of the global population, yet they were being not
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only ignored, but victimized and oppressed as well. Only if women were
empowered could they become independent actors able to control their
lives, their bodies, their families, and their economic situations, and therefore, be able to effect the personal and social changes essential to sustainable development. Thus, the new development approaches not only
encouraged the direct involvement of women in the problems of overpopulation and scarcity, but also emphasized the importance of fair access. If
women were provided better access to education, the job market, and material resources, then many problems could be resolved. As long as the majority of Third World women remained systematically excluded from
traditional avenues of advancement, individual efforts to improve their situations were certain to failure. Indeed, a more radical solution provided
women development opportunities exclusive of men. The goal was for
women to shake off the bonds of male domination and to assume roles of
economic independence. The results were innovative women-only projects and small-scale economic programs such as the Grameen Bank that allowed women greater opportunities to devise their own development
plans rather than compete in the "male-dominated development process."
Begun as an experiment in 1976 by Muhammad Yunus, by 1983 the
Grameen Bank was firmly established as an independent bank in
Bangladesh. The bank grew to serve more than thirty-six thousand poor
villages and 2.1 million borrowers of whom 94 percent were poor women.
Over the years, the bank not only had lent more than $1 billion dollars to
the neediest in Bangladesh, but also had become part of a progressive international development movement. The bank's founder believed that his
strategy of lending almost exclusively to women would reverse the gender
discrimination of financial institutions in Bangladesh and the Third World
where women were unable to be independent economic actors and hold
title to property or contract loans. The microlending experiment was tried
in 1992 in Bolivia by Banco Solidario, which became the first private commercial bank dedicated to microlending. The Bolivian bank came to serve
some seventy-six thousand borrowers of whom 70 percent were women.
The success of microlending programs shook up the global development bureaucracy, challenging gender bias in development and the bigger-is-better approach of institutions such as the World Bank. Instead of
financing primarily large-scale infrastructure development projects as in
the past, the major international development institutions began to support grassroots microenterprises. In 1994, the UN International Confer-
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ence on Population and Development gave special recognition to innovative development models such as microlending and microenterprises that
helped to empower women economically. At the same time, the proliferation of grassroots women's organizations around the world has also increased both the social and the political power of women .and has had an
impact not only on how women conceptualize themselves and their personal and public roles, but also on how society views them. Many grassroots development organizations by women are also becoming feminist
organizations, which are primarily focused on women's issues and the status of women in society. Overall, the politicization of both types of groups
has resulted in an increase in women as visible social actors and in the
greater acceptance of women as political leaders .

Gendered Violence
What thegendered division of violence constructs is a world shaped by hostile fo rces.
- V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan, Global Gender Issues

Poverty, injustice, environmental degradation, and conflict interact in
complex and potent ways. The discrimination against women is undeniably a critical part of the complex of causes of conflict and violence . Thus,
population growth and environmental decline lead to social and political
unrest and conflict; in turn, these conditions increase the potential for environmental and internal war-induced population displacement and international refugees, 80 percent of whom are women and children. However,
refugees not only flee environmental destruction and internal conflict but
also cause these conditions. Thus, the world's poorest of the poor (the
majority of whom are women) cause as much natural-resource depletion
as all the other 3 billion developing-world people put together. The principal agents of deforestation and water depletion in the Third World are
the desperate refugees from civil war and rural poverty. For instance, in
Rwanda's brutal civil war, more than 2 million refugees fled abysmal conditions of resource scarcity and genocide only to re-create these horrors in
overcrowded and insecure refugee camps where violence against women
and children became endemic.
In the same manner that scarcity and environmental depletion in-
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crease the potential for violence generally, these factors also promote institutionalized violence against women. In the international and internal
wars of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, gender-related violations became recognized and ultimately prosecutable as war crimes for the first
time . Although systematic sexual assaults and rapes have served as gendered instruments of violence and warfare against women throughout
world history, only recently have these offenses been accepted as war
crimes and egregious violations of human rights. Most governments and
international institutions had permitted official and social tolerance of violence against women during conflicts, in great measure because of the extensive state-supported violence against women by Third World military
and police forces. However, in 1993, media reports of the systematic rape,
torture, sexual enslavement, and murder of Bosnian Muslim women and
children by Serbian military and paramilitary forces provoked the world's
condemnation of rape as a weapon of war and ethnic cleansing.
Gendered violence served as an integral and insidious component of
interethnic conflict and genocide. A survivor of the multiethnic strife in
the former Yugoslavia observed that "nationalism and sexism are deeply
interwoven, one nourishing the other and relying on the other" ( Morokvasic 1998, 68). In the wars of Bosnia and Kosovo, women experienced multiple victimizations by enemies and friends alike as subjects and
objects of the strife . Not only were women absent from the halls of national and regional power where war policies had been made, but also they
became captive to the gendered ideologies and patriarchal symbolism of
the region's interethnic violence . Women were stereotyped as the
guardians of ethnic purity, and were "either excessively protected or violated," depending on whether they were "perceived as 'Ours' or 'Theirs' "
(ibid.).
Women are, therefore, the direct and indirect victims of everyday violence and the social disintegration, economic hardship, and political chaos
of international and internal war. Indeed, wars, especially multiethnic
wars, are primarily wars against women and children. Through gendered
violence, genocide takes on another pernicious meaning-the death of the
ethnic group and race. The intended goal is genocide or ethnic cleansing
by other means . In this way, the destruction of the ethnic Enemy and
Other is accomplished via the rape of women in the former Yugoslavia, as
well as in Rwanda, Somalia, Algeria, Haiti, East Timar, India, and the
many other countries in internal and multiethnic conflict. Precisely be-
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cause this gendered violence is intended to threaten the entire out-group,
torture and rape are perceived not as crimes against individual women but
as collective sectarian violence against the ethnic and nationalist groups to
which the women belong. It is in this way that sexual violence against
women becomes politicized, ideologized, and gendered, in the process,
further depersonalizing and dehumanizing its victims, and feeding that
cycle of scarcity and violence.

Ending the Cycle
However, there are constructive ways to break the vicious cycle of scarcity
and violence against women. The first step is to recognize the violence
against women as part of a seamless web of humankind's inhumanity to
man, and to encourage a normative examination and debate of the entrenched power relations that have caused gender discrimination and marginalization. A second important way to interrupt the cycle is to find and
to adopt a new and more humanistic social paradigm based on gender
equality and respect for all groups that are different because of race, ethnicity, class, religion, and gender. Third, planning for humanity's future
must be taken away from those people who cannot challenge entrenched
assumptions or accept a broader vision. Fourth, we must all realize and act
upon the fact that women's security is vital for environmental security and
human survival. The endangered status of the world's women serves as a
challenge to prevailing power relations, including patriarchal forms of
power, and is an accurate measure of the disenfranchisement of the powerless among us.
To effect these broader solutions, specific policies can also be implemented. The structural scarcity that confronts humankind is the result of
an imbalance in distribution that is deeply rooted in institutions and class,
gender, and ethnic relations. Moreover, the intimate relationship of the
state of the world's women with global overpopulation, the crisis of unsustainable development, and catastrophic environmental decline makes it
imperative that both short-term and long-term solutions to these problems include the world's women. Governments and international institutions must provide support for female education, for medical and health
care, for family planning, for economic independence, and for political
and social empowerment. Women's rights must be respected and protected as human rights, and systematic violence against women must be
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fully prosecuted as crimes under domestic and international laws. Only by
relieving inequalities in gender relations and providing equal opportunities and life chances to women will women be able to fulfill and to formu late their needs. And as we begin this search for ways out of the coming
global scarcity, the most important lesson to remember is that if we take
care of the world's women, we will surely take care of the entire family of
humanity.
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Scarcity, Genocides, and the
Postmodern Individual
Leon Rappaport

likely to react if future scarcities lead to increasing
conflicts and genocidal events in much of the world/ More specifically,
what sort of social and psychological responses may be anticipated from
"postmoderns"-people who have grown up in the high-tech and mediasaturated environments of North America and Western Europe/ This
question is explored by first outlining the sorts of genocidal conflicts that
seem probable in future conditions of scarcity, and then reviewing the personality attributes that many social scientists and culture critics already
perceive to be characteristic of youth in postmodern environments. Finally, the various ways that such postmodern individuals may react to
genocidal events are discussed.
HOW ARE PEOPLE

Genocidal Conflicts
It takes no great leap of the imagination to understand the connection between scarcity and the deadly conflicts that can ultimately, and just as
quickly, kill as many people as perished in the European or Cambodian
Holocausts. The most obvious case in point is Africa, where scarcities appear endemic either because of crop failures, warfare, or government mismanagement and corruption, and often all three at tl1e same time. Over
the past decade, these conditions have created massive famines and genocidal conflicts with tens of millions of victims. Even where governments
operate with integrity and goodwill, however, scarcities brought on by
183
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overpopulation, soil erosion, water shortages, and epidemic diseases such
as AIDS undermine the ability of authorities to implement humane policies. And as a result, their societies tend to deteriorate into a state of armed
tribal rivalries.
If scarcities of one sort or another clearly stand as the cause of conflicts
and mass death in much of Africa, then the reverse appears to be true in
Eastern Europe. Here, sociopolitical conflicts have emerged as the apparent cause of scarcities, but the end result has been the same for the victims
of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, or of the Russo-Chechin war.
The destructive effects of such "low"-or "moderate"-intensity conflicts
are similar throughout the world. In the Middle East, there is the perennial Arab- Israeli conflict, whereas in Iraq, people continue to die from the
indirect effects of U.S. bombings that have destroyed much of the
country's physical infrastructure. In the Far East, the civil war in
Afghanistan and the wars of rebellion in Sri Lanka and Indonesia claim
their victims more directly, whereas, in Latin America, victims accrue from
the effects of guerrilla warfare, narco -terrorism, death squads, and counterinsurgency campaigns.
There is also a "breeder effect" in all these cases whereby the male
children who survive but are left destitute and traumatized by their exposure to violence become teenagers who are easily recruited into the factions that perpetuate ongoing campaigns of warfare and terrorist violence .
It deserves emphasis, furthermore, that powerful, prosperous countries
such as the United States are not immune to the dynamics of violence associated with scarcity. The social dislocations produced as the United
States has become a postindustrial state geared to global corporate economics appear closely linked to the rise of private militias, armed religious
cults, and gang violence . Although the death toll thus far from cults,
gangs, suicidal paranoids, terrorist bombers, and alienated schoolboys
who turn their guns on students and teachers is still relatively small, it may
well show a dramatic increase under the impact of serious scarcity. And according to recent news reports, our government is already preparing contingency plans against the threat of chemical-or biological-weapon
attacks by domestic or foreign terrorists .
No discussion of potential genocidal events associated with scarcity
would be complete without mention of the rogue-nation nuclear-weapon
scenario. The theme here is that the sociopolitical pressures created by
scarcity would increase the likelihood that either nations or the terrorists
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they support will acquire and eventually use nuclear weapons against the
United States or Western Europe. Scarcity in the former Soviet Union is
also presumed to be the reason that material and technology from the Soviet nuclear arsenal have apparently been offered for sale to any high bidder.
Postmodern Culture and Personality

Detailed discussion concerning the end of the modern and beginning of
the postmodern era is beyond the scope of this chapter, but some brief
perspectives on the issue may be noted. One view I presented elsewhere is
that the modernity ideal died at Auschwitz and Hiroshima. That is, the
fundamental assumption of modernity, that human progress toward a better world could be achieved through increased rationality, technological
efficiency, and social control, has been, on the evidence of the Nazi death
camps and nuclear bombing ofJapan, shown to be false . Nothing in modern science, law, or religion served to forestall or seriously mitigate the
mass genocides of the twentieth century. Indeed, more than one historian
has argued that the mass killings of the twentieth century were facilitated
by various mechanisms associated with rationality, technology, and social
control.
Another perspective was offered by the architecture critic Charles
Jencks, who proclaimed the end of modernity when the Pruitt-Igoe hous ing project in St. Louis was demolished in 1972. Designed according to
the rationalized, functional criteria of modernity, this low-income, highrise housing complex was finally seen to be unfit for human habitation . Yet
another way that some writers have distinguished the postmodern from
the modern is through a series of simple material comparisons. Accordingly, electronic clocks are postmodern, whereas mechanical clocks are
modern; nuclear weapons, computers, and television are all postmodern,
whereas gunpowder, adding machines, typewriters, and radio are all modern. In broader cultural terms, the postmodern versus modern distinction
may be seen in comparisons such as feminism versus sexism, the Internet
versus the telephone, MTV versus the hit parade, and almost all of the
films of the 1980s and '90s versus those films of the '30s, '40s, and '50s.
Films and television have a particularly important role in postmodern
culture because they allow individuals to evade domination by established,
normative realities and encourage awareness of alternative possible
worlds. Commentators on postmodernity further suggest that in some re-
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spects the electronic media technologies have advanced to such an extent
that the images and simulations they produce have become more significant than the objects or conditions they claim to represent. As Marshall
McLuhan famously observed, the medium becomes the message. What
this statement implies is that our perception of persons, issues, and events
tends to be ruled by media imagery.
Taken together, all of the aspects of postmodernity discussed above,
and many more that could be cited, cannot fail to influence the culture
base that social scientists recognize as the foundation for human develop ment and personality. Indeed, it is a truism in the social sciences that in any
society, personality is grounded upon culture, and culture reflects the
"collective personality" of the society. Consequently, over the past decade,
an increasing number of personality theorists have begun to discuss and
investigate the effects of postmodern culture on the personality development of the youths growing up in it. Most of this work has been based on
the premise that an individual's core sense of self or identity is based on the
systems of meaning (language, roles, norms, and values) provided by his
or her culture. It therefore appears axiomatic that major changes in a culture will inevitably bring about major changes in the self-concepts or personalities of its inhabitants.
But how do such changes occur? In premodern and early modern societies, the mechanisms of identity formation or change or both were not
considered problematic. One's self-concept or identity was seen to be
largely determined by the cultural meanings attached to one's gender, status in the family (first or later born), and the status of tl1e family (particularly the father) in society, as often indicated by the family name: Baker,
Hunter, Smith, and so on. With the rise of industrial societies, and even
more so in postindustrial, postmodern societies, however, identity and the
self have become profoundly problematic because the traditional meanings of gender and family-background factors have become increasingly irrelevant. This state of affairs was already beginning to be understood in
the 1940s and '50s, and was described in popular works by theorists such
as David Reisman (The Lonely Crowd,) Erich Fromm (Escape from Freedom,) and Erik Erikson (Childhood and Society). But it was Erikson who
had the greatest impact. During the 1960s and '70s, his concept of the
adolescent "identity crisis" became something of a household phrase.
The conditions these writers originally saw as emerging threats to
healthy social adjustment and stable personality development have now, in
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postmodern societies, become the rule rather than the exception. Thus, it
is unusual today to find strong, intact families able to model a clear sense
ofindependent selfhood to their children, as in the classic TV series Father
Knows Best. And even where such families exist, they can hardly succeed in
this task because the meanings and values they represent often do not connect with the situations challenging young people in the postmodern environment. In the larger social context, moreover, identity has become
increasingly problematic because structural and process changes now
occur so rapidly as to offer only an amorphous basis for identity formation.
The former certainties provided by predictable gender roles and career
paths have disappeared along with the industrial economy that once supported them. Instead, young people now encounter an "information
economy" emphasizing consumption rather than production and fluid,
rapid adaptations to changing technologies and markets.
In general, therefore, for many young people, the former ideal of an
integrated, unitary self-concept has gone beyond the problematic and, like
the manual typewriter and rotary telephone, taken on the quality of a historical artifact. What has emerged instead is a sense of self characterized by
diversity, flexibility, and multidimensionali ty-an adaptable self that has
the potential to project more than one possible identity. In other words,
what is valued is an ability to reinvent the self to suit changing demands
and situations.
Popular-culture examples of this type of"postmodern self" abound in
the form of celebrity performers such as Madonna, who seems able to easily reinvent her persona to fit the demands of changing trends in music and
films. At another level, in the now-defunct TV series Highway to Heaven,
the lead characters were angels who took on a variety of novel identities as
they went about aiding people in distress. And surely at the head of any list
of famous people who represent the qualities of postmodernity in themselves would be Bill and Hillary Clinton. Indeed, much of the controversy
surrounding the Clintons follows from what many critics see as their excessive "flexibility" concerning personal and political issues.
The underlying attraction of both the fictional and the real models of
a pluralistic self and diversified personal identity lies in the exciting transformational possibilities they present. On the one hand, they dramatize
the rich potentials that may become available when the social construction
of reality principle is applied to personality development, and on the other,
they represent a glamorous alternative to the prosaic qualities associated
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with a single, unitary identity. Particularly for young people reared in the
postmodern environment of rapid socioeconomic changes and a 50 percent divorce rate, therefore, the older ideal of an identity based on consistent, one-dimensional loyalties to a specific career and specific mate can
appear only arbitrary.
Human-potential psychologists and therapists who often appear on
TV talk shows also contribute to the culture trend toward pluralism by
warning against becoming trapped in a fixed sense of self that can inhibit
personal growth. Therapies designed to encourage self-transformation are
readily available, and by recourse to body-work facilities and cosmetic surgery, the body itself may be harnessed to the task of self-transformation.
Some psychiatric theorists consider that this trend encouraging pluralism and change signals a dangerous public vulnerability to mental disorders . The American Psychiatric Association's diagnostic manual defines
an identity disorder as the "inability to integrate aspects of the self," and a
recent survey reported a significant rise in the number of persons diagnosed with such disorders. But other theorists do not agree. At least one
has argued that a "schizoid consciousness" is adaptive to contemporary
social life, and another suggests that it is normal for people to have several
"subpersonalities."
There is mounting research support for the more positive viewpoint.
One study has shown that normal college students think about their future development as consisting of a range of different "possible selves."
Another reports that persons with more complex, pluralistic self-concepts
are better able to cope with stress, the premise being that if a loss of selfesteem occurs in one self-domain, it can be offset by success in a different
one. And there is a third study indicating that persons with high scores on
a measure of personality multiplicity show higher levels of creativity than
those persons with low scores.
Although most theorists agree that the self is changing under the impacts of postmodern culture and technology, there is no consensus about
the long-term effects. Kenneth Gergen (1991) has suggested that the
postmodern self is "saturated"-overst imulated and fragmented from the
impacts of exposure to nonstop communications media. But the same environmental conditions are seen by another theorist as producing an
"empty self'' in postmodern individuals who then try to smother their interior emptiness with consumer goods. And a third perspective has been
developed by Edward Sampson, who theorizes that the problems of con-
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temporary selfhood are due to the irrelevancy of the traditional American
ideal of "self-contained individualism." He suggests that in the global
world system today, the individual can no longer find meaning in assertive
independence, but must find it through relationships and integration with
a larger community. Accordingly, Sampson sees the postmodern individual adapting by maintaining a pluralistic manifold of self-concepts.
Taken together, the burden of evidence accumulating from analyses of
popular culture, empirical research studies, and theoretical discussions
clearly points to multiplicity or pluralism as the defining quality of the
postmodern personality. This definition poses a major challenge to the
unitary, hierarchical personality system that has dominated modern psychological theory in the past. Based on the view that personality is a centrally organized, vertically integrated system in which lower-order
impulses and emotions are controlled by higher-order cognitive (ego)
processes, the hierarchical model now appears obsolete. It seems destined
to be replaced by a more decentralized, horizontally organized system. In
the latter, cognitive and emotional processes are understood to be interpenetrating rather than opposed, and the model for consciousness is a
"conversation of equals" rather than a struggle for power.
When viewed in this perspective, the modern idea that personal
morality involves a conscience or superego that struggles against basic instincts in order to enforce obedience to internalized moral values seems
obsolete, and reminiscent of a Victorian steam engine. By contrast, the
postmodern perspective would conceptualize personal morality as based
on context-dependent evaluative possibilities. As one theorist has already
suggested, the postmodern individual rejects the idea of universal moral
principles in favor of diverse, locally grounded moral alternatives, and
seeks to define morality in terms of relationships and communal values .
This type of morality can be summarized as agnostic, highly relativistic,
and independent of any single system of rationality. It follows that moral
decisions or choices are thus no longer a matter of obedience to "natural
laws" or religious values, but have instead become reduced to the status of
an act of will dependent upon how individuals interpret their situation.
Postmoderns' Reactions to Genocidal Events

Before examining the issue of how postmoderns may respond to genocidal events, it will be helpful to first clarify the basis of the discussion. Al-
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though focused on the postmodern individual, the question is not addressed in a genuinely postmodern voice. If this were to be done, then it
would immediately require a critical, contextualist analysis of the question
itself: who is asking it, and for what purpose, and what particular sorts of
genocidal events are involved? To do this would be to adopt the methodology of discursive textual analysis known as deconstruction, and the likely
final answer would be simply that "it all depends."
It should also be acknowledged that like modern and premodern individuals, postmoderns are not all the same. If traditional social class distinctions have become more complex and difficult to interpret today than in
the past, they are, nevertheless, still relevant. At least metaphorically, there
are the postmodern proletarians who in one way or another maintain the
information highways versus the plutocrats who cruise on them . And
there also are those "lumpen" and outlaw inhabitants of cyberspace, forever seeking new thrills via pornography, fraudulent Web sites, or the creation of viruses, as well as the avant-garde technocrats always pushing tl1e
limits of global linkage. But piecemeal analyses based on the foregoing distinctions would be impractical here. Instead, for the sake of convenience,
the following discussion assumes an "average" postmodern individual.
And when considering how such individuals may respond to genocidal
events, the primary psychological factor involves empathy.
A large body of research indicates that empathy, a reflexive emotional
feeling of identification with the suffering of victims, is the main motivation for observers to respond sympathetically. Drawing on this research
evidence for his analysis of how people responded to tl1e major genocides
of the twentieth century, Ervin Staub concluded that two general conditions inhibit empatl1y. One is material scarcity, which drives people toward
preoccupation with their own personal needs and reduces their sense of
connection with others. This circumstance was the case in Weimar Germany, the former Soviet Union, and many other places. The other condition is an inner psychological state tl1at Staub describes as being associated
with a weak ego or poorly articulated self-concept. This condition is characteristic of people who have been traumatized during childhood by severe abuse, the chaotic deprivation occurring in war zones, or by family
breakups in bitter divorce conflicts. Such people tend to deal with anxiety
and stress by using paranoid defense mechanisms, blaming others for their
difficulties .
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There is no substantial evidence showing that the multiplicity characterizing postmoderns leads to paranoid defense mechanisms, or equates to
a weak ego, but there is enough similarity between these states and multiplicity to suggest parallel reactions to scarcity-induced stress. Moreover,
something like a "blaming the victim" reaction would certainly fit the
free-market orientation of postmodern culture. Illustrative examples
might include the defensive reactions of Bill Clinton to the Lewinsky scandal, or the way Bill Gates has blamed weak competitors for the government lawsuit against Microsoft.
Another explanation for why reflexive feelings of empathy may be repressed or ignored has been suggested by the social psychiatrist Robert
Lifton (1986). Based on his studies of the German physicians who performed atrocious acts in the Nazi death camps, he concluded that they
were able to remain indifferent to their victims through a process of"doubling." This process is defined as a form of dissociation whereby the individual adopts two or more alternative self-concepts. Thus, Lifton found
that the German doctors saw themselves, on the one hand, as sensitive humanitarians, and, on the other, as respectable objective scientists while
performing horrific experiments on helpless women and children. In a
subsequent study, Lifton and Erik Markusen found a similar but less intense form of doubling among American nuclear-warfare planners.
Insofar as doubling is a valid mechanism allowing people to accom modate themselves to genocidal activities, and since doubling appears to
be a variant of the general multiplicity, if not "schizoid consciousness," of
postmoderns, it is plausible to assume that postmoderns would probably
not find it very difficult to tolerate genocidal events . In short, it may well
be that the same adaptive qualities of a pluralistic self-concept that can
make for creativity, flexibility, and effective stress coping can also insulate
against empathy.
Prevalent culture trends expressed through language and imagery
have also been identified as a source of indifference to atrocious events.
Studies of the Nazi SS personnel and other organized perpetrators of extreme violence indicate that an abstract, "nonfeeling" language of euphemisms, acronyms, and metaphors allows people to distance themselves
or dissociate from the realities of human destruction intrinsic to their
work. There is a fairly direct parallel here to the semiotics typical of postmodern culture, in that much of contemporary language and imagery is
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manifestly "nonfeeling." One need consider only the rapid collage imagery, metaphors, and language of music videos, video games, computer
icons, passwords, PINs, and the trivialization of violence in films and TV.
Immersion in such a semiotic environment may not produce fullblown dissociation but is likely to facilitate a significant degree of indifference or desensitization toward genocidal events. And this condition
would be particularly relevant to situations in which victims lack the sign
qualities that can evoke empathy among observers. In a rudimentary way,
such desensitization may already be apparent from the way postmoderns
deal with the homeless people cluttering urban centers, either treating
them as invisible or dropping a handout without breaking stride .
A final issue concerns the difference between modern and postmodern morality noted earlier. Recall that in contrast to the modern ideal of
universal moral values, postmodern values were described as contextdependent possibilities. Postmoderns, therefore, are not likely to show
knee-jerk moral responses to genocidal events, but to reflect on them in a
more complex, exploratory fashion. The contrast can be seen clearly in the
ways that moral issues are treated in modern as compared with postmodern media dramas. Such postmodern productions as Pulp Fiction and The
Sopranos deliberately confound modern moral values by having attractive
characters placed in ambiguous, amoral situations such that no simplistic
moral principles can be applied to their behavior. The modern films made
by John Ford and John Wayne impose a straightforward, "predigested"
morality on viewers, whereas the moral issues in films made by Quentin
Tarentino are confabulated. The former succeeded as popular entertainment because they gave assurances of moral certainties; the latter succeed
today because they emphasize moral ambiguities. A relevant citation-life
imitating art?-might be seen in the way the 0. J. Simpson murder trial
became a major media entertainment.
Other aspects of postmodern culture also promote complex, ambiguous moral perspectives. During the Gulf War, television often presented
near-simultaneous reports from both sides of the conflict, and viewers
could be led to cheer for the bombers while almost at the same time experiencing sympathy for the bombees. Postmodernism even acknowledges
the logic of terrorism: when anyone can become a victim, governments are
shown to be impotent; when terror attacks generate wide media coverage,
they become a public relations tactic; and when everyone can be defined as
a direct or indirect participant in the world system, there are no innocent
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bystanders. This statement is not to suggest that the logic of terrorism is
accepted as legitimate. What is accepted, however, is that as soon as yesterday's terrorists (for example, the PLO or the IRA) agree to renounce violence, they become legitimate participants in the world system.
In general, therefore, given the qualities of multiplicity associated
with postmodern personality development, and the increasing climate of
moral ambiguity characterizing postmodern culture, the only plausible estimate that can be made of how postmodern individuals would respond to
genocidal events is that it will be tentative, complex, and multifaceted.
That is, in situations where the events are not persistently presented in the
media, and where victims do not evoke a significant level of empathy in
observers, the response will tend toward indifference or apathy. This outcome appears to be the case with current genocidal conflicts in subSaharan Africa. The contrary is indicated by reactions to the conflict in
Kosovo, where conditions finally provoked an affirmative public response,
but one that was carefully programmed to minimize involvement. The operative principle of postmodern public and government responses to the
forces responsible for genocidal events may sum up to something like this:
"If you can't wait them out, talk them out, or buy them out, then blow
them up, but only if the cost-benefit ratio is very favorable."

Conclusion
Although most predictions of the future notoriously turn out to be
wrong, given the conclusions presented here, that might be a good thing.
However, all of the relevant cultural factors-the language, imagery, and
climate of moral ambiguity-suggest that a growing process of desensitization is at work. And all of the relevant personality theory and research
suggest that the multiplicity characterizing postmoderns facilitates the
adoption of desensitizing stress-coping or defense mechanisms.
What this may mean for the future remains problematic . The pessimistic view is that in the short run, it portends a dark era in which a privileged postmodern minority will become smugly indifferent to an
increasing number of genocidal conflicts. But there is also a more optimistic long view, whereby in due time, the postmodern minority will find
the means, however slowly and tentatively, to save what can be saved while
encouraging the spread of a liberating, humanitarian multiplicity.
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Ways Out
There are no simple ways out from the likelihood that postmodern individuals will be relatively insensitive to genocidal events. However, this tendency might be substantially reduced through a combination of efforts in
the popular media, churches, and education systems to counteract indifference. An illustrative example would be the film Schindler's List that was
not only a popular success but also used in schools to convey knowledge of
the Holocaust and foster empathy toward its victims. Sympathetic attention to the plight of other genocide victims has also been stimulated by
celebrity musicians who have organized special concerts for this purpose.
Finally, the effects of government policies should not be underestimated.
If governments in Western Europe and North America committed themselves to respond quickly to genocidal conflicts by deploying effective relief and military forces, then postmodern individuals might be encouraged
to participate or offer significant support.
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